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Abstract
“The Road to Self-Support: Vocational Rehabilitation and the Associational State, 19171945” traces the origins and development of the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation (CVR)
program from its inception in 1920 until the conclusion of the Second World War. Rapid
industrialization and the fallout of the First World War handed the nation a large amount of
people with disabilities, which drew on already strained state and local welfare relief. The project
examines the interwar period and finds it to be a battleground of differing governing strategies
over how best to solve America’s growing level of disabled workers. The project argues that
policymakers settled on a federal-state cooperative system where daily administration was
handled by state officials with only nominal federal oversight. State agencies proved ill-equipped
to handle the volume of applicants and thus turned to non-state actors (private organizations and
business leaders) to aid in the execution of their duties. As the New Deal order entrenched itself
in American society, this associational mode of governance became the target of newlyempowered federal agencies. These agencies, this project argues, emerged as the administrative
wing of the federal government and wielded authority independent of Congress. Though World
War II provided the catalyst necessary for a partial resurrection of the associational state, the
CVR program never eliminated it from practice. Clients routinely received placement in private
industries for training and employment.
This dissertation is broken up into four chapters. Chapter 1 explores the origins of the
CVR program and the debates over how to best implement such a policy played out in Congress
and private organizations. Chapter 2 focuses on the role of the National Rehabilitation
Association (NRA) as an industry organization and how it capitalized on the associational
structure of the CVR program and evolved into an authoritative body independent of the existing
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federal agency. Chapter 3 investigates the change in the federal policy as part of the New Deal
order and how these changes eroded the power of the NRA and other private groups in favor of
direct state control. Chapter 4 examines the social impact of the CVR program and how
associationalism played a significant role in the implementation of policy with respect toward
white women and African Americans.

iv

Introduction
“Bolshevism!” So shouted Illinois Republican Senator Lawrence Sherman in response to
Senator Hoke Smith’s (D-GA) proposed legislation for extending the Soldiers’ Vocational
Rehabilitation Act to America’s civilian population. Similar exclamations echoed from the
House of Representatives, notably from Robert Moore (D-VA), who suggested such a measure
was a slippery slope to socialism, noting Congress could then do “almost anything that would
appeal to human sympathy.” Congress had spent the better part of the summer and autumn of
1919 debating the bill. Introduced into the House and the Senate by Representative Simeon D.
Fess (R-OH) and Senator Smith, respectively, the bill received a lukewarm welcome. Critics
argued that taking care of America’s disabled population was not within the orbit of federal
authority. It was a state matter. Sherman and Moore were but two vocal opponents who cited a
violation of federalism at best, or a state-sanctioned descent into socialism at worst.1
In response, Representative Horace M. Towner rose to his feet and appealed passionately
for his colleagues to support the Smith-Fess bill. The Iowa Republican urged his fellow
congressmen to approve the measure, despite the calls of federalism from members like Moore
or criticisms of Bolshevism from senators like Sherman. Towner argued that one of the primary
reasons for the “Bolshevist talk” was “because we have not done our duty to the legitimate
interests of labor in this country.” At the root of such a radical ideology, Towner reasoned, was
the general apathy of Congress toward the common laborer; once workers were of no use to
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Robert Moore, Speech on the House Floor, Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 7, October 11, 1919 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 6745; Horace Mann Towner, Speech on the House Floor, Ibid., 6745.
Reuben Cahn, “Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 32, no. 6 (December 1924),
667.
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industrial capitalism, they were discarded as “human junk.”2 It was this apathy that progressive
policymakers, such as Towner, sought to remedy. If Congress extended vocational rehabilitation
services to civilians, he concluded, it would serve as “the very best cure for Bolshevism that
could be suggested…and, in my judgement, the only cure.”3
The debate focused on the extension of vocational rehabilitation services to America’s
civilian population who were “injured in industry or otherwise.” The United States had followed
several European nations in 1918 and adopted a vocational rehabilitation program for returning
veterans of the First World War. Many of these servicemen came home with newly acquired
disabilities, ranging from loss of limbs to sensory deprivation, and required some level of
reeducation back into civilian work life. Proponents argued rehabilitation for veterans
demonstrated the “ability of science and the wonders of a specialized reeducation,” which could
“correct the otherwise serious handicaps” that resulted from the war. Sympathetic policymakers
saw the merits of extending these programs to the multitudes of civilians who, through no fault
of their own, had acquired similar disabilities to those of America’s veteran population.4
Vocational rehabilitation, according to its sponsors, was a program rightly split between
the federal government and the states. Congress appropriated federal money to the states in the
form of grants-in-aid, a system utilized by the national government since the Civil War era.
States, in turn, provided matching funds to the federal grant. The relationship split on a 50-50
basis, with any remaining money returned to the federal treasury at the end of the fiscal year.
Rehabilitation workers screened applicants for physical and cognitive ability, while taking

“The Evolution of a National System of Vocational Reeducation for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors,” Vocational
Education Bulletin No. 15, Vocational Rehabilitation Series No. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1918), 76.
3
Horace Towner, Speech on the House Floor, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, 6745.
4
Beth Linker, War’s Waste: Rehabilitation in World War I America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011),
4; “The Evolution of a National System of Vocational Reeducation for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors,” 76-77.
2
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applicants’ personal choices into account, in order to place them into training programs that
ideally resulted in permanent job placement. The goal was for men to “become wage-earning,
productive members of society” once again, rather than remaining on public or private welfare
rolls or burdening families. The Federal Board for Vocational Education (FBVE) explained the
process and purpose of rehabilitation for Americans as “taking a person who, through accident or
disease, has practically lost his earning capacity, and restoring him to an earning power.” The
state made an investment into the well-being of its disabled citizens; these people, in theory,
repaid the state in tax revenue with their newfound careers. Congress passed the Smith-Fess Act,
with support from southern Democrats and midwestern Republicans, President Woodrow
Wilson’s signature, in the late spring of 1920 established the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation
(CVR) program in the United States.5
Fifteen years later, the nation was in the grips of a new panic. The Great Depression had
gutted the American economy, leaving several million people out of work and destitute.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acting on one of his campaign promises, submitted his plan for
social security to Congress. On April 13, 1935, Representative Thomas B. Fletcher (D-OH)
called upon the House to amend the Economic Security bill to make vocational rehabilitation
services permanent. Fletcher lamented that the successful CVR program required congressional
reauthorization every two years. He wished for its inclusion in the Economic Security bill to
make the program a permanent fixture within the federal budget.6

5

Ninth Annual Report to Congress of the Federal Board for Vocational Education (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1925), 43.
6
Thomas B. Fletcher, Speech on the House Floor, April 13, 1935, Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Session,
vol. 79, part 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1935), 5599-5600; “Congress Faces a Heavy
Program,” The New York Times (January 2, 1935).
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Fletcher noted the popularity of rehabilitation among the several states. By 1935, he
explained how “forty-five states and the District of Columbia” were now “engaged in
vocationally rehabilitating their disabled citizens.” The Ohio Democrat elaborated on the
economics of rehabilitation. It was, he claimed, far cheaper for the state and national government
to retrain and secure job placement for Americans with disabilities than it was to house them
indefinitely within institutions. Restore the physically disabled to employment, and within a
year, their new earning capacity will “exceed the total cost of…rehabilitation.” For Fletcher, it
made more economic sense to make vocational rehabilitation a lasting feature of the federal
bureaucracy. Ohio found a need for maintenance funds for trainees who “were not eligible for
worker’s compensation” and for those who required “complete hospitalization.” Title V of the
Social Security Act made the CVR program eternal, resulting in a “New Deal” for vocational
rehabilitation. Social Security liberalized funding restrictions on maintenance and
hospitalization. Passage of the bill on August 14, 1935, led Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins to
proclaim it as “a milestone in our progress toward a better ordered society.”7
By the eve of World War II, the United States had moved beyond the immediate peril of
a Bolshevik revolution and into the recovery stage from the Great Depression. Indeed, references
to the imminent communist invasion had filled the Congressional Record in the autumn of 1919,
yet by the mid- and late-1930s, congressional focus shifted toward economic relief and recovery.
The “Red Scare,” seemingly, had subsided. Ultimately, Horace Towner was right. The expansion
of vocational rehabilitation services to the civilian population had not, contrary to what
Representative Moore had argued, led America on the “slippery slope toward socialism.”
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Ibid., 5599-5600; Sixth Annual Report to Congress of the Federal Board of Vocational Education (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1922), 377; “Social Security Bill is Signed,” The New York Times (August 15,
1935), 1; “How Security Bill Aids Aged and Idle,” The New York Times (August 15, 1935), 4; Frances Perkins,
“Social Security: The Foundation,” New York Times (August 18, 1935), SM1.
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Moreover, the program appeared to be popular as the majority of the states adopted it. The FBVE
reported to Congress that, in 1935, there were 18,228 applications pending, 9,878 people with
disabilities enrolled in rehabilitation programs around the nation, and 4,729 individuals returned
to the active workforce at a cost of $2,248,000. These numbers reflected the policy’s target
population of younger people who still retained a significant working life expectancy.8
Vocational rehabilitation did not become a welfare program with monetary handouts as
some policymakers, such as Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) or William King (D-NV) feared. On
the contrary, the Smith-Fess Act applied to Americans with physical disabilities, which, as
Fletcher noted, was a relatively miniscule amount of people. He found that those who qualified
for vocational rehabilitation services amounted to 1 out of every 5,000 Americans. Refining his
estimation further to the “disabled population,” he posited that ratio was even more limited.
According to Fletcher’s estimation, the country could see an average annual increase of 25,000
Americans with disabilities who qualified for vocational rehabilitation.9
Fletcher highlighted a nagging problem in the country, namely the continuing occurrence
of industrial accidents that drove the increasing need for programs like vocational rehabilitation.
Heavy industries, such as steel production, mining, and the railroad, contributed to significant
accident rates resulting in thousands of fatalities and permanent disabilities each year. In 1915,
Frederick L. Hoffman, of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, reported that nearly 2,000,000
accidents occurred each year within American industries. Of that figure, Hoffman estimated, a
full half were “safely chargeable against the industries” and “were the direct result of the

Reuben D. Cahn, “Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 32, no. 6 (December
1924), 667; “Vocational Rehabilitation Caseload and Expenditures, 1921-1999,” Historical Statistics of the United
States, Series Bf717-721; Statistical History: Federal-State Program of Vocational Rehabilitation, 1920-1969
(Washington, DC: Division of Statistics and Studies, 1970), 12-13.
9
Fletcher, House Speech, April 13, 1935, Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 79, part 5, 5599.
8
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occupational risk.” The mortality rate, Hoffman observed, averaged at just over 82,000 per year.
The FBVE corroborated these statistics in 1922, and found that a similar number of accidents
resulted in nearly 40,000 permanent disabilities each year. With numbers climbing in such a
manner, it came as no surprise that William Bankhead estimated there were nearly 300,000
Americans with disabilities who could benefit from rehabilitation services in 1919. By World
War II, the federal Department of Education found in a national survey that 4,000,000
Americans possessed “some degree [of] permanent disability,” which was approximately 3% of
the population. This federal survey used a broader definition of disability and included higher
functioning intellectual disabilities among those feasible for rehabilitation services.10
Congress placed the states in charge of daily administration of the CVR program. The use
of the grant-in-aid system allowed for a national program with local autonomy. The illusion of
federalism appeared to hold firm. In 1919, Dr. Charles Prosser, the director of the FBVE,
explained that the federal government was “vitally interested in the success of industrial
rehabilitation” because rehabilitation for people injured in industry was “essential to the national
welfare.” Prosser noted, however, that state and local agencies were better equipped to seek out
potential clients; the federal government, therefore, acted solely in an advisory capacity.11

Frederick L. Hoffman, “Industrial Accident Statistics,” Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 157
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915), 5-7, 12; Sixth Annual Report to Congress of the Federal
Board for Vocational Education (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922), 345-346; William
Bankhead, Speech on the House Floor, June 25, 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58,
part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 1758. See Carl Hookstadt, “Comparison of
Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the United States and Canada Up to January 1, 1920,” Bulletin of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 275 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920); “Restoring the
Physically Handicapped to Useful Employment: Vocational Rehabilitation, 1940” (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of
Education, 1940), 1-2. See Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
11
Fourth Annual Report to Congress of the Federal Board for Vocational Education (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1920), 526.
10
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This arrangement appeared successful throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s. The
FBVE worked closely with the state rehabilitation divisions and other adjunct organizations,
such as the Junior League, the American Legion, Kiwanis, Rotary, and Lion’s Clubs, as well as
private, non-state actors like prominent, local businessmen. Taken in the aggregate, the CVR
program embodied modes of associational governance that permeated the early decades of the
twentieth century. Federal policies were easier to implement when administered by local public
and private agencies and institutions when both public officials and the private sector “coalesced
around narrowly-drawn public policies.”12
Associationalism, typically, was a trait of the Republican Party in the early twentieth
century. Public officials, such as Gifford Pinchot and Herbert Hoover, utilized this strategy for
more-effective governance under the Republican administrations of the era. These officials saw
cooperation with the private sector as an easier way to get federal policies implemented.
Associationalism, however, was not monopolized by the Republican Party; the Democratic
Party, especially in the South, utilized similar practices. Southern progressivism, as historian
Dewey Grantham notes, was not a “centralized and coordinated effort on the part of politicians,”
relying, instead, on aid from private philanthropists. Southern states used this strategy to enact
social and economic reform while expanding the “new regulatory powers of the state.” The
adoption of associationalism, as a governing tactic, defied the party politics of the
Republican/Democrat dichotomy.13
By the mid-1930s, governing strategy had shifted significantly toward consolidation. The
Great Depression called into question Republican economic policies and relaxed state regulation.
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Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 139.
13
Ibid., 139; Dewey Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1983), xvi, 111.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal propelled the federal government into a massive
spending spree on internal improvements and transformed the political landscape. Federal
agencies took the lead in the dispersal of federal funds. The FBVE was no different. John A.
Kratz, director of the Federal Board’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, charged the states
to separate from any private organization or non-state actor in participating or carrying out
rehabilitation work. The program had become too politicized and daily operations were
administered by non-state actors. Rehabilitation was a government program that was to be
carried out by government workers. The national government began consolidating its hold on
public money and centralizing its power over the states’ ability to conduct associational
governance.14
This dissertation examines this change of governance from associationalism toward the
New Deal state. It uses the CVR program as a lens to explore the changing politics of national
social welfare policy and traces the evolution of the administrative state. During the 1920s and
early 1930s, rehabilitation operated as part of the associational state. Federal administrators
worked with state-appointed officials and private organizations in order to retrain Americans
with disabilities and return them to the workforce. This scheme utilized the grant-in-aid as a
policy tool to produce a nationwide rehabilitation program with the goal of restoring people with
disabilities back to “remunerative employment.” Federal authorities encouraged associational
administration of the CVR program. State-level officials received help from local businessmen
and private organizations in referrals, interviews, development of rehabilitation plans, and even
training programs.

“Survey of Vocational Rehabilitation Program: State of Tennessee,” (Washington, DC: Office of Education,
Department of the Interior, 1939), 49-50.
14
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By the late 1930s, however, the national government consolidated its power and
centralized its authority within its own agencies. Caught up in the bureaucratic crackdown, the
CVR program underwent a significant administrative transformation. The FBVE took full
control and dictated vocational policy to the states, which were no longer to “contract out” their
rehabilitation work. In the wake of the New Deal order, state-sponsored programs were to be
carried out by state-employed officials. The price for federal grants, it appeared, was an increase
in federal control. The CVR, therefore, became a prime example of coercive federalism.
Moreover, the project explores the changing conception of disability within American
culture. The CVR program, when first developed, focused on people with physical disabilities,
such as loss of limbs or sensory deprivation. Those Americans with intellectual disabilities, such
as Down Syndrome or manic disorders, were often overlooked as being incapable of
comprehending training. That understanding, however, evolved. By 1945, Congress extended
vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with intellectual disabilities. The BardenLaFollette Act, passed in 1943, expanded services to these Americans for the first time. Between
1920 and 1945, the cultural conception of disability changed significantly; the need for labor
during the war, in part, fueled the push for inclusion of America’s intellectually disabled
population.
The project, therefore, makes four arguments. First, this dissertation examines the
political and legal origins of the CVR program in the years following the end of World War I.
Since a national system of vocational rehabilitation placed the federal government in control, it
required lawmakers to rethink the contours of federalism to avoid accusations of socialism or
worse, Bolshevism. Supporters of a national rehabilitation program did not frame it in terms of
welfare; rather, policymakers saw rehabilitation in terms of a national investment. The rising
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level of disabled Americans reflected what contemporaries termed a “human conservation
problem,” where too many people were being sidelined from the workforce and relying on state
and local welfare. This issue was one that politicians and other social reformers argued
vocational rehabilitation could effectively fix.15
In order to maintain the illusion of autonomy, their solution was to utilize the federal
grant-in-aid: a scheme which allowed the states to voluntarily sign-on with the national
government in a joint policy instrument. The idea adhered to the deference to state authority
championed by the Republican Party. States developed their own programs and oversaw their
daily administration; the FBVE served in a mainly advisory capacity.16 The New Deal, spurred
by the Democratic Party’s response to the Great Depression, significantly altered the
administrative agreement between the states and the national government. The FBVE took on a
more direct managerial style. By the eve of World War II, the FBVE dictated policy and micromanaged all state programs. Although federalism mattered in appearance, the CVR program
allowed for politicians and lawmakers to incrementally extend the administrative state into new
areas.
The second argument the dissertation puts forth examines associationalism as a
governing strategy. It explores this theme through the National Rehabilitation Association
(NRA). Founded in 1925, the NRA became the authoritative body for vocational rehabilitation

“Vocational Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped,” Vocational Education Bulletin No. 190, Vocational
Rehabilitation Series No. 25 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1936), v.
16
Kimberly Johnson, Governing the American State: Congress and the First New Federalism, 1877-1929
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); "Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments." Survey of
Current Business 96, no. 8 (2016): EH; Robert Jay Dilger, Federal Grants-in-aid: An Historical Perspective on
Contemporary Issues (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2009); Brian Knight, “Endogenous Federal Grants and
Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program,” The
American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 1 (2002): 71-92; Science as Service Establishing and Reformulating
American Land-Grant Universities, 1865–1930, ed. by Alan Marcus (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
2015).
15
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officials across the country. Although the NRA was a professional organization designed to unite
the field, it quickly came to dominate the national conversation on the administration of
vocational rehabilitation and served as the decision-making entity. The general membership of
the NRA comprised numerous rehabilitation professionals. The organization claimed it was a
group independent of any government control; however, its executive committee rounded itself
out with several state-level rehabilitation directors and members of the FBVE. Decisions
rendered by the NRA had the power of regulatory policy. The organization represented the
associational governance typical of the era: the state cooperating with private entities to
faithfully execute public policy.
The associational state was a complex system of cooperation between private and public
organizations and institutions to carry-out public policy. When it came to the execution of the
CVR program, associationalism operated in multiple ways. The NRA demonstrated a top-down
relationship between the FBVE and the states. Between 1925 and 1938, the NRA worked to
secure funding measures, developed professional qualifications for rehabilitation workers, and
even operated as a mediator between disagreeing parties. The private sector represented the
bottom-up approach to associational governance. It aided rehabilitation workers in their pursuit
to administer rehabilitation services. Thus, the CVR program appreciated wide community
support, but it spoke to a broader practice of including private entities in the administration of
public policy.
Thirdly, as the New Deal expanded administrative capacities, federal agencies moved to
consolidate their power and hold over grant-in-aid programs. Congress adopted new legislative
initiatives which placed significant authority in federal agencies. This was an attempt on
Congress to reign in any corrupt practices in order to boost public confidence and standardize
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management as evidenced by the passage of the Social Security Act (SSA). In 1939, Congress
reorganized much of the federal bureaucracy into the Federal Security Agency (FSA) in order to
effect such change. Associationalism eroded as a result of the New Deal order’s bureaucratic
reconfiguration.
Indeed, the NRA’s position of power evaporated in the heat of the New Deal state. While
the NRA had served as the unofficial source of authority, the New Deal’s restructuring of the
administrative state and subsequent erosion of cooperative federalism placed the federal
government and its agencies in complete control of the vocational rehabilitation program. The
NRA remained the primary organization within the “rehabilitation movement,” acting as industry
leader and providing resources to its members. By 1938, the FBVE directed states to eliminate
any non-state actors from performing rehabilitation work. These adjuncts were still permitted to
refer applicants to the state, but it would be state-employed counselors who performed the
follow-up work.
Prior to the New Deal’s retooling of the national state, state rehabilitation programs had
partnered with third-party vendors and private organizations in order to carryout rehabilitation
work. Associational governance was a choice made by several state programs due to the limited
staff and the influx of applicants in the 1920s. Following the New Deal’s implementation, the
grant-in-aid programs, became more federalized in the years leading up to World War II. In a
series of audits, the FBVE discovered some states had misappropriated federal funds. The U.S.
Senate had undertaken a series of investigations, beginning in 1936, with the goal of rooting out
corruption in the government. In a radical change of policy, administrative agencies, like the
FBVE, micromanaged state programs. Individual states were required to gain approval from the
FBVE for nearly all decisions made about their programs. With respect to vocational
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rehabilitation, associational governance vanished; the New Deal laid the groundwork for a much
more centralized administrative state, one where private groups or citizens, were pushed out of
the daily operations of public policy.
Finally, the CVR program facilitated the return of thousands of Americans with
disabilities to the workforce. Policymakers, like Hoke Smith and Simeon Fess, visualized the
white male as the primary and ideal client to apply for and receive services from the state. Since
the Smith-Fess Act possessed no exclusionary language, the program had an unintended
egalitarian effect on the disabled population, resulting in a democratizing side effect. Beginning
in 1920, white women and African Americans received training from the vocational
rehabilitation program, enabling these groups to pursue and claim equal rights. By 1945, both
demographics composed a significant percentage of vocational rehabilitation’s caseload. World
War II placed a strain on labor in the war industries and, beginning in 1943, the CVR program
extended services to those with intellectual disabilities, which facilitated a new labor source.
These new clients, many who were institutionalized, claimed economic and political citizenship
for the first time in their lives.
They did not, however, do this alone. The use of an associational governing strategy
allowed for the state to cooperate with local groups and actors on the ground in order to reach
and rehabilitate these minority groups. Prior to the Second World War, states possessed limited
rehabilitation staff; several states relied on associational cooperation from the private sector to
fully execute public policy. In the 1920s, white men found aid from private clubs and
organizations such as the local Lion’s Club or Kiwanis International. African Americans
routinely depended on the Junior League to secure rehabilitation services. White women,
especially those in rural areas where a state rehabilitation office had not been established, relied
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on local businessmen for similar services. The existence of the associational state effectively
extended the reach of the vocational rehabilitation program to include groups that were not
originally envisioned, but not legally proscribed, in its framework.
Historiography
Vocational rehabilitation in the interwar period has yet to find its historian. “The Road to
Self-Support” seizes upon this neglected piece of American history. It builds off of historian
Beth Linker’s War’s Waste: Rehabilitation in World War I America, which examines the debate
over and development of vocational rehabilitation for veterans. In her final analysis, Linker lays
the foundation for the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act, but stops short of exploring it in
full detail. Likewise, “The Road to Self-Support” provides a foundation for the emerging
disability civil rights movement. Normally considered part of the overall Civil Rights Movement
of the 1960s, historian Audra Jennings persuasively moves it back to the postwar period. In her
recent work, Out of the Horrors of War: Disability Politics in World War II America, she finds
the origins of the deinstitutionalization movement, the crux of the disability civil rights
movement, to be a product of the rise and success of civilian vocational rehabilitation. Therefore,
this dissertation fills the gap in the historical scholarship and is framed by these two scholars.17
As a focused study of one specific policy area and its social, and economic impact, this
study contributes to several areas of scholarship. First, the history of the American state has a
vast body of literature associated with it and “The Road to Self-Support” builds upon the already
impressive reserve. Central to this dissertation is an examination of state power and how

Linker, War’s Waste; Audra Jennings, Out of the Horrors of War: Disability Politics in World War II America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Carl Obermann wrote one of the first histories of vocational
rehabilitation in 1965. His research covered only the high political development of vocational rehabilitation and
overlooked the social and cultural aspects of the program. See Carl Obermann, A History of Vocational
Rehabilitation in America (Minneapolis: T.S. Publishers, 1965).
17
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different actors used that power. Stephen Skowronek argues that Americans long held a disdain
toward the state and that modern statecraft was the product of institutional changes. He
concludes that it was no longer a question of if an administrative state would emerge, the
question was who would control it. In Skowronek’s argument, the executive branch stepped into
the spotlight. On the contrary, as Kimberly Johnson concludes, the executive branch lacked “the
strength…to enact and implement sweeping policy changes, or to create fully developed and
effective bureaucratic structures.” Congress, therefore, moved back into the forefront of
American policymaking and created new institutions and agencies to carry-out its new policy
agenda.18
Scholars in recent years have examined the associational state and its impact on public
policy. Historian Brian Balogh argues that the administration of federal policy was more
successful when coupled with “the use of interest groups rather than the state” in response to a
national crisis. His analysis finds that the associational state survived the New Deal’s
restructuring of state power and authority. It eroded the “impermeable boundary between state
and society,” which facilitated the inclusion of the private sector in executing national policy.19
More recently, historians Brent Cebul and Mason Williams have examined the
relationship of the associational state and the New Deal order. Their analysis places it within
terms of federalism. These two scholars echo Balogh’s findings, but introduce a “politics of
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partnership,” which contributed to the emergence of new actors during the New Deal. Unlike
Balogh, they include the actions of state governments as part of the associational framework.
Much of the New Deal, according to Cebul and Williams, hinged on regionalism and history.
Municipalities in the north, where Progressive Era movements thrived, welcomed the New Deal
state’s resources and were more open to “incorporate redistributive and regulatory features of the
New Deal state” while the rural South, where racial segregation was the norm, rebuffed many of
these features. New Deal programs, paradoxically, were easier to administer in the South due to
the lack of organized labor and a broad, egalitarian polity.20
“The Road to Self-Support” diverges from these scholars in one very significant way.
The associational state, according to Balogh, Cebul, and Williams, appeared to survive the New
Deal order’s emergence. This dissertation shows otherwise: In vocational rehabilitation,
associational techniques of governing were cast aside. The FBVE consolidated its power,
beginning around 1938, and effectively pushed the private sector out of the daily administration
of the CVR program. State governments were now beholden to federal authority. It follows the
trajectory of the history of education where, as historian Tracy Steffes suggests, educational
policy tended to be dictated by local schoolboards; however, it facilitated the “rationale and
mechanism to extend state oversight and public policies” over areas where state control,
traditionally, did not have authority. This project, therefore, provides a declension narrative of
associational state authority.21
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“The Road to Self-Support” joins this scholarship and offers a new perspective on the
state’s antagonism towards labor and its role as facilitator of economic growth. Though it
typically sided with big business, the state, this dissertation shows, also worked on behalf of
labor, especially workers with disabilities. Scholars such as Melvyn Dubofsky and William
Forbath focused their attention on the relationship between the state and the labor movement in
the early twentieth century. This direction of “bringing the state back in” examined “the
persistent dominance of anti-labor law and government subsidization of finance and
manufacturing,” in addition to the feeble-nature of organized labor.22 As Nelson Lichtenstein
argues, governmental regulations of private capitalists were required and social problems such as
poverty, inequality, and even disability could be solved by actions of the state.23
Currently, there is a very large body of scholarship on the welfare state and “The Road to
Self-Support” continues to build on that foundation. As the administrative state continued to
evolve during the interwar years, the working class began to seek new benefits from the
emerging welfare state. Traditional narratives of the welfare state hold the New Deal to be the
origin of American social relief legislation on a national scale; however, historians have recently
discredited this assessment. These scholars, such as Michael Katz, Christopher Howard, and
Jacob Hacker, note a split in the welfare state. As Katz observes, welfare in America has always
been a mixed economy, one that was bifurcated along public-private lines. Other scholars have
since elaborated on this perspective. Rather than a series of relief programs that handed funds
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directly to the American people, Howard and Hacker find the welfare state “hidden” behind a
veil of tax-law revisions and other “fringe benefits” that constituted the emerging welfare state.24
More recent research has concluded that the welfare state was inherent to the American
political system since the inception of the Constitution. Michelle Dauber argues that disasters
motivated the federal government to provide relief after floods, droughts, and social unrest, as in
the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. By the early twentieth century, congressional welfare programs
were met with resistance from the southern bloc. Dauber notes southern adherence to states’
rights placed national welfare programs in a precarious position. Her analysis is consistent with
Ira Katznelson’s conclusions about what he calls the “Southern Cage” and how the South
retarded the growth and development of the modern welfare state.25
“The Road to Self-Support” situates itself between these bodies of literature. Dauber and
Katznelson are only the newest scholars to find southern opposition to the establishment of social
welfare policies. Several other historians have made similar conclusions. These scholars find the
South, as a region, has continuously kept widespread reform measures from taking root on the
national level. As V.O. Key observed, the one-party dominance of the Democratic Party made
the hopes of Progressive reform appear no more than a pipe dream. Elna Green argues southern
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reform efforts met with the remnant of the elite class of the old order, which vied for “public
support against the charity organizers and the Confederate welfare advocates, both of whom held
positions of formidable strength.”26
In addition to the shift in methodological models, popular foci in disability historiography
concern policy and the Disability Civil Rights Movement. In terms of policy, scholars tend to
focus on the negative aspects of disability; therefore, scholarship on eugenics and other
detrimental medical practices, such as the lobotomy, have long dominated historians’ minds.27
More recent research has focused on how the social construction of disability crossed paths with
local laws. Known as the “ugly laws,” these ordinances made being disabled in public and
begging for alms a crime.28 Furthermore, historians have also examined the rise of the Disability
Civil Rights Movement and deinstitutionalization movement.29 Though vocational rehabilitation
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was born out of the era of eugenics and the “useless” or “defective” labels for people with
disabilities, the program served as a catalyst for claims of civil rights.
“The Road to Self-Support” rejects the premise that workers with disabilities were
marginalized by American society. Vocational rehabilitation facilitated the restoration of a
client’s economic potential, but more importantly, it restored their social standing as breadwinner
and community leader. Cultural understandings of disability held that people with disabilities
could not be leaders or contribute to economic productivity. Scholarship on political leaders and
famous individuals have revealed the extraordinary lengths these figures went to conceal their
disability or to downplay it.30 Moreover, people with disabilities had a much harder time
convincing their “normal” peers in the workplace that they could perform just as adequately
under the same conditions. At the height of industrialization, physical disabilities were viewed as
honorable; however, by the early twentieth century, people with disabilities were increasingly
marginalized. Historian John Williams-Searle traces this transformation within American labor
history. He concludes that as capitalism permeated society, corporate giants did not feel the
benefits outweighed the risks of employing people with disabilities. Possessing a disability in
industry held a mark of experience in the late nineteenth century, but as time moved forward and
capitalism ran up against unionization, companies were quick to remove permanently disabled
workers.31
Chapter Overview

Hugh Gallagher, FDR’s Splendid Deception (Arlington, VA: Vandamere, 1994); Kim Nielsen, The Radical Lives
of Helen Keller (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
31
John Williams-Searle, “Cold Charity: Manhood, Brotherhood, and the Transformation of Disability, 1870-1900,”
in Paul Longmore and Lauri Umansky, The New Disability History: An American Perspective (New York: New
York University Press, 2001): 157-186. See Sarah Rose, “Labor Historians and the Challenge of Disability,” Labor
2 (2005): 27-54; Ruth O’Brien, Cripple Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
30

20

“The Road to Self-Support” explores the origins and administration of the civilian
vocational rehabilitation program from its inception in 1920 until roughly 1945. The primary
focus of the project is on the political and associational development of the Federal Board for
Vocational Education and the establishment of the National Rehabilitation Association (NRA). It
uses the push for social and political reform and the expansion of the administrative state as a
framework to investigate the shift in national attitudes towards disability. Although the civilian
vocational rehabilitation program offered a new path for Americans with disabilities to pursue a
brighter economic future, it required American policymakers to rethink the duty of the national
state by shifting more toward relief programs for Americans with disabilities, while
simultaneously creating a murky administrative structure played out between governmental
actors and the privately operated NRA.
“The Road to Self-Support” is comprised of four chapters that trace the origins of the
vocational rehabilitation program as it made its way through Congress and how it was
implemented between 1917 and 1945. Chapter one explores the political origins of the policy.
Written by Senator Hoke Smith and Representative William Bankhead, the bill, which had
already been tabled by the House in the First Session of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, was
resurrected by Representative Simeon Fess in the Second Session. Discussion in the House and
Senate quickly shifted from sympathy for disabled workers toward a debate on federalism. Did
Congress have the authority to enact such a policy? Opponents to welfare programs held out on
voting for the vocational rehabilitation bill on the grounds of federalism and creating a nation of
dependents. Meanwhile, proponents framed rehabilitation as the way to get rid of dependents
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altogether. Vocational rehabilitation, thus, required lawmakers to rethink the nature of disability
as not being dependent upon others, while simultaneously reexamining the role of the state.32
Chapter two investigates the emergence of professional organizations within the
vocational rehabilitation program. Congress empowered the FBVE, under the leadership of
Charles Prosser, to administer the policy. The Smith-Fess Act stipulated the FBVE cooperate
with the individual state boards, created with the required accepting legislation. Beginning in
1925, leading rehabilitation officials met in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to discuss the benefits of a
professional organization. The resulting group, the National Rehabilitation Association, counted
among its ranks numerous directors of state programs as well as members of the FBVE.
Behaving similar to other professional organizations, such as the American Medical Association
or the American Bar Association, the NRA set professional standards and developed policies of
ethics for the industry. They used their position as a nongovernmental entity, composed of
governmental actors, to act as arbitrator for disputes.33
The power the NRA wielded in the second half of the 1920s and into the Depression
came to an end with the New Deal. Chapter three examines the transformation of the
administrative state from cooperation to consolidation of federal power. The Great Depression
represented a “crisis of confidence” between the American people and the national government.
The resulting New Deal did not simply seek to restore the economy, it also sought to restore
Americans’ faith in the federal government. This meant federal agencies conducted internal
audits and moved to directly oversee their departments. Vocational rehabilitation was not exempt
from the consolidation of the administrative state. The Federal Board, in 1938, opened audits
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into state programs over the use of funds in order to root out corruption. In the 1920s, the Federal
Board acted solely in an advisory capacity. By the late 1930s, however, it actively required state
rehabilitation officials to gain federal approval for personnel changes as well as monitoring state
appropriations management and expenditures. Whereas the NRA had been the unofficial
authoritative body before the Depression, in the wake of the New Deal, the FBVE took more
direct oversight of state-level programs.
Vocational rehabilitation was, at its core, a program meant to help get Americans with
disabilities back onto the “road to self-support” and into remunerative employment. Chapter
four, therefore, explores how associational governance impacted people with disabilities on the
ground. White men were the targeted population envisioned by the policy’s framers; however,
there was no language precluding other groups from seeking rehabilitation services. White
women and African Americans with disabilities sought these benefits as well. In the rural regions
of the South, minority groups relied on associational governance to secure access to the
rehabilitation program. While white men dealt with state officials directly, white women and
African American clientele were disproportionately left in the hands of cooperating non-state
actors. With the establishment of the New Deal order, state-employed rehabilitation counselors
took over the duties of these non-state actors. By the late 1930s, all clients within the CVR
program, regardless of race or gender, had their cases overseen by these rehabilitation
counselors. These men and women were responsible for the daily communications with their
assigned clients as well as fostering relationships with the private sector for job training and
placement. Associationalism may have lost its authoritative position on the ground, but it
remained a tool utilized by the state to fulfill its duties to its disabled citizens.
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As the nation came to terms with disability as a natural consequence of an industrializing
society, it came to rethink the potential of the crippled American as an “economic unit.”
Vocational rehabilitation became the solution settled upon by congressional reformers in an
effort to rebuild America’s workforce, but it was more than simply a solution to a nagging
problem. This dissertation tells the story of how a Republican policy meant to target a small
subset of the population actually helped lay the foundation for direct relief social welfare
policies. The CVR contributed to the growth of the federal welfare state in the mid-1960s.
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Chapter 1
“For This Purpose, Rehabilitation”:
The Political Origins of Vocational Rehabilitation, 1918-1923
“Let Alabama take care of her own cripples,” thundered Massachusetts Democratic
Representative David Walsh. Similarly, shouts of “Bolshevism!” were heard echoing from
Illinois’ Republican Senator Lawrence Sherman. Congress had spent the better part of the
summer and autumn of 1919 debating the passage of the Smith-Fess bill, a proposal which called
for the extension of the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Act to offer vocational rehabilitation services to
Americans crippled in industry. Introduced into the House and the Senate by Representative
Simeon D. Fess (R-OH) and Senator Hoke Smith (D-GA), respectively, the bill received a
lukewarm welcome. Walsh and Sherman were but two members of the vocal opposition to the
expansion of vocational rehabilitation to civilians citing a violation of federalism and sound
economics.1
Concerns about economic citizenship and dependency coupled with radically different
understandings of governmental power laid the foundation for a heated debate over the
expansion of the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Act. Congress split into two camps: one composed of
younger lawmakers, who saw crippling accidents as a national problem caused by the rapid
expansion of capitalism and the war industries; the other camp, made up of older politicians, who
opposed the measure as being what Joseph Cannon and Champ Clark referred to as “paternalistic
and visionary.” Representative James Good (R-IA) argued that the private economy was not
ready for such a program. On the contrary, Dr. Charles A. Prosser, Director of the Federal Board
for Vocational Education (FBVE), remarked that a system of vocational rehabilitation for
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civilians could be established within a similar framework of the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation
program, suggesting a smooth transition from the United States Army to the Industrial Army.
Private interests joined Prosser and other state directors of vocational education to offer their
support.2
Congress had a historical foundation with which to construct a more comprehensive
welfare state. Between 1890 and 1920, Progressive Era reformers successfully utilized the
powers of government to effect social and political change. Different groups pushed state power
into areas where congressional regulation and influence had once been rejected. An unexpected
ally to social reform emerged when the United States joined other western European nations to
combat Germany in the First World War. In the aftermath of the war, thousands of soldiers
returned home missing limbs and suffering from “soldier’s heart,” known today as posttraumatic stress disorder. This large influx of returning veterans placed new stresses on an
already strained veteran pension system. New alternatives needed to be investigated. Rather than
take on tens-of-thousands of new pensioners, Congress passed the Smith-Sears Act establishing a
system of vocational rehabilitation for veterans, which diverged from the tradition of simply
providing cash payments to veterans. Instead of paying this group to remain idle for the
remainder of their lives, the government chose to retrain them in a skill suitable to their disability
with the goal being to cultivate a culture of “successful cripples” among America’s veteran
population.3
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Though veterans received these services, beginning in 1918, America’s industrial army
did not receive such benefits. Eleanor Adler told of a young ranch hand crippled in a train
accident in the Vocational Summary who depended on localized charity and the care of family
because there was no public program to aid him. Between 1910 and 1925, several states adopted
a worker’s compensation system whereby a disabled laborer, injured on the job, could seek some
level of state-subsidized income. Available resources and time limited this economic safety net;
recipients received only a small percentage of their previous wage on a temporary basis. Carl
Hookstadt calculated that the average worker’s compensation claim between 1913 and 1916 was
$1,614, and the growing number of industrial accidents across the nation multiplied this average
claim to significant sums. Lucian Chaney noted the iron and steel industry employed 2,459,993
Americans between 1910 and 1918 with a 16% accident rate. Though this number may seem
small, the economic cost to the state was staggering: accidents resulting in temporary or
permanent disabilities translated to a spike in worker’s compensation claims, which totaled in the
millions.4
Mounting accident rates and the rise in worker’s compensation claims placed new strains
on the already stressed compensation system. Worker’s compensation was not designed to
handle this massive caseload. Echoing the dire financial situation of the veteran’s pension
system, worker’s compensation required a new solution for long-term survival. Reformers
encouraged policymakers to take a second look at vocational rehabilitation. If it helped ease
tensions for the veteran’s pension system, it could work similarly for civilian compensation
programs. This chapter explores the political and legal origins of the Civilian Vocational
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Rehabilitation (CVR) program and the realignment of the national state toward social reform.
Vocational rehabilitation, therefore, served as the solution that satisfied the growing concerns
about the increased number of industrial accidents, the economic drain caused by these
accidents, the social and cultural ramifications of losing “breadwinner” status, and the short-term
nature of worker’s compensation.
As the United States emerged from World War I and its geopolitical turmoil, it carried
with it the established and powerful industrial economy, along with the massive number of
industrial accidents that accompanied it. Social safety nets of workmen’s compensation and
higher education existed, but they proved increasingly unable to serve the ever-growing numbers
of physically handicapped laborers. Beginning in 1920, Congress took the lead and adopted a
grant-in-aid system with the states to assist them in retraining their disabled labor force and
returning them to the labor market.
Origins of Vocational Rehabilitation
The Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program did not simply appear in the United
States following the end of the war; it had a long and contentious legislative history behind its
adoption. Economist Robert Higgs has argued that when national crises arise, state power
expands to meet the crisis and find solutions to end it. Historian Brian Balogh augmented Higgs’
thesis holding that once the government does so, it does not relinquish such powers easily. In this
climate, Congress could adopt new social programs under the guise of prosecuting the war effort.
The resulting wave of legislation, termed the “rehabilitation movement,” provided new hope for
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veterans and civilians to return to remunerative employment and stake their claim as
breadwinner for their families.5
The horrors of industrialized warfare not only affected the United States, but other
nations as well. As Europe began the arduous process of picking up the pieces from the war, its
nations faced a significant social problem of what to do with the thousands of veterans who had
acquired a disability from the battlefield. The conflict redefined the roles of governments and
their relationships to their people. Unlike previous wars, governments began asking questions
about what to do with their returning veterans. Never before had national leaders taken such an
active role in the affairs of veterans. Moreover, nations began to examine the prospect of
providing for their civilians who were left in similar conditions to the soldiers of the recent
struggle.
European nations were adrift in the years immediately following the end of the First
World War. Many attempted to adapt to new medical and therapeutic strategies as ways of
dealing with the multitudes of disabled citizens of their countries. World War I provided the
national laboratory for these states to pursue alternative methods of restoration without having to
resort to conventional welfare tactics. Though different countries adopted the welfare state
apparatus in differing ways, each sought to elevate their citizens from poverty and dependence to
a status reminiscent to their prewar condition.6
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European nations found it easier to address the subject through public and private
endeavors by promoting a strong work ethic. As historian Deborah Cohen notes, nations like
Britain and Germany attempted to restore their disabled veterans to a prewar state, but each used
radically different means to accomplish this goal. While Britain pursued a policy of nonstate
intervention for its veterans, Germany utilized a policy of direct state assistance. The British
government remained outside the realm of direct assistance, instead letting private organizations
assist their disabled soldiers. Though European nations found mixed results in their endeavors of
rehabilitating their disabled citizens, they found the process much more economically feasible
than providing a life-long stipend for the thousands of people with disabilities. By using new
ideas and techniques of rehabilitation, these states were able to avoid further economic decline as
well as the social stigma associated with the label of disability.7
The United States struggled with similar social questions that plagued Europe in the years
following the 1918 armistice. Tens of thousands of American veterans returned home from the
trenches and battlefields of Europe with newly acquired disabilities, such as vision loss, hearing
loss, missing limbs, and a new psychological disorder colloquially referred to as “shell shock.”
Responding to this misfortune of war, the government created facilities for veterans to receive
care. Disabled soldiers fell under the jurisdiction of the Veteran’s Bureau and the services
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provided were little more than medical care. Breaking with tradition, however, the American
government instituted a new policy during World War I. Congress passed the War Risk
Insurance Act in 1916 to cover the costs and risks of international trade among belligerent
nations; however, Congress amended the law in 1917 and allowed for soldiers and sailors to buy
insurance covering the costs of disability, disfigurement, or death as a result of the war. Due to
the military draft, American families sometimes had to sacrifice their primary breadwinner. The
War Risk Insurance Act served as a potential solution to the very real possibility of losing the
family’s main source of income.8
Soldiers and sailors were not the only groups of Americans needing some form of
physical restoration. Similar to military personnel, America’s industrial army suffered from
industrial accidents which left them disabled, disfigured, or dead. Congress acted on the plights
of veterans and passed the Smith-Sears Act, or the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Act, in 1918.
Veterans could then obtain taxpayer-funded vocational training, which the Veteran’s Bureau
“strongly recommended.”9 Civilians, however, were left out of the rehabilitation efforts afforded
to America’s fighting men and women. In the meantime, America’s European peers likewise
took notice of how industrialization impacted their workforce and adopted rehabilitation
programs for their disabled civilian populations. Nations, such as Britain, France, Italy,
Germany, and others, sought to reeducate their disabled populations from being cast aside as
“human junk” and return them to being productive breadwinners. In terms of economic
reconstruction, the United States lagged significantly behind the war-torn nations of Europe.10
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In the United States, the basic idea for the reeducation of people with disabilities predated
World War I. Following the conclusion of the American Civil War, the South lay in shambles
with many thousands of its people both physically and mentally exhausted. Faced with limited
economic opportunities, many turned to the public workhouses and asylums that dotted the
region. For example, the Republican governor of Tennessee, William “Parson” Brownlow,
toured the Tennessee Lunatic Asylum in 1868 and noted how its population continued to
increase. The superintendent, Dr. W.P. Jones, alarmed Brownlow with the rate at which patients
were admitted to the institution. Jones explained to the governor that the asylum, and by
extension the State of Tennessee, took on a new charge every thirty-six hours, a rate that utterly
shocked Brownlow. The governor quickly lay blame on the recent “wicked rebellion” for the
spike in people seeking help in the asylum. Many of those were either destitute from the war,
disillusioned with the loss of the Confederacy, or a combination of the two.11
Veterans of the former Confederate States of America were, by law, barred from
participating in any pension benefits. Contrasting their experience with their Union counterparts,
Confederate veterans had to rely on local charities or, as the Tennessee State Lunatic Asylum
demonstrates, depended upon the individual states. Southern states spent much of their money
during Reconstruction on artificial limbs and then on veteran’s homes. Mississippi, for example,
spent nearly 20% of its annual budget for 1866 on artificial limbs for its disabled veteran
population. While Union veterans could look to the federal government, Confederate veterans
had to rely on their state legislatures’ good will in providing any relief. As Elna Green notes,
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much of southern welfare in the Reconstruction Era was driven by the preeminent Lost Cause
School rather than any notions of “social welfare inclinations.”12
By the post-World War I era, the numbers of those seeking such services far outreached
the available resources of state or local charity and welfare programs. The veterans of past wars,
coupled with veterans of the industrial army, provided a new drive for alternative solutions. No
longer could the United States simply ignore this group of people. Disabled workers were
involved in work-related accidents at an alarming rate, but the results went beyond the physical
injury. Those workers also lost significant portions of their family’s income. Even if the injury
was not completely disabling and a worker was capable of still being employed, businesses
would not hire them in the same capacity as prior to their injury. As Crystal Eastman estimated
in 1910, more than 40% of laborers who survived an industrial accident earned significantly less
than they had before their injury. Moreover, a significant percentage of survivors could no longer
remain employed. It was this group that required a new alternative, lest they be forever bound to
state and local welfare rolls.13
As with all such state-funded endeavors, budgets were small and finite. The care for
America’s disabled population was no different in this respect, with state institutions granted
only minimum budgets to operate. In the 1840s, state officials in Tennessee, taking a religious
stance, noted how patients in the lunatic asylum were too idle. For these lawmakers, idleness was
a great evil that needed to be eradicated; man was not made to be inactive. The state charged the
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superintendent with educating those who were deemed capable to learn skills. Gardening and
small-scale manufacturing thrived within the asylum’s walls. Policymakers’ goal was two-fold:
selling goods produced in the asylum could mitigate costs of operation and the acquisition of
new skills could better serve those with physical disabilities upon release from the institution.
Outside of these local attempts to rehabilitate people with disabilities, no largescale program
existed until the World War I era.14
When the United States joined the war in April 1917, changes already began to take place
within American society. Congress moved beyond its traditional position and adopted the War
Risk Insurance Act. It also took further steps and passed a number of laws, which President
Woodrow Wilson signed, that created what Robert Little referred to as a “vocational movement”
across the country. A series of legislation shifted the focus of the national government toward
bolstering the vocational skills of Americans, and, ultimately, restoring those vocational skills
among its disabled citizens. Beginning in 1917, Congress passed the Smith-Hughes Act, which
was the first in its vocational programs. The law appropriated federal dollars on a matching basis
with the states to strengthen a state’s vocational schools. This was an attempt to standardize and
spread vocational skills to as many of America’s youth as possible.15
The need for vocational education emerged from the rapid industrialization of the United
States during the late nineteenth century. As Arthur Holder argued in the Vocational Summary,
industrial capitalism, with its focus on the factory system and mass production, contributed to the
“abolition or the nullification of the apprenticeship system.” Americans, according to Holder,
appeared to lose their ability to specialize in a trade. This threatened to undermine the “future
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mechanics and technicians” of the nation if their employers did not use them efficiently. To this
end, employers should turn to America’s secondary schools to train young men and women in
the fields required to maintain industry.16
The population of Americans with crippling disabilities possessed a more difficult
challenge in obtaining a similar education to that of their “able-bodied” peers. Job training for
non-disabled Americans received state and congressional support beginning with the Morrill
Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, the Hatch Act of 1887, and the Nelson Act of 1907. Crippled
Americans did not receive such national support; their job training was mostly local. Americans
with disabilities in the nineteenth century typically found themselves within the jurisdiction of
the state hospitals or asylums. It was here where superintendents needed to balance the needs of
patients with their safety. Physicians, therefore, encouraged patients to pursue activities that were
of interest, so long as they were safe to perform. The goal was to mitigate any idleness from
taking root in the minds of patients. Pamphlets from the nineteenth century argued that “man was
not made to be inactive” and, thus, physical activity was required. Local groups came to the
asylums and taught patients gardening and small-scale manufacturing. With vocational training
for people with disabilities before World War I being localized and sporadic, no standard
national policy was yet in place.17
The Smith-Hughes Act attempted to expand vocational training and established a national
program which the FBVE administered. Headed by Dr. Charles A. Prosser, the Federal Board
convened for the first time in 1917 and immediately set about executing its duties as a guide for
the states that accepted the Smith-Hughes Act’s federal funding as well as directly overseeing the
distribution of those funds. Prosser knew that he had to tread carefully in carrying out his

16
17

Ibid., 6-7.
Remarks and Facts in Relation to Insanity and the Lunatic Asylum, 7-8.

35

responsibilities; the nature of federalism in the early twentieth century dictated a clear division
between states and the federal government with respect to education. Historically, a relationship
between the states and the federal government had existed since the mid-nineteenth century.
Beginning with the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, Congress aided states with land grants to
establish agricultural and mechanical schools, but federal agencies did not govern these
institutions. The states could operate them as they wished. This was in contrast to the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs unilateral move to establish the boarding school system and policy of
Native American assimilation between 1879 and 1920. Prosser cited the widespread acceptance
of federal land grants as evidence of the states’ willingness to cooperate with the federal
government.18
The FBVE brought three cabinet-level departments together on one board not only to
direct federal spending but also to administrate a standardized system for the nation. Under the
supervision of the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce, the Commissioner of
Education (a precursor to the Secretary of Education), and three civilian leaders representing
labor, agriculture, and commerce, the FBVE’s Executive Staff implemented the mandates of the
Smith-Hughes Act. The bureaucrats composing the staff of the FBVE were the real “ground
troops” for the vocational education program. They developed curricula, training and counseling
programs, and methods of testing. The FBVE consequently looked to new techniques for
carrying out its mission: the training of America’s working population within the context of the
emerging industrial order.19
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Educational leaders, such as John Dewey, found vocational education as a great tool for
not only education of America’s youth, but also as a way to inculcate citizenship into them.
Dewey championed the idea of vocational education in his earlier treatise on pedagogy. After
Congress and the individual states adopted the Smith-Hughes Act, Dewey and other educators
sought to use it to further democratic values. Vocational education and vocational rehabilitation,
according to Dewey, ought to be taught in the public-school systems across the nation. As
Dewey proclaimed about the children of the United States, let them be “masters of their
industrial fate!”20 For adults that acquired a disability from the war, a program of reeducation
became necessary for them to achieve the same level of democratic participation within the
industrial economy that their “normal” peers possessed. Thus, educators and policymakers came
together to explore the possibility of a new system of education, one where not only the nation’s
youth was concerned, but one where the nation’s “discarded” received job training and
placement within remunerative employment.
Vocational legislation found a sympathetic ear, beginning in 1917, with Senator Hoke
Smith. The Georgia Democrat sponsored every one of the bills in Congress that spoke of a
vocational nature (the Smith-Lever Act, Smith-Hughes Act, the Smith-Sears Act, and soon, the
Smith-Fess Act). Smith’s passion for vocational programs and the restoration of the nation’s
disabled population stemmed from his early professional career as an accident lawyer in Atlanta
during the Gilded Age. An aggressive attorney with a fervor for defending laborers, he made a
name for himself taking corporations to court and holding them accountable for their employees’
various on-the-job accidents and resulting injuries and disabilities. As his biographer, Dewey
Grantham, noted, Smith held these companies, particularly railroads, liable for his clients’
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injuries and disabilities. This zeal carried Smith far in his political aspirations, becoming
Secretary of the Interior under President Grover Cleveland, Governor of Georgia, and finally
United States Senator.21
It was in the Senate where Smith established his political legacy as the legislative father
of the “rehabilitation movement.” As the war raged on in Europe, soldiers and sailors continued
to return with disabilities. Congress long had awarded pensions to veterans and their families for
the remainder of their lives; by 1918, the national treasury furnished pension payments to
veterans of the Union Army and the Spanish-American War. The increasing number of veterans,
however, placed increasingly larger burdens on the nation’s finances and the addition of several
hundred thousand new veterans could potentially break the bank; the 1910 Census found
veterans comprised 6% of the nation’s population. Moreover, congressional actions in the late
nineteenth century compounded the financial strain; the Arrears Act of 1879 increased pension
benefits from $3.50/$1,000 of gross national product (GNP) to $10/$1,000 of GNP. To avert a
potential financial disaster, the nation needed to shift away from lifetime pensions. Seeing a
possible solution, Smith proposed, with the backing of the FBVE, the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation
Act in January 1918. The bill appropriated money for the rehabilitation and reeducation of
disabled soldiers and sailors and aid their return to civilian life in gainful employment. This bill,
which became the Smith-Sears Act of 1918, placed the FBVE in charge of all rehabilitation for
America’s military.22
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Charles Prosser directed his agency to begin looking at how to incorporate veterans into
the existing system of vocational education. Congress shifted administration of rehabilitation for
veterans from the War Department to the FBVE. This was a radical move on the part of
Congress and Prosser was unsure how to proceed. In July 1918, Prosser voiced his concerns in
an article in the Vocational Summary, the industry’s newsletter. In the article, he explained, in
what appeared as a thought experiment more than an actual study, how the FBVE would
reconcile its new charge of America’s veterans while simultaneously conducting its original
mission of providing vocational education for America’s youth. He reasoned that if the United
States sent over 1,000,000 men, it stood to reason that 1% of them, 10,000 men, would return
needing vocational reeducation in order to transition back into civilian employment. Prosser
looked to Canada as an example to predict the extent and costs of such a massive new
responsibility for such a young and, yet untested, government agency. He estimated that
complete rehabilitation would cost around $500 per case; when compared to a lifetime of
pension payments, $500 per case appeared to be a more economical alternative.23
The existing structure of the administrative state required Prosser’s Federal Board to
operate within a unique framework. In contemporary America, the Veteran’s Administration
handles veterans’ benefits; however, this agency did not come into being until 1921, which
resulted in veterans being held in a sort of “bureaucratic limbo,” passed from one agency to
another in a never-ending loop. Prosser’s agency was but one leg of the administrative triangle,

laws dealt with the disabled civilian industrial worker. See Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Stuart McConnell, Glorious Discontentment: The Grand Army of the
Republic, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); and Peter Zavodnyik, The Rise of the
Federal Colossus: The Growth of Federal Power from Lincoln to F.D.R. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Books, 2011).
Charles A. Prosser, “Problems in the Vocational Reeducation of Disabled Men,” The Vocational Summary, vol. 1,
no. 3 (July 1918), 9; Linker, War’s Waste, 27. Existing pension plans continued to pay U.S. soldiers from the Union
Army and veterans of the Spanish-American War. By the height of World War I, this amounted to nearly $5 billion
in public tax dollars going for the upkeep of America’s veteran population.
23

39

with the Office of the Surgeon General and the War Risk Insurance Board making up the other
two. Hoke Smith’s bill, though progressive in its outlook and design, did not take into account
this existing federal administrative framework. The Office of the Surgeon General incurred the
costs of hospital stays and medical procedures; the War Risk Insurance Board provided living
stipends for the client’s dependents. Only Prosser’s division managed the actual (re)education of
the veteran. Sensing a potential bureaucratic collision, Smith and his House colleague William J.
Sears of Florida, amended their original bill to be more in-line with the opinions of those who
would be on the frontlines of implementing this new law.24
The American Federation of Labor weighed in on the establishment of a governmentsubsidized rehabilitation program for disabled veterans. The AFL aimed to extend this sort of
program to all disabled workers, but knew that small steps were required before American
society could accept such a new relationship with the government. At their annual meeting in
June 1918, the AFL’s executive committee voted overwhelmingly to support the Smith-Sears bill
making its way through the legislative process. The AFL’s legal team helped frame the bill and
the executive committee believed they would aid in its implementation. Rehabilitating disabled
soldiers and sailors, and, ultimately disabled civilians, required cooperation from the burgeoning
labor movement and the government, two forces that historically did not peacefully coexist.25
Congressional debates for civilian inclusion into the Smith-Sears bill began in 1917.
Robert Little, Commissioner of Labor Statistics and director of New York’s vocational education
program, and John B. Andrews, Secretary of the American Association for Labor Legislation,
appeared before Congress and testified in support of the inclusion of America’s industrial army

Prosser, “Problems in the Vocational Reeducation of Disabled Men,” 9-10.
“Healthful and Brotherly Attitude of Labor on Reeducation of Disabled Soldiers,” The Vocational Summary, vol.
1, no. 4 (August 1918), 11.
24
25

40

within the framework of the rehabilitation bill. Rehabilitation supporters argued that vocational
education was a great program to help train America’s youth for new occupations in industry and
agriculture; however, it stopped with the training. What happened if (and when) an employee
was involved in an accident and acquired a permanent disability from which he or she could not
resume their previous job? Who then would be responsible for their future? Smith argued that a
program of vocational rehabilitation be made available for not only American veterans of foreign
wars, but also America’s increasingly crippled civilian workforce.26
Timing played a role in the passage of the Smith-Sears Act (Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Act)
in 1918. It also played an important role in the denial of civilian inclusion for rehabilitation
services. Congress passed the Smith-Sears Act in June 1918, nearly six months before the
signing of the Armistice. The Senate passed it unanimously, but several senators questioned why
the inclusion of civilians was ultimately left out of the final bill. The short answer was political
expediency. Sponsors were skeptical about whether Congress would pass such a massive piece
of legislation that included a social safety net for America’s working class. It was easier for the
American people to accept welfare legislation intended for the aid of disabled soldiers and
sailors. As Representative Sears explained it to Robert Little, “After we show the country the
good that can be accomplished…the civilian bill will follow.” Republican Representative
Simeon D. Fess concurred with Sears’ assessment citing patriotic duty to America’s veterans
first. He explained his reluctance that “if we should include [civilian rehabilitation] …we may
have some trouble” obtaining the necessary votes from fiscally conservative lawmakers.27
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Despite the neglect of civilians in the Smith-Sears Act, Prosser and his agency got to
work quickly. He directed the Federal Board to examine other nations in Europe in order to gain
a sense of what they were doing and how they were accomplishing their task. Using these
European models, Prosser developed a plan of action. He instructed his division to adopt the
prosthetic innovations of the French in order to mold a rehabilitation plan for each veteran’s
individual needs. These innovations opened up a variety of doors for disabled veterans to train in
many different vocations. Moreover, it allowed the Federal Board to adhere to a more
individualistic nature of rehabilitation. As Prosser warned his colleagues, rehabilitation was a
matter of “dealing with individuals, not with groups.” The agency quickly found that a
systematic approach was not a successful methodology; not all disabilities were created equal. 28
Vocational rehabilitation went against the progressive trends of standardization and
efficiency in the early twentieth century. Proponents of the Efficiency Movement argued waste
existed in society, economics, and, especially, government. Leading figures like Frederick Taylor
sought to clean up this waste and apply scientific management to these areas in order to make
them more efficient. This included the establishment of management schools to train young
professionals in the science of management with efficiency as the goal. Standardizing production
and labor, as well as the state and local government, defined the Efficiency Movement.
Municipalities, such as Chicago, established Efficiency Divisions, which were charged with
hunting for more effective organizational styles to accomplish tasks. Chicago was joined by
states like Massachusetts in this endeavor. The common denominator among them, however, was
to save money while receiving the highest output possible. Americans with disabilities could not
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be included in this calculus, though, due to the varying nature of disabilities. A veteran making
his way in the world blind could not be trained in the same fashion as a veteran who returned
from Europe missing a leg. Furthermore, training programs had to be tailored to match the
intellectual capacity of the individual. Not all men missing a limb were capable of learning the
same vocational skill in the same manner as not all Americans were capable of attending
university. Rehabilitation simply could not function in the standardized world of the Progressive
Era.29
Under the Smith-Sears Act, any veteran, theoretically, could apply for rehabilitation
services. In reality, clients received approval if Article III of the War Risk Insurance Act were
entitled them to compensation.30 Despite the ease with which the Smith-Sears Act allowed
veterans to enroll in its programs, only a few jumped at such an opportunity. For example, the
district office of Washington reported only 123 applicants in the fiscal year 1918-1919. Of those
initial 123 applicants, 76 were accepted into vocational training, the remainder being adjudicated
by the War Risk Insurance Board as “compensable” or “non-compensable” cases.31 In order to
ease the enrollment process and thereby make the program appear more immense within the
federal bureaucracy, Congress amended the Smith-Sears Act in July 1919. The new framework
awarded training services to “all men honorably discharged from the service whose disability
was such as to require vocational rehabilitation to overcome their handicap.”32 The Smith-Sears
Act shifted social welfare away from the worthy-unworthy framework for social intervention
toward a criteria-based system measuring eligibility. Though providing assistance to veterans
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was considered a moral imperative, a new framework based on eligibility criteria dictated the
application process.33 The goal, however, remained the same: the government would subsidize a
program for job training for disabled veterans in order to restore those individuals to economic
independence and return them to a sense of “useful citizens.”34
The Federal Board’s efforts to advertise the available services began to bear fruit as 1918
drew to a close. By December, applicants soared to 12,684 disabled veterans. The majority came
from the Federal Board’s District #5, the South, with the Midwest’s District #9 coming in a close
second. Before the Federal Board could proceed with their work, however, the War Risk
Insurance Board had to determine whether each applicant was deemed trainable and, if they were
not, what the level of compensation would be for them. Of the initial 12,684 applicants for
rehabilitation, 2,183 (17%) were approved for services under the Federal Board as being
“prospects for training.”35 Though the government sought to rehabilitate their veterans for a more
remunerative vocation, they were unsure of the initial cost and sought to keep the recipients’
numbers from getting too high. Despite the preliminary disqualifications of some applicants, the
Federal Board was able to train and place 1,455 veterans back into private employment; clients
were employed in “show-card writing,” the textile industry, phototype engraving, clerical work,
or entered one of America’s colleges and universities36. Within the first year of operation, the
soldiers’ rehabilitation program succeeded in retraining 67% of its clients, a statistic that gave
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many officials a sigh of relief. Though not perfect, such a success rate was acceptable for the
inaugural class of trainees.37
From Grand Army to Industrial Army
It was not long before congressmen began entertaining the idea of a new vocational
rehabilitation program for civilians. The success of the Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Program
resurrected the debate over the inclusion of America’s civilian disabled population. As the nation
continued to industrialize, workplace accidents became more and more common among the
industrial army. Furthermore, injuries accrued from outside the workplace affected Americans in
a similar manner, which kept them from earning a living. Private agencies and charities worked
tirelessly to retrain Americans who had acquired a disability, providing many with vocational
skills that matched their physical ability. These charities, such as the American Red Cross and
the Salvation Army, had their resources stretched thin and they looked for a new alliance with
the state and national government.
The Smith-Sears Act’s success proved that the federal government’s investment in the
rehabilitation of disabled veterans and their subsequent placement into paid employment was a
worthwhile endeavor. Policymakers soon looked at this success and pondered the application of
vocational rehabilitation to civilians. Senator Smith noted nationwide support for the expansion
of rehabilitation services to the “industrial cripples,” who were “thrown upon the human junk
heap” each year.38 In order to bring about an extension of rehabilitation, Congress had to wrestle
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with how it could subsidize the cost of rehabilitation without appearing to violate the tenets of
federalism. The solution to the problem was the federal grant-in-aid, a system that required a
cooperative agreement between the national government and the individual states, one in which
the states had to accept.
Grants-in-aid were a logical choice for supplementing the nation’s growing accident rate
and strained local resources for welfare. Congress, historically, had entered into federal-state
cooperatives in order to remedy national problems. Between 1877 and 1929, Congress asserted
its authority in areas such as food safety, highway construction, and even maternity welfare. As
historian Kimberly Johnson notes, the federal grant-in-aid was a tested method for delivering
national resources to the American people without upsetting the delicate balance of federalism.
For example, Congress had recently passed the Federal Highway Act in 1916 (FHA), which
appropriated $75 million, over the course of five years, for the construction of a national
highway system; each state was apportioned a certain amount based on the population and was
required to match federal dollars on an even basis. Several states accepted the FHA’s terms,
passing the requisite legislation and raising new taxes to fund the project. States like Nevada and
Tennessee raised property taxes by twenty cents per $100 assessed value or diverted their poll
taxes toward covering road construction, respectively.39
On December 26, 1918, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor voted favorably
for S. 4922, a bill that Hoke Smith introduced a few weeks earlier. The bill called for amending
the Smith-Sears Act to include civilians injured in “industry or otherwise.” The numbers of
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accidents and the spike in disabilities these accidents left in their wake persuaded Smith to
explore the possibility of extending vocational rehabilitation to civilians. The bill appeared “to be
the third and necessary final step in a program of nationwide vocational education which was
initiated by the vocational education act.”40 For Smith and his counterpart in the House, William
Bankhead of Alabama, the economic benefit outweighed any potential overstep of federal power.
The memory of World War I was still quite fresh in their minds and the extensive federal
overreach that accompanied it still weighed on the minds of these policymakers. The multitudes
of Americans with disabilities could still perform a job if they were given the tools and
opportunity. Consequently, Smith and Bankhead sought to usher in a new era of state aid.41
Though the Committee on Education and Labor passed the Smith bill favorably, it still
had a long journey to go before it could be implemented. Representative Bankhead’s version of
the bill gained a favorable response from the House Committee on Education, which advanced it
to the House floor for debate. On the floor of both the House and the Senate, the two southern
Democrats steadfastly defended the bill’s merits. Other lawmakers in Congress, from both
parties, were not as warm to the idea of providing a social safety net for any non-veteran,
disability notwithstanding. Opposition to such a policy represented a generational shift among
policymakers. Older, more conservative lawmakers flatly opposed such a measure on the
grounds of federalism, sectionalism, or even a slide toward socialism; younger, more liberal
congressmen, who were open to experimentation, supported the idea of extending
rehabilitation.42
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By the summer of 1919, the Senate heard debates on the Smith bill on the floor.
Lawrence Sherman (R-IL), who began his political career in 1897, led the opposition to Smith’s
bill. To provide a comprehensive program of vocational rehabilitation for civilians, Sherman
warned, would lead Americans to dependence on the state; the federal government simply was
not in the business of promoting social welfare for people with disabilities, no matter how they
acquired them. He admonished his colleagues that to adopt such a policy would start the United
States on the slippery slope toward socialism, a system that was anathema to American values.
Sherman criticized the bill as being an employment bill, arguing that “every time a man is
vocationally rehabilitated” there needed to be “something to employ his rehabilitated talent.”
Otherwise, Sherman declared, rehabilitation would be “a failure…that naturally will become a
part of the system.” Shouts of “Bolshevism!” filled the Senate chamber after Sherman voiced his
reservations.43
Further opposition to a civilian rehabilitation program emerged from other lawmakers
citing breaches of federalism or even resurrecting the sectionalist arguments from the midnineteenth century. Utah’s Senate delegation, Democrat William King and Republican Reed
Smoot, led the challenge. To these Senators, vocational rehabilitation ought to be framed in
terms of states’ rights; vocational rehabilitation was part of education and therefore ought to
remain within the sole domain of the states, not Congress and the federal bureaucracy. King, the
junior politician who began his career in 1897, pressed the bill’s defenders, notably Senator
William Kenyon (R-IA), that a federal program of vocational rehabilitation for civilians would
“undermine the States of their duty” to provide “for the education of those within their borders.”
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King deemed what he termed the “general plan” of these reformist politicians as an attempt to
“chloroform the States” and “render the people anemic” by transferring the responsibilities of the
states onto the federal government. Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) opposed the measure
as a “step toward the federalization” of American education. He continued by criticizing the
appropriation calculus as being disproportional; Frelinghuysen complained bitterly that wealthy
industrial states like New York and New Jersey should not pay more for the “upkeep of
America’s cripples in the poorer states of the West and the South.” The New Jersey Republican,
in essence, did not want federal money going to the former Confederate States. Despite the
opposition, the Senate did pass the Smith-Bankhead bill on June 21, 1919 and sent it to the
House for their approval.44
Similar to the Senate, the House of Representatives also divided on the issue of
vocational rehabilitation for civilians. In some ways, the House was more resistant than the
Senate; much of their debate centered on the proper role of the state vis-à-vis the welfare of
ordinary Americans. Bankhead took the floor in order to defend his bill. In a rousing speech, he
provided an analysis to the growing problem of industrial accidents and dismantled the
oppositional notion that vocational rehabilitation was nothing more than a fad imported from
Europe. Bankhead argued that, as he spoke, more than 300,000 individuals with crippling
disabilities were out of work which placed an undue burden on the local governments and
charities of their respective states. Representative Frank W. Mondell (R-WY) continued
Bankhead’s defense. The House Majority Leader argued that the rehabilitation bill was more
than simply a means to aid Americans with disabilities; it was a chance to promote “cooperation

44

Senator William King, Speech on the Senate Floor, June 2, 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st
Session, vol. 58, part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 512; Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen,
Speech on the Senate Floor, June 2, 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, part 1, 515516; Obermann, A History of Vocational Rehabilitation, 221.

49

with the States” by using “Federal encouragement” to stimulate state and local governments into
“performing their responsibilities.” For Mondell, the rehabilitation bill represented a new
opportunity for Americans with disabilities to forge an independent life. To these two
policymakers, the economic benefits significantly outweighed any initial costs that may be
incurred. As Mondell bluntly noted for his colleagues, the House “willfully voted billions for
war,” but scoffed at funding a $1 million social program.45
Opposition to Bankhead’s bill came from, as reflected in the Senate, a bipartisan bloc of
congressmen. Representative David A. Walsh (D-MA) motioned to ask Bankhead of the
constitutional merits and permissions of such a measure. Bankhead’s position was the states had
failed to step up to aid their own citizens being returned to the workforce, and, therefore, the
federal government had to act. For Bankhead, a lack of action on the part of the states, for
whatever reason, was an invitation for federal intervention. Walsh appeared unmoved by
Bankhead’s argument, at one point shouting, “Let Alabama take care of her own cripples!” Why
should the national treasury subsidize the states? Bankhead responded with a litany of legislation
where Congress supplied public money to the states for new programs. He alluded to the
development of highways, agricultural extension, and the allocation of land-grant colleges during
the latter half of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. All of these programs were
cooperative schemes with the states; they reflected the era of cooperative federalism prevalent in
the United States.46
Walsh, however, did not let up in his criticisms. He lambasted Bankhead for the mere
thought of having the federal government allow the states to “escape their responsibilities” by
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sending them money. Echoing the federalism arguments of Senator William King, Walsh
exclaimed that industrially disabled Americans were a problem of the state and not the national
government; Congress ought not to increase the national debt for social services, “even with the
paltry appropriation of $1 million” when the states were more than capable of handling such
issues on their own. Representative John Huddleston (D-AL) replied that it was a congressional
problem since workers were injured by corporations “owned by capitalists who resided in the
northern industrial states.” Huddleston, basing his argument on the Commerce Clause, defended
the rehabilitation bill as being necessary for the very health of industrial capitalism. Moreover,
the Carson City Daily Appeal noted that “vocational rehabilitation cannot be regarded as costing
the community…any thing whatever.” Crippling disabilities were becoming a national problem,
so too should its solution be national in scope.47
Other congressmen began to voice their criticism and outright opposition to the SmithBankhead bill. Representative James Good (R-IA) opposed the measure on the grounds of an
ineffective federal bureaucracy. Serving as the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
Good found the appropriation of $1 million to be too high for an agency that could not function
efficiently. He noted how Congress earmarked $14 million for the rehabilitation of veterans, but,
citing an unknown report from the Federal Board of Vocational Education, he concluded that the
Federal Board had “practically broken down” and was currently “overloaded with this work.” If
the bill passed, it would place an additional 300,000 disabled workers onto the already strained
Federal Board. Moreover, Good polled his fellow representatives, asking if any of them outside
the Committee on Education had received any support for such a measure. He conceded that he
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had not received a single letter of support; to his astonishment, several members stood to meet
the challenge. Representatives Walter Newton (R-MN), William Andrews (R-NE), John Nolan
(R-CA), and William Carss of the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota presented letters of support
from their constituents.48
Opposition on constitutional grounds came from a bipartisan group of lawmakers from
vastly different parts of the country. Representative Rufus Hardy (D-TX) flatly opposed the bill
as being unconstitutional prima facia. He chastised his colleagues who supported the proposal
under the general welfare clause. According to Hardy, the general welfare clause was incredibly
elastic and concluded that with such fluidity, “there is nothing that cannot be authorized.” The
Texas Democrat continued by saying the bill improperly created a special class of Americans
and that these few would receive benefits while the remainder did not. “Were not the sufferers of
the Galveston flood a particular class of people” when Congress approved disaster relief for
them, Bankhead interrupted. Hardy fell into a logical trap and he conceded that historical
precedent did exist where “instances [overrode] the Constitution under urgent appeals to our
sympathy.”49
Fellow Texas Representative Thomas Blanton (D-TX) elaborated on Bankhead’s
response to Hardy. He noted how the vocational rehabilitation bill was a means to offer young
Americans the opportunity to a fair share. It was not designed to help Americans who “surpassed
65 years of age, in full possession of all their mental faculties, and endowed with full mental and
physical strength and vigor.” Blanton found the proposal sought to “make over, rehabilitate, and
restore to full earning capacity” those individuals who, one way or another, could not perform
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the same types of work or enjoy the fruits of American labor in similar ways to their more ablebodied peers. As the Washington Standard noted, the entire purpose of the vocational
rehabilitation bill was to aid the “victims of industry” and retrain them to “return to industry as
efficient workmen.”50
Bankhead was right. The national government and the states had been involved in a more
intense relationship since the end of the Civil War. The Smith-Bankhead bill did not demonstrate
a radical departure from established federal policy. In fact, it represented the emerging system of
the grant-in-aid, or what Kimberly Johnson has termed an “intergovernmental policy
instrument,” as a means to federally subsidize these social programs within the state while
simultaneously avoiding the specter of federalism. This division between the national state and
the component states served to maintain a distinct balance of power; however, it was federalism
itself that policymakers targeted in order to push a more active national state agenda. Federalism,
thus, could be manipulated to achieve a specific end. Federal power was already ascending by
the World War I era. As historian Brian Balogh notes, most Americans did not notice this
ascension due to the national state’s ability to operate in plain sight. National policy was carried
out through the combined efforts of national organizations and voluntary associations.51
Some congressmen were unsure how such a meager provision could accomplish a
massive goal of rehabilitating a huge number of industrially handicapped people. According to
Bankhead’s own estimations, disabled veterans numbered around 280,000 while civilians
numbered at least 300,000 or more. Indeed, the Federal Board of Vocational Education
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corroborated Bankhead’s assessment, concluding that disabled “soldiers of industry greatly
exceed[ed] the average casualties of war.”52 Bankhead continued to find criticism from not only
his own party, but even from his own state. Representative William B. Oliver, a Democrat from
Alabama’s Sixth Congressional District, questioned Bankhead on how such a small federal
appropriation to the State of Alabama ($17,000) could possibly provide aid to the number of her
physically handicapped. Becoming somewhat frustrated with having to defend his bill, Bankhead
responded by asking his fellow Alabamian if he had even read the bill in the first place. The
execution of such a program fell not onto just the federal government, but more so onto the
states; they needed to step up and bear some of the burden as well.53
For Bankhead and his senatorial counterpart Hoke Smith, the idea of a civilian vocational
rehabilitation program rested firmly within the economy. Both politicians were champions of
labor and received very favorable praise from organized labor. Smith spent his life seeking
justice for laborers and others injured on the job against large railroad companies. Bankhead,
though not a personal injury lawyer, spent his career in the House defending the rights of labor to
organize and the social welfare of America’s workers. The American Federation of Labor (AFL)
noted his commitment to enhance and secure the rights of workers through his voting record.
Bankhead had voted favorably on several bills and measures that benefitted labor. Between 1917
and 1920, he voted with labor organizations 75% of the time. This gained him a reputation for
being a friendly face for social welfare legislation. In return, Bankhead received the “royal
ascent” from AFL leader Samuel Gompers on his civilian rehabilitation bill.54
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The House continued debating Bankhead’s bill for another few weeks, but it ultimately
tabled the measure until the next session of Congress convened in January 1920. When the new
session opened, Bankhead chose not to refile his bill; rather, a new and ambitious lawmaker from
Ohio stepped in to fill Bankhead’s position. Simeon David Fess, a junior Republican
representative, had been moved by the ideas and passion of Bankhead’s bill earlier in October.
Fess, a former history professor at the University of Chicago and current Chairman of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, reintroduced the Bankhead bill for hearings and debate by
the full House. In February 1920, Fess opened the first set of hearings on the rehabilitation
efforts for veterans and how they may be extended to include America’s working class. The
committee heard testimony from “a small group of veterans” who were successfully rehabilitated
as well as private organizations that helped either fund or place successful cases into new jobs.55
Charitable institutions, notably the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and
numerous churches (mostly Catholic), sought to help assuage the costs by offering donations to
help in such “worthy causes.”56 The Smith-Fess bill, however, did not see people with
disabilities within the worthy-unworthy spectrum; rather, it saw them as economic units rendered
inert by the steamroller of industrial progress. Private organizations like The Carry-On
Association, led by its president Mrs. Wendell Phillips, provided wounded soldiers with food,
shelter, medical and dental care, and laundry services. Phillips, who was wounded herself in the
ambulance core in France, championed the rehabilitation of soldiers and then civilians. The
Rocky Mountain Club under the leadership of John Hays Hammond, joined the Carry-On
Association. The Rocky Mountain Club, touted as the “Eastern Home for Western Men,”
promoted the lifestyle of America’s western states. During and after World War I, the
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organization provided resources, both financial and material to America’s returning soldiers, and
by 1920, the group enrolled more than 25,000 veterans in vocational rehabilitation facilities.57
Fess knew that his version of the Bankhead bill would draw criticism and outright disdain
from members of Congress, similar to that of William Bankhead himself. In order to mitigate
some of the incoming criticism, Fess amended some of the language of the bill to be more
palatable to his more conservative colleagues. The major change was the inclusion of a “means
test” whereby an applicant had to prove that their handicap was detrimental to them earning a
living and leaving them destitute. This was one way for the young lawmaker to perhaps limit the
number of applicants seeking services from the government. Fess, though forward thinking, still
adhered to the idea of rugged individualism and pursuing a life unobstructed by the state.58
Similar to the criticisms Bankhead faced, Fess received questions about the proper role of
the state. Representative James Good, a Republican from Iowa, supported the idea of vocational
rehabilitation for its economic and social benefits, but he concluded that it was clearly outside
the scope of the federal government to support such a measure. He argued that, though the
proposed legislation may have positive results and be the right thing to do, it was never “the
intention of the founders of the Republic and framers of the Constitution to provide that all of
these services…come out of the Federal Treasury.”59 He echoed Pennsylvania Republican
Mahlon Garland’s assertion about the role of the state. Garland explained that Pennsylvania had
a similar bill making its way through the state legislature and that Congress ought to leave this
issue up to the states to make their own decision. David Walsh agreed with both Good and
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Garland in that it was a state matter rather than a federal matter. Providing job training for
America’s industrially disabled, though a noble idea in itself, was simply not within the purview
of the national government.60
Many congressmen were open to the idea of a civilian rehabilitation program by the
spring of 1920. The concept provided the nation with a solution to the common nature of
industrial accidents, but these lawmakers were skeptical about the administration of such a new
program. Why should the federal government take the lead and provide money to the states for
what amounted to a direct welfare program? Several expressed their reservations about the role
of the state and if it was appropriate for federal tax dollars to be use in this instance. Fess moved
beyond the historical precedents that Bankhead cited; rather, he saw the cooperation of the
federal government in more logical terms. Reintroducing people back into the workforce may
require moving them from one state to another, a task much more easily accomplished by the
federal government. Furthermore, the national government has more resources to expend that the
states may not currently possess. The Federal Board for Vocational Education already had,
through the Smith-Hughes Act, well-established relationships with state-level vocational
educational agencies. Finally, Fess explained that special institutions may be necessary for
specific classes and the states may not have these facilities available. Congress could direct the
Federal Board to utilize federal installations, such as forts, land-grant colleges, army posts, etc.
The use of federal funds implied the adoption of federal standards. It was a way, as Fess saw it,
to maintain some level of standardized implementation of a policy.61
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For Charles Prosser and the rest of the Federal Board, federal involvement was not just a
novelty; it was a necessity. In their fourth annual report, Prosser posed the question of why the
federal government should supplement the states for civilian rehabilitation. They provided four
distinct reasons that mirrored Fess’s position. First, vocational rehabilitation for those injured in
industry was “essential to the national welfare” and national economy. If the workforce became
disabled, economic output would grind to a halt quickly. Second, federal money was required to
equalize the burden of carrying on work in the states. Each state had its own spending and
budgetary priorities as well as vastly different populations. Funding was necessary to aid those
states with higher concentrations of industrial workers who were more inclined to be rendered
disabled, such as the industrial centers of Pennsylvania. Third, the federal government was
“vitally interested in the success of industrial rehabilitation.” It did not profit the government if
industrial accidents rendered the workforce, which was a valuable source of tax revenue,
inactive. Finally, the Federal Board echoed the Committee on Education when it repeated the
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need for a deeper relationship between the federal government and the states. It allowed for
proper standards and efficiency to be employed by all parties involved across the country.62
Opponents to the bill still held out reservations about the role of the national government
overtaking that of the states. The idea of states’ rights and federalism had not evaporated during
the First World War; rather it had been brushed aside. In order to prosecute the war, the Wilson
administration utilized several new tools of statecraft to construct a modern bureaucratic state.
Once the war ended, historian Julia Ott notes, political conservatives sought to dismantle these
tools and return the nation to its isolationist role with clear distinctions between the federal and
state governments. Rehabilitation, similar to other programs associated with labor, was to remain
within the purview of the individual states. Massachusetts, for example, took the initiative and
adopted a system of rehabilitation for their disabled workers as early as May 1918. Minnesota
passed a civilian rehabilitation act in April 1919, the first such law to provide subsidized services
for “persons disabled in industry or otherwise.” For political conservatives, such as David Walsh
or Lawrence Sherman, state-level action for disabled laborers was the “responsibility of the state
and local” community and, therefore, more appropriate than congressional action.63
Nongovernmental groups also strongly opposed the establishment of governmental
interference in not only the economy, but within private society as well. The American Medical
Association (AMA) opposed the idea of vocational rehabilitation on the grounds that it
resembled socialized medicine. If the government adopted such a policy, they reasoned, it could
set the precedent for the foundation of price controls on the schedule of fees that physicians
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could charge their patients for services. It would mean “collective bargaining and a usurpation of
the individual rights of the American physician.” Dr. Emery Hayhurst of Ohio State University
argued that medical care for “probably 90% of the population” was a luxury they could ill-afford
on an individual basis.64 Frank Billings, former president of the AMA and an army surgeon,
applauded the program for veterans, but, similar to his colleagues, could not bring himself to
support a civilian endeavor. Other physicians, such as Jacob Gallinger, dwelled on the matter of
administration. Who would ultimately have administrative control, education or medicine? The
structure of the Civilian Rehabilitation bill seemingly fused the two professions together and
placed them under the Federal Board’s authority. Moreover, insurance companies, such as
Kaiser, also opposed the Smith-Fess bill as the government’s attempt to subsidize physical and
occupational therapy.65
Debates over the inclusion or exclusion of medical procedures within the Smith-Fess bill
kept politicians busy over the late spring of 1920. In order to win the support of the AMA and
insurance companies, Congress eliminated medical coverage. Orthopedic surgeons could,
however, donate their time to aid in the restoration of Americans with disabilities. Willis
Campbell, an orthopedic surgeon in Memphis, TN, donated his time and facilities in order to
successfully rehabilitate 65 people with disabilities.66 This philanthropic gesture, however, did
not stymie opposition from conservative watchdog groups. One such organization, the Sentinels
of the Republic, argued against any such legislation that infringed upon the rights that Americans
enjoyed. Using a strict interpretation of federalism, as laid out by the Supreme Court in the early
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decades of the twentieth century, the Sentinels vehemently opposed any action that undermined
Americans’ ability to make a contract or engage in lawful employment. These politically rightwing activists fought against Progressive reformers’ attempts to gain any measure of social relief
for child laborers, women, and those with disabilities. Indeed, one of the main founding
principles of the organization was “to prevent the concentration of power in Washington…under
a perverted interpretation of the general welfare clause.”67
Similar to the conservative principles of the Sentinels of the Republic, a second group
emerged to oppose the adoption of any ideas for government-sponsored medical intervention.
Rather than echo the constitutionally-erected barriers of federalism, Christian Scientists argued
that state-provided insurance and procedures were “a sinister effort of conventional medicine to
suppress religious and medical freedom,” two concepts they believed were protected by the First
Amendment. Both groups, the Sentinels of the Republic and Christian Scientists, were minor
organizations, but their vocal nature contributed to the defeat of medical care within the national
proposals.68
Despite the criticisms levied against it, the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act passed
Congress in May 1920. The need for a program to help get people back to work, thereby
fulfilling the purpose of the federal government of promoting the economy was completed. The
debates were over, and now it was time to implement the law. Charles Prosser staked his
professional reputation on the development of a program similar to that already in existence for
veterans. How would the expansion into the civilian population affect the administration of
vocational rehabilitation? How many states would sign on to the rehabilitation grant-in-aid
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system that the law established? Heading into the summer of 1920, Prosser hoped the transition
would be smooth and that the whole country would pass the required enabling legislation.
Travelling the Road to Self-Support
On Wednesday, June 2, 1920, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Smith-Fess Act into
law. The new legislation carried with it a miniscule appropriation of $1 million per year
($12,995,900 in current rates) for the purpose of rehabilitating Americans with disabilities. When
compared to the overall federal budget of the fiscal year 1920-1921 of only $6.6 billion
(85,772,940,000 in current dollars), a $1 million dollar grant to the states did not appear to be a
significant investment; rehabilitation composed a small 1.52% of the overall federal budget.
Congressmen still held reservations about such a program and chose not to place too much faith
in it. The budget for the first year of operation amounted to only $750,000 which increased to the
full amount of $1 million in the following fiscal year; the program required an “annual per capita
tax of less than a cent.” States received a grant in proportion to their population with no state
receiving less than a $5,000 grant for rehabilitation efforts. Congress, ultimately, appropriated
$777,951.44 to the states for the inaugural year. This took into account a special appropriation of
$27,951.44 for the states in order to guarantee less populated states a minimum of $5,000 as
stipulated in the Smith-Fess Act. In order to use these funds, states had to provide their own
funding on 50-50 matching basis. The use of a matching system allowed Congress to split the
financial responsibility between itself and the individual states.69
The individual states quickly accepted the Smith-Fess Act and moved to get their state
agencies set up. Part of the grant-in-aid system required states to join with the federal
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government of their own freewill. Any state wishing to participate had to pass the required
enabling legislation. If their legislature was not in session, as was the case with Montana, a
proclamation of the governor was acceptable in the interim until the legislature convened to
enact the requisite laws. To better aid in the expansion of services to the hundreds of thousands
of disabled workers, the Federal Board created the Division of Rehabilitation to oversee the
individual programs and then got to work developing a bulletin to provide guidance for state
legislatures or governors looking to accept the Act’s terms. Several states had already created
similar legislation to the Smith-Fess Act well before its passage; therefore, it made sense for
them to be some of the first to join the federal-state cooperative scheme. States, such as
Minnesota, went further and adopted their accepting legislation before Congress finalized the
Civilian Rehabilitation Act.70 Within six months, ten states adopted the program; within a year,
thirty-five states (73% of the country) had joined. Vocational rehabilitation evidently proved to
be popular among the states. In a decade littered with various fads, it quickly became clear that
vocational rehabilitation was not going to disappear; it was a true movement, as Robert Little
constantly referred to it, that received the praise of both public and private community leaders.71
State-level human services departments realized they could not successfully rehabilitate
disabled workers alone. The numbers were simply too immense for each individual agency.
Furthermore, the lack of standards and practices meant each program functioned at different
levels of treatment and, ultimately, of success. The cooperative system the Smith-Fess Act
established eased the burden on the state agencies and allowed them to reach more affected
Americans. Financial contributions on the part of the state consistently matched federal grants
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and usually exceeded the federal dollars. This suggests that states possessed a positive attitude
toward the program as a whole. As the chart below indicates, state expenditures dependably
outpaced congressional appropriation. This overspending on the part of the states demonstrates
not only faith in the ability of vocational rehabilitation, but, more importantly, a possible sense of
pride in restoring their disabled work population to gainful employment. Rehabilitation,
therefore, was “performed as a public duty, not as a charitable need.”72

Once the funding system was put in place, the task was set for state and federal officials
to begin bringing people into the program. There was no shortage of workers being injured on
the job in America’s thriving industries. Within the mining industry alone, for example, numbers
of job-related accidents rose significantly. During the war years, 1917-1918, there were 111,162
nonfatal accidents. As wartime production dropped off, that number dipped somewhat to a still
significant 85,334 nonfatal accidents in the mining industry, as reflected by the fiscal year data
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1919-1920. Across all industries, the fiscal year 1919-1920, according to the Federal Board,
witnessed two million nonfatal accidents, of which 40,000 resulted in a permanent disability
(approximately 0.02%). The civilian vocational rehabilitation program thus provided a feasible
alternative to traditional methods of subsistence.73
Despite the large numbers of those victimized by industrial accidents in the years leading
up to the passage of the Smith-Fess Act, only a fraction applied for services from the joint
federal-state program. According to Federal Board statistics, uncertainty and haphazard
administrations marred the early years. State reports reflected this reluctance on the part of their
disabled populations. Some states, such as California, complained they were too large
geographically to have a centralized bureaucracy in one location. Other states, like Ohio,
identified other issues; first, a need for extra funding for the maintenance of trainees, and,
second, a solution for hospitalization of those requiring medical treatment. The language of the
Civilian Rehabilitation Act excluded any funding for medical procedures or hospitalization.
Clients could receive training and perhaps prosthetics, paid for by the joint federal-state funds,
but the federal government was unable to procure funds to pay for hospital stays and/or surgery.
The AMA fought against such inclusions, and Congress acquiesced to their demands.74 Though
no federal funds could go to medical treatment expenses, the law did make a compromise that
private donations of money, time, and facilities from private organizations and physicians.75
Within a few years, the number of crippled Americans seeking the services of vocational
rehabilitation increased significantly. By 1923, just under 160,000 people applied for and were
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accepted into the various state rehabilitation programs. Prosser, and his successor John A. Kratz,
still felt that more could benefit from reeducation and job placement. There was a substantial
number of people that held out reservations about the new system. Their reluctance was wellplaced; why should they attempt to be retrained in a job when they were receiving compensation
from their employer or from the state due to their injury? It was precisely this idea that made
vocational rehabilitation so popular among the various states, regardless of sectional
identification or party composition. Compensation claims were only granted on a temporary
basis; some states used a flat period of time and a percentage of a worker’s wages, while others
adopted a more categorical system. The common denominator among these different systems
was the brief nature of benefits. Economics fueled the Smith-Fess Act and the immense
structural bureaucracy that accompanied it. Rehabilitation sought to supplement and, ultimately,
supplant workmen’s compensation programs.76
Workmen’s compensation was a relatively new idea in the early twentieth century. It was
the product of a long and contentious debate on the risk of workers and the liability of industrial
capitalists in the pursuit of profit. By 1920, forty-two states had adopted worker’s compensation
statutes in order to hold accountable the corporations that maintained horrendous working
conditions and low wages. They represented a form of provisional public social insurance, paid
to the injured worker for a period after receiving either a temporary or permanent disability.
Between 1917 and 1920, five states, Alabama, Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia,
enacted their own forms of worker’s compensation. Since the practice was conducted at the state
level, no national standardization existed. Congress adopted a similar law to cover federal

76

Statistical History: Federal-State Program of Vocational Rehabilitation, 1920-1969, 8; Carl Hookstadt,
“Comparison of Compensation Laws in the United States, Including 1919 Legislation,” Monthly Labor Review, vol.
10, no. 1 (January 1920), 242.

66

employees in 1908, but it did not provide any cohesion. Some state laws, such as the one in
Alabama, provided little comfort to those injured in the workplace. The benefits were low and
the scope of the law applied only to a few industries. As Carl Hookstadt noted, Alabama’s
compensation law was virtually pointless.77
States adopted worker’s compensation laws in one of two variants: a compulsory or an
elective style. Compulsory compensation laws required all employers that fell under the purview
of the law to pay into a state-administered compensation fund. These funds were disbursed to
claimants who fell victim to industrial accidents and acquired either a temporary or permanent
disability. The states that enacted elective compensation laws on the other hand allowed for
employers to choose whether they wished to join in the state’s compensation plans. Elective
worker’s compensation laws were more common among states than compulsory laws. States
such as Montana, Tennessee, Alabama, Minnesota, and Oregon possessed these elective laws.
What made these laws more attractive was not only the inherent choice among employers, but
also the push by various state legislatures to abrogate the archaic common law defenses for
employee error. The most famous such defense was the “fellow-servant rule” developed by Chief
Judge Lemuel Shaw in his opinion in Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Rail Road in 1842.
Shaw’s opinion held the dominant legal viewpoint regarding workplace accidents as the fault of
the employees, not the employers. Employees, according to Shaw, assumed any and all risks
when seeking employment in industry. Employers used the “fellow servant rule” to shield
themselves from legal recourse; by the early twentieth century, states began to erode this defense
in order to provide a level playing field.78
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Judicial rulings abounded from various states regarding worker’s compensation laws.
Many states upheld them as proper uses of the state’s police powers. Despite these rulings,
employers still found opportunities to invalidate such legislation and took their states to court
widely citing violations of “right to contract” and equal protection of the law. Progressive
reformers, holding out hope for national standardized workmen’s compensation, found a
sympathetic ear in Congress which enacted the federal worker’s compensation law in 1908. That
law only applied to federal employees; the standardized system reformers long sought still
remained elusive. Still, states continued to pass their own programs: Montana adopted one in
1909 to protect coal miners while New York enacted a similar act in 1910. Appearing victorious,
workers did not cheer for long; the Montana and New York state supreme courts invalidated the
laws as unconstitutional breaches of state power.79
Several of these decisions went to the United States Supreme Court for final arbitration.
The Court had a checkered past with laws concerning labor regulation and relief, and had
previously invalidated several such laws as violations of an employer’s and employee’s right to
contract and the privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States.80 In 1917, however,
the Court diverted from its established case law and moved to uphold workmen’s compensation
laws around the nation. In New York Central Railway Co. v. White, the Court held that an
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amendment to the New York Constitution did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. The section in question required any employer to provide compensation toward
an employee who was killed, injured, or otherwise disabled while performing the tasks
associated with the employee’s job. The Court upheld New York’s amendment as constitutional
and found that the employer’s rights to due process were not inhibited in any way. It was
perfectly within the state’s right to regulate an employment contract when the result of an
employee’s accident contributed to a direct effect on the public welfare. The Court balanced the
right to contract one’s labor with the rights of the state to use their police powers to protect the
common good. New York Central Railway provided a transition in American labor law and the
shift to accepting constraints on employers’ property rights.81
John B. Andrews, Secretary of the American Association for Labor Legislation, noted the
vast disparities among the nation’s worker’s compensation laws and argued that a new, more
standardized system was needed. He discovered that laborers in different parts of the country
were subjected to differing degrees of bureaucratic structure. Most states utilized a board or
commission to determine eligibility and the benefits granted. Some states, mostly in the South,
continued to adhere to an antiquated system of using the local courts to make these judgment
calls. This strategy resulted in a county-by-county application of the law and the discretion of
local county judges.82
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In Tennessee, for example, the Davidson County Appeals Court moved to strike down
the state’s worker’s compensation law as a violation to the state constitution. The presiding judge
in Harrison v. Phillips and Buttorff Manufacturing Company held that the state’s worker’s
compensation law required an injured employee to accept any employer’s compensation awarded
to them; this was a direct violation of personal liberties of redress. A worker injured on the job
was entitled, through due process, to a redress of grievances; the language of the statute, in
essence, arrested an injured worker’s ability to seek restitution. The state legislature also
included a section that precluded a jury trial from any and all cases arising from industrial
accidents. Judge Rutherford found against the state citing that the Tennessee Constitution
required a “remedy by due course of law,” which typically referred to a jury trial. Under these
points, he moved to invalidate the statute as written.83
Accidents resulting in a permanent disability were another matter altogether. Worker’s
compensation laws typically looked at accident victims in terms of a temporary disability that
dissipated over time. Permanent disabilities required special compensation. This, too, differed
from state to state. Workers who acquired a permanent disability were at a much more severe
economic loss than if they simply died. Death was cheaper for families to handle in the long
term; having a permanently disabled member of the household placed a large drain on the
family’s financial resources. Moreover, permanent disabilities extended farther out than simply
the family unit. They affected the community-at-large through increased taxation, and they
affected the person on a cultural level as well. The loss of a breadwinner was not only a financial
loss, but was also what Ronald Conley refers to as a “psychic loss.” Feelings of inadequacy,
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dependency, insecurity, and rejection combined to make a permanently disabled individual
appear inferior to their peers.84
Worker’s compensation benefits were supposed to mitigate these feelings of inadequacy
and financial loss that permanent disabilities carried with it. The ad hoc nature by which these
laws were passed resulted in differing benefits for Americans with disabilities. Only eighteen
states and the federal government provided for compensation benefits for the remainder of the
person’s life. The remaining states used a set timeframe for worker’s injuries. Payment time
tables had a wide range: California, Kansas, and New Hampshire only paid disabled workers for
150 weeks while other states like Montana and Tennessee capped their benefits at 400 weeks.
Recipients of worker’s compensation received either a lump sum, as with the case of twentyfour-year-old Jonnie Brown, or they were given a weekly stipend based on their previous salary,
as was the result for twenty-one-year-old Fred Adams. Both had lost limbs in their respective
vocations and were considered permanently disabled. Since their benefits were not permanent,
the Tennessee Workmen’s Compensation Board recommended both seek services from the
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation.85
The limited nature of workmen’s compensation pushed many more Americans with
disabilities to seek rehabilitation services. For those who were denied injury benefits, living
expenses began to mount during their rehabilitation programs. Governmental funds were
restricted to only the training of clients; they could not be used for maintaining the person or
their family. To ease this financial burden, many states, along with the Federal Board,

Hookstadt, “Comparison of Compensation Laws in the United States,” 241; Conley, The Economics of Vocational
Rehabilitation, 14-16.
85
Hookstadt, “Comparison of Compensation Laws in the United States,” 241-242; Johnnie Brown, “Application for
Vocational Rehabilitation,” September 13, 1924, and Fred Adams, “Report of Accident Case from Department of
Workshop and Factory Inspection,” April 6, 1927, Tennessee Department of Education Records, Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Record Group 273, Microfilm Reel 126.
84

71

recommended that clients could continue to draw on their workmen’s compensation benefits
while in training for a new vocation. The caveat to such a policy change was that should a client
be injured while in training, they could not seek additional resources from the state compensation
funds.86
Worker’s compensation was never meant to be a permanent solution to the growing
problem of industrial accidents and disabilities; this was evident by the majority of states placing
maximums on how long a person could collect benefits. Indeed, some congressmen thought the
Smith-Fess Act was the federal government’s attempt to supersede the workmen’s compensation
laws of the states. Representative Carlos Bee (D-TX) called into question the purpose of a
civilian rehabilitation program. With the passage of the Act, “what becomes of the workmen’s
compensation acts and the procedure in the various States,” Bee pontificated. Though opposed to
the measure, Representative Allen Treadway (R-MA) conceded that expanding rehabilitation
services to civilians “supplement[ed] the workmen’s compensation act[s]” in the various states.
Vocational rehabilitation, therefore, developed from the need to provide disabled laborers a
chance to reclaim their lost status as a breadwinner in society. The adoption of the federal grantin-aid framework allowed Congress to, in essence, subsidize American laborers. The short-term
income of a worker’s compensation claim coupled with the long-term rehabilitation plan
developed between a client and their counselor facilitated the restoration of the indigent “human
junk” and placed them back on the “road to self-support.”87
Scrutinizing the Grant-in-Aid
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Federally funded vocational rehabilitation enjoyed a humble beginning in 1920 and,
though its numbers were not incredibly high in the first year, the program began to expand
exponentially. Prosser could count the number of clients rehabilitated in 1920 using only his
fingers, but by 1921, that number exploded to 523. Just a year later, nearly 2,000 permanently
and temporarily disabled Americans were successfully retrained in a new vocation and placed
into a paying job. As time moved on, more and more Americans with disabilities sought services.
Congress, in the meantime, continued using the grant-in-aid to subsidize the states and
incrementally extend their authority, clashing with traditional areas of state control. In 1921,
Congress passed the Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy Act, more
commonly known as the Sheppard-Towner Act. This law established another grant-in-aid
cooperative that used federal and state funds to aid pregnant women in maintaining healthy
pregnancies and lifestyle choices.88
In December 1922, Harriet A. Frothingham, the wife of a prominent Boston attorney,
filed suit against the Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, challenging the constitutionality
of the Maternity Act. She contended that, as a taxpayer, she had a say in how the federal
government allocated its money. Frothingham did not agree with the provisions of the Maternity
Act and felt that it was a violation of the Tenth Amendment’s provision for federalism.
Congress, according to Frothingham, had no authority to appropriate her tax dollars to be used in
welfare-based expenditures.89
Frothingham was not alone in her objection to the Sheppard-Towner Act; the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts also filed suit against Mellon. Massachusetts Attorney General
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Weston Allen argued that the Act “invades the local concerns of the state” and the state must act
to protect the interests of its citizens. For Massachusetts, the Sheppard-Towner Act represented a
violation of the separation of powers, specifically the nature of limited government.90 Mellon
countered both Frothingham and Allen arguing that Congress had virtually no limits on how it
could appropriate federal funding and that “from the earliest years of the country’s history,
Congress had repeatedly made appropriations…relating to matters which it was not entitled to
regulate.”91
Hearing the case on appeal, Chief Judge Constantine J. Smyth of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirmed the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner Act. He
dismissed Frothingham’s lawsuit citing her lack of legal standing to sue the federal government
as a taxpayer. In Smyth’s opinion, the Maternity Act did not impose any specific detriment on
the state-at-large. Not feeling defeated, Frothingham appealed her case to the Supreme Court.92
In a rare unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Smyth’s conclusions.
Frothingham did not have standing as a taxpayer to sue the government; however, the Court
consolidated the Massachusetts complaint into the Frothingham case. Taking a step further,
Justice George Sutherland held that the Maternity Act did not impose any sanctions or coercion
against the states for not accepting the Act’s terms. Moreover, if a state wished to participate in
the federal program, it could pass the required enabling legislation and enter into a contractual
agreement. At no point, Sutherland wrote, did the federal government infringe on states’ rights
under the Tenth Amendment.93
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The case never garnered national frontpage news coverage. Much of its press interest was
relegated to no more than a paragraph toward the back of newspapers, suggesting the public was
not heavily invested in the outcome. Frothingham and the State of Massachusetts did not just
challenge the Maternity Act itself; rather, they challenged the very nature of the federal grant-inaid program at its core. The Smith-Fess Act, among other programs, utilized the grant-in-aid
system as the basis of its existence and if the Court invalidated the Maternity Act and its funding
structure as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, what did that mean for vocational
rehabilitation? Though the Smith-Fess Act and its bureaucracy were never directly challenged in
the courts, the basis for its funding and existence was. Justice Sutherland’s unanimous opinion
gave the program’s cooperative relationship between the states and the national government
reason to breathe.
The Frothingham decision, though a minor case about the constitutionality of the
Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act, held potentially profound consequences for the Federal Board
of Vocational Education and its young civilian rehabilitation program. The Court upheld the use
of federal money to aid in curbing the high infant mortality rates of the nation; but, more
importantly, it accepted the scheme from which that money derived. Charles Prosser and his
successors worked within the limited budgets that Congress granted them in 1920, and the
numbers of those who applied and completed the rehabilitation process reflected those humble
origins. With the indirect blessing of the Supreme Court, the director of the Federal Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation moved forward in seeking more funding from Congress. Applicant
numbers rose in the years following the Frothingham decision and, with that increase, the
number of those rehabilitated and placed within secure jobs also increased. No longer were there
calls of “Bolshevism” or violations of states’ rights by politicians or ordinary Americans. As the
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1920s unfolded, the civilian rehabilitation program would be subsumed into the nation’s growing
bureaucracy as a part of the expanding regulatory state.
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Chapter 2
The Other NRA:
The National Rehabilitation Association, the American State, and the Defense of Disability,
1925-1935

In 1960, Charles F. Feike, then-President of the National Rehabilitation Association
(NRA), reflected on his time within the organization and as a rehabilitation agent. He fondly
ruminated on his 42 years as part of the “Rehabilitation Movement” and how it had evolved from
a primitive group of philanthropists into a massive federal-state program that became part of the
administrative bureaucracy. Feike, hired in the early 1930s as a “rehabilitation agent” in his
home state of Oregon, had helped to organize that state’s chapter of the NRA in 1933. One of the
greatest challenges every state rehabilitation agency had to contend with was “the annual
concern for the fate of our state agency” as Congress debated the federal budget. Feike was but
one such rehabilitation worker who joined the NRA in order to have a louder voice independent
of the government. Others, such as William Faulkes, Homer Stanton, and Robert Bynum, joined
with Feike not only to make the NRA a successful organization, but also to legitimate the
Rehabilitation Movement as part of the federal-state cooperative system.1
The NRA represented more than a professional organization for those involved in
vocational rehabilitation to gather and talk about caseloads or new ideas. It served as a lobbying
force to encourage Congress and state legislatures to listen to the needs and desires of vocational
rehabilitation officials; however, more importantly, it addressed the needs of a growing
population of Americans with disabilities. Moreover, the NRA sought to legitimize the practice
of rehabilitation counselors and workers. When Congress passed the Smith-Fess Act in 1920, it
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appropriated a block grant to the states that chose to accept it. Outside of very mild guidelines,
such as a fifty-fifty match of state funds, congressional stipulations for the daily administration
and training of those involved in the rehabilitation of civilians with disabilities were malleable.
For Congress, the meager sum of $1 million a year was a small investment in this new enterprise
of restoring this growing crippled workforce back to gainful employment. On the contrary,
leaders such as Feike and Faulkes, who had devoted their lives to training people with
disabilities, saw the NRA as a means to bring public attention to their work as well as provide a
level of professionalization and legitimacy that all vocations seemed to possess. It was a means
of uniting bureaucrats, policymakers, social scientists, and social reformers in one organization,
members of which occupied more than one of these labels.
The NRA’s emergence was part of a long history of grassroots movements in the United
States. These associations tackled many different social and political issues during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, such as alcohol abuse and slavery. By the late nineteenth century,
professional organizations emerged to govern their particular industry. These associations, such
as the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the American
Historical Association, established professional qualifications and set industry standards for its
members. These associations fiercely guarded their members’ rights and pushed out anyone who
did not conform to such criteria. In such a way, the organizations were able to validate their
existence in American society; it was a method to ensure their expertise. The NRA followed suit
and established itself as the industry leader for vocational rehabilitation.2
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The relationship between the NRA and the emerging administrative state blurred during
the formative years of the rehabilitation program. It represented, what historian Brian Balogh
terms the “associational synthesis,” a system whereby the relationships between the state and
civil society were fluid. This bureaucratic “twilight zone” between the national state and the
state-level were where agencies and nongovernmental entities thrived. It was nongovernmental
organizations, such as the NRA, that most successfully carried out state authority. Between
Reconstruction and the New Deal, Congress returned to the foreground of governance and
expanded mixed federal-state enterprises; it was their attempt to solve national problems without
overstepping its boundaries into state-level affairs. The use of federal grant-in-aid programs,
administered by governmental agencies, facilitated the emergence of the administrative state.3
Agencies appeared to fill a gap between the state and federal governmental apparatus. A
significant portion of policymaking took place within this murky region of political authority
where Congress tended to act while agencies and nongovernmental organizations tended to react.
What happened, however, if a nongovernmental organization chose to act? This chapter seeks to
shed new light on this question. Governmental institutions served as agents of change, but
nongovernmental institutions also served as agents of change, sometimes even more so. This
chapter explores the origins and function of one such organization, the National Rehabilitation
Association. It examines how the group took shape in the 1920s and who joined it. The chapter
argues that it was the NRA, not the Federal Board for Vocational Education, which acted as the
policy vehicle for change. The NRA counted among its ranks state-level directors and other
rehabilitation professionals as well as members of the Federal Board itself. It operated, therefore,
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as a nongovernmental, professional organization; yet it also acted as the authoritative body that
sought to regulate the practice and profession of vocational rehabilitation within the United
States.
A National Organization Emerges
The early years of vocational rehabilitation were chaotic for administrators, employees,
and applicants. Indeed, the very idea of rehabilitation was new to many American policymakers;
it had proven itself useful in several European nations following the war’s conclusion. Many
states, however, did not possess the staff required to carry out such a vast new enterprise.
Rehabilitation employees pursued referrals and conducting interviews with prospective clients;
many were not trained, however, as social workers. Even some state directors were not qualified
as social workers. Robert Bynum, for example, was a colonel in the U.S. military and held a
Bachelor’s degree in philosophy. Between 1920 and 1925, as New York’s rehabilitation director
Robert Little bluntly put it, “the only certainty in rehabilitation was uncertainty.”4
That uncertainty, which Robert Little described, came from a combination of the nature
of the grant-in-aid system and the ad hoc manner in which individual state programs functioned.
Each state, under the Smith-Fess Act, operated its own vocational rehabilitation program, so long
as they followed the guidelines set by the Federal Board of Vocational Education. These
guidelines were not rigid and were open to interpretation by rehabilitation officials. So long as
each state possessed a “uniform system of administration” and maintain access to services
“regardless of origin of disability,” the Federal Board’s requirements were satisfied. Agents
sought to retrain everyone who applied, but were limited due to funding and available job
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placement. Rehabilitation reformers, therefore, often clashed with bureaucrats over how best to
implement vocational programs.5
Due to the language of the Smith-Fess Act and the national separation of powers, the
Federal Board was not in the position to dictate policy to the states. It could only serve in an
advisory capacity and any changes in national policy had to be “practically sold to [the states] on
a service basis.” With respect to rehabilitation, the states had to consent to federal changes in
policies and procedures. In order to cultivate uniformity and harmony between the Federal Board
and the individual state programs, the Federal Board conducted annual conferences. The
National Civilian Rehabilitation Conferences gathered Federal Board members, state
rehabilitation directors, and other rehabilitation workers and provided opportunities for officials
to discuss the philosophy and practice of rehabilitation. Though limited in quantity of attendees,
the number of states represented demonstrated a national response to the issues associated with
rehabilitation.6
Things evolved rapidly, however, by 1925, as the National Civilian Rehabilitation
Conference got underway in Cleveland, Ohio. Recognizing that “rehabilitation could not expect
vocational education leaders to fight its battles,” a small group of vocational rehabilitation
workers, mostly state directors and field counselors, met in a closed-door session. The members
of this small group ratified and established the National Civilian Rehabilitation Conference’s
governing bylaws and constitution, and within a year, the National Civilian Rehabilitation
Conference morphed into the National Rehabilitation Association. One member explained that “a
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private organization of rehabilitation workers” was needed “to express themselves independent
of the federal agency.” The ratification of the group’s constitution that gave birth to the NRA
was a year in the making. Due to his leadership and hard work, Wisconsin’s Director of
Vocational Rehabilitation William Faulkes received the honor of being the organization’s first
president on October 2, 1925.7
The NRA emerged as an organization by rehabilitation workers, for rehabilitation
workers. The officers of the NRA were all directors of their respective state programs. NRA
president Faulkes served as the director of Wisconsin’s rehabilitation program, while Marlow
Perrin assisted as vice president of the NRA and simultaneously as the director of Ohio’s
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Other state directors composed the Executive Committee
of the NRA. Membership rolls listed Homer Stanton of North Carolina, Silas S. Riddle of
Pennsylvania, Robert Little of New York, and David M. Blankenship of Virginia among its
ranks. Though it was small in number, the inclusion of state administrators among its
membership demonstrated the reach and effort of the national organization to bring all states
under a similar methodology for practice.8
With rehabilitation being a relatively new concept among state bureaucracies, not all
employees were necessarily trained or credentialed in social work, much less vocational
rehabilitation. Some officials, such as William Faulkes, possessed a background in vocational
programs; between 1913 and 1919, he served as the director of the Appleton Vocational School
before being appointed Wisconsin’s vocational rehabilitation program in 1921. Still others, such

William Faulkes, “Reflections of a Pioneer,” Journal of Rehabilitation, vol. 24, no. 2 (March-April 1958), 2;
“Conference Highlights of the Cleveland Conference,” Golden Anniversary of the National Rehabilitation
Association, 5.
8
William Faulkes to Member of the National Civilian Rehabilitation Conference, April 30, 1926, Department of
Public Instruction, Division of Vocational Education, MARS 104.364, Box 1, Folder 3.
7

82

as Pennsylvania’s Silas Riddle, did not hold any social work experience. Riddle, a graduate of
Lafayette College with a degree in civil engineering, got his rehabilitation start by being
appointed “Editor of Publications” for the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry in
1915; he advanced as a major figure in rehabilitation after being appointed director of
Pennsylvania’s vocational rehabilitation program in the autumn of 1919. Since professional
licensures were nonexistent and credentials were spotty at best, even among state directors, the
NRA needed to coalesce into the voice of the industry and proffer legitimacy.9
Under Faulkes’s leadership, the infant association began publishing its trade journal; in
the late spring of 1926, the first issue of the Rehabilitation Journal, soon rechristened the
Journal of Rehabilitation, appeared among American trade publications. Faulkes urged members
to write as soon as possible to Frederic Elton, the managing editor of the journal, and instructed
them to explain what they were doing in their respective state programs regarding techniques and
administrative issues. Elton had forged partnerships within the medical and rehabilitation fields
such as leaders in industry, corrective surgery, liability insurance, worker’s compensation, and
national labor organizations and composed a diverse contributing pool for articles. The journal,
as Faulkes described it, served to help the rehabilitation movement in all parts of the country
remain connected in practice if not in administration. In essence, the NRA, through its journal,
created a network of contacts for future cooperation or job placement for clients.10
Other organizations, including the NRA, operated during the early years of the
rehabilitation movement. One such group, the American Vocational Association (AVA),
emerged a year earlier. This organization emerged as a fusion of the National Society for
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Vocational Education and the Vocational Education Association of the Middle West. These two
organizations united in an effort to wield more lobbying power with Congress for vocational
funding. Unlike the NRA, the AVA represented the entire vocational field, not simply
rehabilitation. Its president, Edwin A. Lee of California, proclaimed the near limitless potential
of the new association. The AVA operated with similar goals and was composed of some of the
same people. For the AVA, rehabilitation represented just a piece of what the vocational workers
did in the United States, and it sought to cooperate with the NRA and share industry news and
other developments.11
In 1926, the Executive Committee of the AVA sent a memo to NRA members looking to
create a “special investigation” for underrepresented groups of Americans with disabilities
particularly blind Americans and women. Leaders of the AVA wanted to make a special census
for “securing information for the state offices regarding demands” for industrial workers.
Furthermore, the AVA wanted to devise a study for women and how they were treated in
rehabilitation programs. The leaders of the NRA did not have a problem with any of these
proposals, but they argued it was not for a private, nongovernmental organization to undertake.
The Federal Board of Vocational Education held the distinct responsibility of promoting new
studies for the advancement of rehabilitation techniques. Moreover, some members of the
Executive Committee of the NRA felt it was unnecessary for the NRA to carry out these
projects. For example, Homer Stanton reminded the AVA that vocational rehabilitation did not
always work with blind Americans and that women were treated differently in rehabilitation
programs in different states. They could be subject to a wide range of regulations from their

11

“A New Association is Born,” Techniques (February 2002): 20-25, 20-21.

84

individual state programs; there was no national standardization in this respect. Thus, the NRA
politely dismissed the requests.12
Members of the National Rehabilitation Association held mixed feelings toward the
American Vocational Association. Some members of the NRA advocated cooperation with sister
organizations. The more outreach the “rehabilitation movement” garnered, the easier it would
become to lobby for reauthorization of the Smith-Fess Act at each appropriation cycle. William
Faulkes managed to get his colleague and friend Homer Stanton appointed to the Executive
Committee on Rehabilitation of the AVA in April 1926. Stanton readily accepted the offer and
made plans to attend the committee’s annual meeting. Industrial and business-oriented people
composed the AVA’s Executive Committee on Rehabilitation. Stanton believed he could
represent the interests of rehabilitation workers and foster new areas of job training.
Unfortunately for Stanton, the AVA did not live up to his expectations. After only one meeting,
Stanton informed Faulkes that the AVA’s Executive Committee on Rehabilitation busied itself
with bureaucratic matters and did not actually achieve any level of success. He lamented the lost
opportunity but felt he needed to remain on the committee for fear that the interests of
rehabilitation workers would “fall into worse hands.”13
Those “worse hands” that Stanton feared came in the form of ill-equipped and illiterate
policymakers who did not see the work of rehabilitation counselors firsthand and industrial
capitalists who only saw the bottom line. Vocational rehabilitation represented a shift toward
better working conditions and a period of increased production. Social scientists saw the era as
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an opportunity to capture legitimacy and claim expert authority over political and economic
institutions. Policymakers and capitalists could not understand the intricate nature of retraining a
person with a disability; it was a process, and one that could not be applied in a standardized
form. The NRA, therefore, stepped in to provide a conduit between policymakers and capitalists
and social scientists and social workers.14
The trajectories of the NRA and the AVA paralleled each other during the interwar era.
Both organizations worked tirelessly to promote their respective programs. While the NRA
remained committed to the “rehabilitation movement,” the AVA attempted to encompass all of
the vocational programs established by Congress beginning in 1917 with the Smith-Hughes Act.
Each of these of groups spent political and economic capital in their effort to lobby Congress to
extend and expand their funding and operations. Events like the Great Depression hit vocational
education and rehabilitation hard, while those like World War II facilitated an expansion of
vocational services. As the economy collapsed in 1929, vocational programs anticipated a drop
in funding from Congress; they were not expecting calls for complete repealing of all vocational
programs. World War II witnessed a spike in applicants based on war industries and returning
veterans from both the European and Pacific Theaters. This influx, coupled with existing
caseloads, required Congress to increase funding in order to meet demand.15
Nongovernmental organizations stepped in to advocate for the continuation of their
programs during the interwar period. The NRA and the AVA sought to convince Congress of
their efficacy and value during an era where the idea of direct welfare was controversial. The
Republican administrations of the 1920s demonstrated Americans’ devotion to a limited
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administrative state, one conducted under the auspices of economic promotion and the private
sector. These professional organizations, however, soon evolved to rival the governmental
agencies created to regulate them. It was in this foggy bureaucratic realm where the NRA
assumed the mantle of industry regulator, which was in-line with the ideology of voluntarism of
the Hoover administration.
The Association Takes Charge
The emergence of the rehabilitation movement in the 1920s created a new system of
regulation for the administrative state. The Smith-Fess Act placed the administration of
vocational rehabilitation within the domain of the Federal Board of Vocational Education. By the
late 1920s, John A. Kratz headed this regulatory body. For his part, Kratz sought to maintain the
Board’s original mission, acting as an advisory body. In essence, there was little direct oversight
to the daily administration of vocational rehabilitation programs among the several states.
Moreover, the Federal Board offered little standardization. Outside of the Smith-Fess Act’s
baseline criteria, state directors could act as they saw fit, denying or accepting applicants so long
as they fell into the program’s admission criteria.
Vocational rehabilitation emerged from the Progressive Era reform movements of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These reforms were not centralized and coordinated
efforts by policymakers; rather, they were ad hoc in their conception and execution.
Rehabilitation, like other movements, was met with the same level of decentralization. While it
was true that Congress created a national program and entrusted its oversight to the Federal
Board of Vocational Education, individual states applied the program in wildly different ways.
Many states in the South, for example, adopted comprehensive regulations for business practices,
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but left the issue of disability and its solutions in the hands of inexperienced bureaucrats and
political appointees.16
The power structure that developed regarding the administration of vocational
rehabilitation programs reflected the political culture of the era. After the constriction of national
power in the post-World War I years, the federal government sought to administer its grant-inaid programs with as little direct influence as possible. Federal agencies, therefore, began to rely
on nongovernmental, professional organizations to be the bridge between federal power and
local power; localized directives were more amenable than edicts from distant bureaucrats in
Washington. As Ellis Hawley explained, the emergence of this political culture enhanced the
administrative state’s abilities by “bringing private administrative resources into ‘public
service.’”17
The very nature of disability constantly changed and evolved as technology and
industrialization expanded. Rehabilitation officials needed to adapt quickly to address new types
of disability during the interwar period. As Sarah Rose argues, much of the rehabilitation
movement was limited due to the shifting nature of the industrial economy and the conflicting
nature of public policy. Organizations like the National Rehabilitation Association, therefore,
became the de facto fourth branch of government. Their role was to maintain a functional system
while serving as a unifying body in a policy scheme that appeared to favor a more decentralized
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approach to administration. In essence, the private organization acted more as an agent of the
state with respect to vocational rehabilitation.18
The actions of the NRA and the Federal Board reflected the hands-off, decentralized
approach of the national state to vocational rehabilitation. During the 1920s, states took the lead
and federal officials did nothing to intervene. This was especially true in Virginia in 1927.
Internal political transformations altered the educational landscape of the state. Since most states
placed vocational rehabilitation within either education or labor departments, any change to these
departments from executive actions or voter initiatives could impede the rehabilitation process.
Though the Federal Board strictly adhered to a non-interventionist policy, they did advocate for a
continuity of staff within each program. Since many state directors were political appointees, the
Federal Board advised the states to keep as many of their officials in place for as long as
possible. According to the Federal Board’s estimations, it took anywhere from one to three years
to train a rehabilitation field counselor, and anywhere from three to five years for a supervisor. If
states kept their supervisors and counselors in place, the Board reasoned, then the rehabilitation
program could operate more efficiently.19
Virginia created a firestorm of sorts with its move to abolish its Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation as an independent entity. In May 1921, Virginia’s Supervisor of Vocational
Education, Raymond Long, appointed David M. Blankenship as the director of vocational
rehabilitation services. With Blankenship at the helm, Virginia quickly rose to prominence

18

Sarah F. Rose, No Right to be Idle: The Invention of Disability, 1840s-1930s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2017), 4.
19
“Procedure for Survey of a State Program of Vocational Rehabilitation,” Vocational Education Bulletin, No. 184,
Vocational Rehabilitation Series No. 24 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1936), 14. For a more indepth discussion of federalism and educational policy, see Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education:
The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969), 12. Orfield argues that the
Vocational Education Act of 1917 was originally meant to grant the Federal Board broad authority over state
programs of vocational education and rehabilitation, but America’s mechanisms of federalism prohibited the
majority of these powers from being exercised.

89

among rehabilitation programs in the nation and successfully placed several hundred people with
disabilities into remunerative employment. Similar to other state programs, such as Tennessee,
Blankenship noted that Virginia possessed a significant population of people with physical
disabilities. He called on the “cooperation and assistance of social agencies…that they report
such cases as [they] come under their observation and which they regard as worthy.”20
By the autumn of 1927, rehabilitation directors and their staffs around the nation heard
about Blankenship’s abrupt dismissal from the department he guided to success. William Faulkes
wrote to his colleague Homer Stanton about how surprised the NRA was about Blankenship’s
termination. Dubbed “the Situation in Virginia” by the National Rehabilitation Association,
several state supervisors questioned this move and wondered how it could affect them.21 Was
there anything they could do about it? Was it possible to have the Federal Board intervene on
Blankenship’s behalf? More importantly, it demonstrated that vocational rehabilitation programs
were subject to the political winds of the state.
Sensing the answer to an inquiry about federal intervention, NRA President Marlow B.
Perrin, wrote to the Virginia Superintendent of Public Instruction, Harris Hart, and inquired
about this new direction of Virginia’s educational policy. Hart explained how Virginia
reorganized its educational system and consolidated the Bureau of Industrial Rehabilitation into
the new department of Public Instruction. He noted how common it was for states to place their
rehabilitation programs within the purview of education. Perrin commended Virginia’s efforts to
streamline the process, but advised the education official to retain Blankenship in his capacity as
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supervisor of vocational rehabilitation. The removal of such a respected figure in “rehabilitation
work” could undermine the faith of the people of Virginia’s goal of restoring its disabled citizens
to economic independence.22
Other state officials saw Hart’s actions as tantamount to destroying the very idea behind
the vocational rehabilitation program and its mission. Robert Little grew increasingly concerned
for the “situation in Virginia” and sought counsel from Homer Stanton on the issue. From
previous correspondence with Hart, Little concluded Hart planned to reconfigure the vocational
rehabilitation program and instruct “standard educational people” to handle vocational clients.
This new policy would, in Little’s opinion, lead to the collapse of rehabilitation as it was
currently known. Hart may have placed his faith in primary and secondary school teachers, but
these educators were not trained to seek out, interview, develop plans, and follow-up with
clients. Little concluded that it was time for state vocational rehabilitation officials to petition the
Federal Board to adjudicate the “situation.” It is unknown as to whether the Federal Board
intervened; however, seeing as how the Board’s role was advisory in nature and that Blankenship
wrote to Stanton in 1928 asking for employment, it can be reasonably deduced that the Federal
Board took little-to-no action with the situation. It was, after all, a state matter.23
The fact that the Federal Board of Vocational Education was not the first avenue of
recourse taken by Blankenship and other rehabilitation workers provides an interesting glimpse
into the inner-workings of the National Rehabilitation Association and its potential influence.
Blankenship’s situation garnered the support of the NRA and the organization sought to
influence Virginia’s consolidation plan. NRA leaders, such as Marlow Perrin and Homer
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Stanton, wrote to Harris Hart in an attempt to persuade him to change his decision. The Federal
Board only became involved when the NRA’s original plan failed to provide an adequate result.
The “Situation in Virginia” demonstrated historian Brian Balogh’s concept of the “associational
synthesis.” In essence, the NRA acted as an adjunct of the state when it tried, albeit
unsuccessfully, to manipulate Virginia’s Department of Public Instruction into restoring a
longtime supervisor and employee. A private organization, therefore, attempted to implement
public policies at the expense of the state.24
The National Rehabilitation Association evolved into a powerful professional
organization in the United States during the interwar years, with many of its members being
political appointees or holding positions within the state or federal boards of vocational
education. These members, therefore, utilized their collective power within the organization to
influence Congress as well as state legislatures. As already noted, the NRA attempted to
persuade Virginia’s Superintendent of Public Instruction, Harris Hart, to alter his decision on
consolidation of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation into the regular education system.
Though the NRA’s effort failed, it established a precedent where an industry organization looked
to sway policymakers in the daily administration of publicly-funded, state programs.
By the late 1920s, membership in the NRA appeared to shrink. Fearful of the loss of
influence in the political arena, NRA leaders sought to alter their membership requirements.
Before 1945, the NRA only allowed membership from those “employed in the state-federal
program.” The result was a limited membership pool of no more than 1,000 rehabilitation
workers, which also translated to a limited amount of financial resources for the organization.
Vocational programs, therefore, hemorrhaged industrial support due to a lack of input in the
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decision-making process. The NRA’s membership during the late 1920s reflected this new trend
of the industrial exodus from private organizations. Homer Stanton lamented the loss of industry
support from organizations like the AVA and the NRA and how important their inclusion was to
the success of the rehabilitation movement. Though not employed by the state or federal
governments, these industrial leaders engaged in rehabilitation work by offering positions within
their businesses for people with disabilities. NRA vice president Percy Angrove agreed with
Stanton’s assessment. He found that rehabilitation benefitted more if industrial leaders were
allowed to participate. Angrove went a bit further than Stanton in that he felt other private
organizations and institutions, such as the Institute for Crippled and Disabled Men in New York,
could also supplement the rehabilitation movement and bring fresh ideas to the administration of
vocational rehabilitation programs across the nation.25
The debate over whether or not to include industrial leaders and other private sector
groups coincided with a general retreat of labor during the 1920s. After the completion of World
War I, labor unions lost power and influence within the economy. Conservative business leaders
returned to prominence and a succession of economically conservative presidential
administrations sought to reduce the bloated federal government reminiscent of the war years.
Vocational rehabilitation programs and the NRA needed the support from business leaders and
industrialists in order to make job placement connections within the emerging service economy.
Businesses, such as Goodwill Industries and the Ford Motor Company, hired Americans that had
completed vocational rehabilitation training, and the National Association of Manufacturers also
played a significant role in the connections made between the NRA and private sector. Their
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concern was the potential for Americans with disabilities to become dependent on welfare. In
this vein, they encouraged businesses to join with the NRA and hire more rehabilitated
workers.26
Let’s All Go to the Lobby
Vocational rehabilitation officials celebrated the progress their individual programs had
accomplished over its short existence. The relationship between the states and the national
government bore fruit beginning in 1921 with the first class of rehabilitated workers making their
way out of training and back into full-time employment. By 1925, numbers of people with
disabilities and those being successfully trained dipped. Rehabilitation officials could see that, as
with any governmental program, funding was drying up at a faster rate than successful
vocational rehabilitation.
In 1924, Congress was bombarded with petitions from different agencies about how their
funding was insufficient for remainder of the fiscal year. Congress did not appropriate enough
money for all of the programs and agencies of the federal government and several feared they
would be forced to suspend operations until the new fiscal year. Vocational rehabilitation
represented one such agency that faced a budgetary shortfall that spring. On May 27, 1924, Ohio
Senator Simeon Fess called up H.R. 5478, an appropriations measure meant to secure additional
funding for rehabilitation efforts. Fess argued that should the Senate not approve the House bill,
all work in rehabilitation would effectively cease. Utah’s junior senator, William King, stalled
the Senate’s consideration of the bill, much to Fess’s chagrin. Rehabilitation funds were limited
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and they, along with numerous other agencies’ budgets, were being held in limbo while Congress
debated the Urgency Deficiency Bill.27
By early June, a message came from President Calvin Coolidge requesting Congress
authorize the increase in emergency appropriations for rehabilitation. The director of the Bureau
of the Budget, H.M. Lord, calculated that vocational rehabilitation required an extension of only
$909,000 in order to continue operation under the current federal budget. Coolidge, himself,
supported the legislation and pushed for it. When it came up for a vote in Congress, the Urgency
Deficiency Bill failed to gain the necessary support, which resulted in Vocational rehabilitation
operating without additional funding until the next budget cycle began in the spring of 1925.
Officials in the state programs scrambled to make ends meet with the limited resources
remaining.28
With the disappointment of congressional inaction of the Urgency Deficiency Bill, state
rehabilitation programs remained in limbo. Uncertainty in future funding led many states to scale
back their rehabilitation efforts, which left many people with disabilities waiting on word from
Congress. In the meantime, state legislatures appropriated their own money for continued
training of those already accepted into a rehabilitation plan. These states acted “in good faith to
develop their programs” until Congress decided to act on the issue. Though only a few years old,
vocational rehabilitation programs garnered widespread acceptance, and states demonstrated
great faith in the venture by putting up their own money when federal dollars were held in
abeyance.29
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Despite the complications with Congress in the spring and summer of 1924, vocational
rehabilitation continued to expand across the nation. In 1925, three more states, Colorado, New
Hampshire, and Oklahoma, accepted the terms of the Smith-Fess Act and began receiving
federal funds for rehabilitation. Meanwhile, those states that were already in the federal-state
cooperative continued to outspend congressional appropriations and expand their programs. For
example, Montana received only $5,213 in federal appropriations, based on population, but
poured nearly $22,000 of its own resources into vocational training; similarly, New York
received $98,650 from Congress, but then surpassed that amount matching $774,180 into its
vocational programs. Rehabilitation officials across the country had thousands of applicants and
hundreds of successful completions. As the decade progressed, local organizations and agencies
came together to provide more opportunities for Americans with disabilities to resume paid
labor.30
On March 4, 1929, Herbert Hoover succeeded Calvin Coolidge to the presidency. Hoover
had aided in the United States’ economic boom of the postwar period in his capacity as Secretary
of Commerce. Under his guidance, America’s middle class expanded and more Americans could
purchase large-ticket items, like automobiles and kitchen appliances, on readily available credit.
Biographers and historians alike praised Hoover upon his entry into office and the first six
months of his administration. David Kennedy writes that Hoover personified the national image
in the summer of 1929, while Joan Wilson characterized him as a man who had “never known
failure.” Historian Robert McElvaine described him as the perfect “blend of modern and
traditional themes.” Hoover, essentially, could adopt whatever image people wanted to create for
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him. The future of the United States looked bright, and the officials of the Federal Bureau of
Vocational Rehabilitation and their state-level counterparts saw the booming economy as a sign
of their efforts and validation of their very existence. At no point in the spring or summer of
1929 did the American people or even government officials fear the sharp turn of events that
would take place in late October.31
The National Rehabilitation Association and its sister group, the American Vocational
Association, shouldered the responsibility of ensuring continued appropriations from Congress.
The complication with the Urgency Deficiency Bill in 1924 caused some in the NRA to worry
about the long-term future of vocational rehabilitation. In the original Smith-Fess Act, Congress
placed language that required reauthorization every two years. Though it was reauthorized in
1924, rehabilitation did not receive any additional funding, a decision that reflected the political
winds of the Coolidge administration. Coolidge spent his term deconstructing the administrative
state to its bare minimum. As the United States entered the Great Depression in the autumn of
1929, social programs quickly became primary targets for government officials who sought to
trim federal expenditures.32
In order to remain in the mainstream of American politics and society, the National
Rehabilitation Association opted to enter the lobbying arena. In 1928, the NRA established its
Legislative Committee, staffed by members of the executive committee of the NRA itself. The
Legislative Committee crafted legislative bills while also lobbying members of Congress to
ensure the continued support from the national government. At the height of the Depression,
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Legislative Committee chair John Lee spent much of his time in Washington meeting with
sympathetic congressmen and pleading rehabilitation’s cause.33
Lee and others utilized the growing influence of the NRA to push a legislative agenda
framing rehabilitation as a vital national resource. By the late 1920s, rehabilitation workers had
retrained and placed 43,388 people with disabilities back into employment. With the onset of the
Depression, that achievement appeared threatened. The NRA moved to demonstrate their
expertise when dealing with congressional appropriations committees and the continued push for
job placement in industry. As Walter Chapman noted, Congress was always “greatly interested”
in the “overwhelming problem of the physically handicapped.” Leaders sought to show how the
organization linked private economic interests and the interests of the general public.
Employment was the primary goal, but as Mary Van Kleeck argued in 1930, the only certainty
was “insecurity of employment.”34
In February 1928, the NRA tested its lobbying abilities when it pushed for Congress to
expand rehabilitation services to the District of Columbia. The original language of the SmithFess Act omitted the nation’s capital since it was not a state. Subsequent amendments extended
rehabilitation funding to the nation’s imperial holdings in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines; however, Washington, D.C. consistently received a legislative cold shoulder. Lee
and his fellow committee members aided in writing HR 13251, which sought to include the
District of Columbia within the federal-state framework of vocational education and
rehabilitation. Daniel Reed, Chair of the House Committee on Education, responded favorably to
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the inclusion; his Senate counterpart, James C. Couzens of Michigan, echoed his support. The
bill appropriated $30,000 for the District of Columbia to establish and operate a vocational
rehabilitation program.35
The NRA’s membership lobbied heavily for this policy change. Since Washington, D.C.
was not a state, discussion boiled down to the matching scheme. The finalized bill, as The
Evening Star reported, reduced the annual appropriation to $15,000 which the federal treasury
completely funded. The Reed-Couzens bill opted for complete federal subsidization; the
committee found that “the amount is so small” and that the fiscal relationship between the
national and local governments was “so indefinite and unsettled” that it was more efficient for
the federal government to cover the expense. The measure passed Congress, signed into law by
President Calvin Coolidge, and took effect on July 1, 1929; Coolidge requested Congress
appropriate $15,000 for rehabilitation work in Washington, D.C. so that he could fulfill his
presidential duties.36
The expansion of rehabilitation services into the District of Columbia was a victory for
the NRA. It made logical sense to extend services to people in Washington, D.C. with
disabilities, but the Federal Board had a different motivation behind it. Since the District of
Columbia did not belong to any particular state, the Federal Board could use this program as a
“national laboratory for research in discovering new ways to rehabilitate disabled persons.”
Moreover, the Reed-Couzens bill allowed for the cooperation between the Federal Board and the
United States Employment Compensation Commission. It authorized both agencies to explore
and “formulate a plan for the vocational rehabilitation” of all government employees in
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Washington, D.C. The NRA had taken the first step toward claiming professional expertise over
all matters of rehabilitation policy and practice.37
The task of expanding rehabilitation services into Washington, D.C. appeared relatively
simple. The move aroused little opposition. Many who had originally opposed vocational
rehabilitation on constitutional or ideological grounds, such as New York Representative Daniel
Reed, had come to accept the program for its positive economic and social benefits. As the
Depression’s grip on the nation’s economy tightened, some governmental officials sought to
eliminate any social programs as wasteful spending. Their goals made logical sense: In times of
economic downturn, eliminate non-essential costs. It was here where the NRA found itself in the
early winter of 1929, right when Congress was prepping itself for a showdown over
appropriations. The Smith-Fess Act possessed an expiration date of June 30, 1930, and needed
congressional reauthorization, and the NRA was poised to intercede on behalf of state
programs.38
Lawmakers in Congress consistently received good reports from the Federal Board of
Vocational Education and the various state programs. People with disabilities flocked to the
various Divisions (or Departments) of Vocational Rehabilitation around the country. Between
1921 and 1929, the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program counted 38,783 crippled
Americans either enrolled in or graduated from rehabilitation agencies around the country.39 It
appeared as if the nation was finally on a positive economic and social climb. Americans in the
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1920s saw their standard of living increase and people with disabilities saw their fortunes
improve. Though not all Americans saw this uptick in their economic futures, the general trend
upward demonstrated the faith Americans placed in their political and economic systems. Like
the pendulum of a clock, however, that faith would be lost in the coming years as the United
States, and the world generally, entered the Great Depression.40
The Great Depression represented more than simply a radical economic downturn. What
took place on Wall Street in October 1929 led Americans to rethink the relationship they had
with political power. Americans across the nation experienced a rapid loss of employment and
began to question the role of government during such times of emergency. Echoing similar calls
for governmental action by Jacob Coxey in 1894, some groups demanded Congress sponsor
largescale public works projects in order to get people back to work. President Herbert Hoover’s
administration, coupled with a conservative Senate, refused to offer any such national programs.
By 1932, the Depression’s worst year, nearly a quarter of Americans dwelt among the
unemployed and the nation’s productive capacity fell significantly.41
Pleas for governmental assistance collided with Hoover’s conservative ideology
regarding the use of federal power. Raised a Quaker, Hoover adhered to “voluntarism” as his
guiding philosophy.42 He felt that it was not the place of the federal government to provide
welfare benefits to the American people; rather, it was the responsibility of the individual states
and local charities. For Hoover, if people relied on welfare from the federal government, then it
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risked placing them in perpetual dependence on the state; but this did not mean Hoover was
against unemployment insurance. To the contrary, Hoover long championed unemployment
insurance when the nation met “with great floods of unemployment.” There ought to be aid
afforded to Americans, but only from private insurance companies; if the government oversaw
such a program, it “would bring the disaster of incompetent and vicious encroachment of
bureaucracy into the daily life of our people.”43 In October 1930, Hoover refused to call a special
session of Congress to address the mass unemployment gripping the nation. He continued to
cling to a “sense of voluntary organization and community service” as the appropriate safety net
for the nation’s unemployed. As the Depression worsened, state resources and local charities
quickly became overwhelmed by the sheer number of those needing aid; in 1929, states covered
75% of welfare costs, and by 1932, that number had risen to 80%. Still, Hoover remained
intransigent.44
Members of the NRA’s legislative committee faced this climate of uncertainty in the
winter of 1929. The Hoover administration, still reeling from the initial shock to the economy,
remained optimistic about America’s economic future. Rehabilitation officials, sharing Hoover’s
optimism, pushed forward with their agenda of lobbying Congress for reauthorization. They had
been successful in their previous legislative endeavors in each reauthorization cycle, but this time
the country suffered from economic issues from which it might not recover; it was disheartening
to a public program with its primary goal of employing people with disabilities. If ordinary
Americans could not find secure work, what did that mean for America’s disabled population?
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The legislative committee worked tirelessly to court members of Congress to help pass
their legislative agenda. In December 1929, David Blankenship, the former director of Virginia’s
rehabilitation program, met with Daniel Reed and Senator Jesse Metcalf about sponsoring new
bills for the reauthorization of rehabilitation funds. Reed explained that he filed HR 7138 in the
House the preceding week and that it was currently in committee. Blankenship’s meeting with
Metcalf reached similar results. He wrote to Homer Stanton noting how delicate the situation
was at this stage; the bills were in committee and the support was there, but it was not considered
urgent.45 Stanton sought to make it a priority and wrote to Senator Metcalf two days later
praising his efforts and continued support for the rehabilitation work being undertaken in the
several states. He asked the Rhode Island Republican if he could expedite the bill through
committee and get it to the Senate floor. The NRA openly endorsed the bill and urged Metcalf
and his House counterpart Reed to push the bill as written. 46
The NRA assumed the responsibility of lobbying for rehabilitation’s continued funding
and success. Paul Chapman, the NRA’s new president, asked whether or not the Federal Bureau
for Vocational Rehabilitation or the Federal Board would help get Congress to reauthorize the
Smith-Fess Act. Homer Stanton explained, the Federal Board could not actively help in the
lobbying efforts on behalf of rehabilitation. It was a conflict of interest that the Federal Board
could not participate. John Kratz, Chairman of the Federal Board, advised Stanton and Chapman
to “drum up support from the States” by sending out copies of the bills to rehabilitation workers
around the country. Kratz instructed them to write to their respective congressmen and even the
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president himself; to aid in locating key lawmakers, Kratz enclosed a list of all members of the
House Committee on Labor and Education.47
The NRA leadership followed Kratz’s advice and dispersed copies of the bill to their
members and other interested parties. The Federal Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation could not
actively lobby Congress, but private organizations like the NRA or the American Vocational
Association could. The NRA and AVA reflected other private groups, such as the American
Federation of Labor or the American Medical Association, that lobbied Congress for various
concessions, whether they be financial or policy in nature. The AMA, for example, consistently
lobbied Congress and other state legislatures to prevent any form of socialized medicine or
single-payer healthcare systems. The AFL used its burgeoning influence to get increased wages
or better working conditions. As the Depression worsened in the autumn of 1930, Hoover’s
administration continued to rely on the support of private organizations. Some of these
organizations, however, were bent on pushing the envelope further, not for some altruistic
reason, but for their continued survival within the federal bureaucracy.48
By November 1930, the nation’s economic future remained uncertain as more and more
Americans were laid off and falling victim to negative market forces. In an effort to curtail
government spending, Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur, proposed to the
president a plan to shutter all grant-in-aid programs. Wilbur, the former president of Stanford
University, found the costs of these programs to be too high for their alleged benefit. He
suggested that Congress cut them and allow for the states to pick up any costs if they so chose.
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Wilbur did not agree with federal consolidation of subjects that the states typically administered;
he decried the proposal to create a Department of Education as a cabinet-level department.
Certain areas, such as education and all of its adjuncts, did not concern the national government.
Wilbur’s announcement, not surprisingly, alarmed many in the vocational community; several
states only adopted vocational programs because Congress picked up half the cost. Homer
Stanton, still sitting on the Rehabilitation Committee for the AVA, called attention to Wilbur’s
proposed move. He sought a partnership between the NRA and the AVA once again, this time
with a common cause, to fight back against these proposed cuts.49
Between 1930 and 1932, the legislative committee of the NRA undertook a massive
campaign for continued funding. The Depression had rocked the very core of the United States
and the American people began questioning the very foundations of capitalism. Vocational
rehabilitation, fortunately, had several sympathetic ears in Congress. The Smith-Fess Act had
been reauthorized in the spring of 1930 with the help and guidance of Senator Metcalf and
Representative Reed. The reauthorization act made no significant changes made to the structure
of the program. By early 1931, however, administration officials began to eye these programs for
potential cuts. Should President Hoover side with Secretary Wilbur’s recommendation, the NRA
reasoned, the future of the rehabilitation movement would be jeopardized at the very least; worst
case scenario, rehabilitation would be eliminated from the federal budget.
In order to maintain rehabilitation as an active part of American society, thus helping
thousands of people with disabilities, the NRA moved to make coalitions with other groups. The
first such group was, naturally, the American Vocational Association. The AVA saw Secretary
Wilbur’s recommendation as detrimental to their existence as well. Vocational programs served
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to aid not only people with disabilities, but also help younger Americans or others transition
from subsistence agriculture to commercial farming or industrial jobs. In a similar manner to the
NRA, the AVA sought to protect its interests as the collective voice for America’s vocational
educators. The Depression had hit the AVA just as hard as the NRA and vocational
rehabilitation. Joining forces, the AVA and the NRA defeated an attempt to repeal the SmithHughes Act of 1917. If the Congress succeeded in repealing vocational education, the AVA
warned, rehabilitation was next.50
Charles Miller, President of the AVA, sought to garner support for vocational programs
in Congress. Senator Arthur Capper, a Kansas Republican, championed vocational education and
rehabilitation for the nation’s destitute and disabled. In the winter of 1931, he introduced S.
3969, a bill which sought to secure and expand vocational services across the nation. It was in
response to Secretary of Labor James Davis’s call for the expansion of America’s vocational
programs from May 1930. Davis offered a contradictory position to that of Secretary Wilbur
regarding federal vocational policy; while Wilbur felt grant-in-aid programs were wasteful,
Davis saw their economic potential in both short- and long-term scenarios. Capper’s bill passed
the Committee of Education and Labor without any dissent, which was only made possible by
the combined efforts of the AVA, the NRA, and the National Education Association (NEA).
Willis Sutton, President of the NEA, lauded both vocational education and rehabilitation as the
“greatest immediate means of aiding depression and restoring confidence” among America’s
unemployed and disabled populations.51
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The Capper-Reed bill mainly concerned itself with the extension of vocational education
overall. Rehabilitation received an extension from Congress even though the bill’s language did
not specifically mention it. In order to appease those who called for more direct attention toward
rehabilitation, the NRA pushed for a more secure and long-term authorization from Congress.
Representative William Bankhead took up the cause in the House and introduced HR 4743 in
May 1932; Senator Samuel Copeland filed similar legislation. The Depression was at its height
by this point and unemployment reached nearly 30% of the population. Despite this alarming
figure, the NRA argued that Congress should not halt the important work that vocational
rehabilitation did across the country. The NRA filed a report with the House in early May citing
the valuable work they do to help “men and women rendered socially useless to become more
productive” and no longer be an economic drain. American industry required rehabilitation’s
continued existence to aid in shifting the injured industrial worker from one position to another
in times of need.52
The efforts of the NRA’s legislative committee, overall, garnered success during the
Depression. Though many millions of Americans were out of a job, grant-in-aid programs like
vocational rehabilitation were not affected by the general economic crisis. Statistical data
indicates that federal expenditures actually increased during the Depression years of the Hoover
administration. At the height of the Depression, rehabilitation workers served tens of thousands
of clients and continued to garner the support of the national government. The Federal Board
noted in its reports that congressional appropriations reflected the increase in applicants. In 1930,
Congress spent $739,000 on vocational rehabilitation; that figure increased to $933,000 in 1931,
a 126% increase. It consistently rose, even in 1932 as the Depression was at its worst. Congress
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spent $998,000 on rehabilitation efforts across the country. Rehabilitation was a program that
surpassed even fiscal conservatives’ reservations during economic crisis.53
Furthermore, the NRA continued the technocratic shift in American society. Technocrats
sought to place authority in the hands of social scientists and manager-experts. The NRA fused
policymakers, social scientists, and business together which granted legitimacy to vocational
rehabilitation across the nation. The Depression severely tested the resolve of federal grant-in-aid
programs and the NRA’s efforts to keep the rehabilitation movement alive. The NRA
successfully proved the “technocratic bargain” struck between social scientists and industrialists
needed a third party to function in the long-term. The addition of state-level policymakers, in the
form of rehabilitation workers, made the technocratic shift complete. Moreover, the NRA
represented the associational nature typified by the 1920s. The successful execution of the
Smith-Fess Act required the assistance of the private sector in training and placing clients. The
NRA acted as a nongovernmental bridge between the public authority of the FBVE and statelevel officials and the private sector. Operating outside of the halls of political power, the NRA
attempted to facilitate the growth of the “New Capitalism” by recycling disabled American
workers and placing them back within the active workforce.54
Vocational Rehabilitation Strikes a (New) Deal
On March 4, 1933, President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt stepped forward to take the oath
of office and became the 32nd President of the United States. Turning to the solemn crowd that
had gathered in the nation’s capital, FDR began his inaugural address. He stressed that “this
great nation shall endure as it has endured,” and that “our greatest primary task is to put people
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to work.” Roosevelt’s words were no stump speech; he had campaigned on providing Americans
with a “New Deal.” The new president tackled his arduous task with vigor and confidence,
which reflected the American people’s trust in him to guide them out of the Depression.
Members of the National Rehabilitation Association took FDR at his word and brought more
clients into rehabilitation training. Little did they realize that the New Dealers sought an
immediate freeze on governmental spending in the interim, which included significant cuts to all
grant-in-aid programs.55
When the Roosevelt administration entered the White House in March 1933 with the
monumental task of reigniting the economy once again. FDR immediately called a special
session of Congress to tackle the most immediate effects of the Depression. During what
historians referred to as the “Hundred Days,” FDR’s administration pushed a massive legislative
agenda, which Congress promptly adopted. The proverbial alphabet soup of federal agencies
emerged and joined the American lexicon. Congress reactivated the U.S. Employment Service,
in June 1933, as an adjunct to the Department of Labor with the passage of the Wagner-Peyser
Act. The U.S. Employment Service provided federal dollars to the states in a block grant to aid
them in establishing their own employment systems. Moreover, it was the U.S. Employment
Service that hired American workers to tackle the massive building projects that the New Deal
funded; however, in a memo from Mary LaDame, the assistant director of employment services,
the U.S. Department of Labor could not provide help to any state that did not establish an
employment office.56
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One of the hallmarks of the New Deal was the expansion of the federal bureaucracy with
the establishment of so many new agencies. These agencies, though they all shared one common
goal, typically did not function on the same level. The U.S. Employment Service reflected this
sentiment and added undue bureaucratic strains to an already compromised labor system.
Rehabilitation officials and the NRA worked to reduce the level of bureaucracy and place social
science experts into positions of authority so that they could better serve their clients. Some,
however, could not wait for the rehabilitation workers and wrote directly to the President to
voice their concerns. One letter, from a P.S. Hines to Roosevelt, complained vehemently about
the “slow response” of the Employment Service and the added “bureaucracy and general time
crunch” people were facing due to the Depression’s continued grip on the economy. The
response Hines received advised him to seek the services of the Tennessee Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation and see if he could get job placement faster this way than by using the
U.S. Employment Service.57
Returning people to work was the primary goal of the Employment Service, but with the
chaotic nature of the New Deal’s implementation, it quickly got mired in bureaucracy. Hoover
had favored an employment service and believed that it could help mitigate the Depression’s
effects on Americans. In 1931, Senator Robert Wagner introduced a bill which would have made
the employment agencies operate more efficiently. Hoover, though he had faith in a governmentrun employment service, vetoed the Wagner bill citing that it would reduce the employment
service into a mere part of the political apparatus. Wagner’s proposal, indeed, rendered the U.S.
Employment Service a shell of its former self; it removed it from the Department of Labor and
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placed it into the administration of the individual states. The NRA, thus, would have to busy
itself with another state-level agency vying for influence over employment and labor.58
The chaos from the Employment Service typified the early New Deal era. Bills sailed
through the heavily Democratic Congress, often with little oversight concerning their language
and scope. President Roosevelt, operating on advice from his “brains trust,” issued several
executive orders with the purpose of reigning in government spending and getting a more
complete understanding of just how extensive the Depression’s effects were on the nation.
Congress was in the midst of Roosevelt’s aforementioned special session to immediately address
the economic crisis. By June 1933, the special session began to wind up its immediate agenda of
proposals and sought to adjourn. On June 10, 1933, Roosevelt delivered to Congress Executive
Order 6166, which sought to slash government spending by nearly 25% overall. The president’s
goal was to curb unnecessary spending by nearly $1 billion total; moreover, FDR wanted to
restructure the federal bureaucracy and move smaller agencies into the framework of larger
agencies. He drew authority from an “Act to Maintain the Credit of the United States
Government,” passed on March 20, 1933, in which Section I allowed for the president to
reconfigure the federal government’s operations. Congress, however, was not quiet about
Roosevelt’s plans.59
The scheme to reorganize the federal bureaucracy had the goal of saving the government
money. While Roosevelt wanted to cut spending by around $1 billion, Congress did not agree to
that high amount. Executive Order 6166, furthermore, cut welfare programs and spending
significantly, and vocational education and rehabilitation suffered immensely from the cuts.
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Section 15 of Roosevelt’s order specifically targeted the federal-state vocational programs and
cut their funding by a full quarter. Within a day, rehabilitation officials across the nation reeled
over the immediate loss of such a chunk of their funding. The states themselves, however, did
not cut funding to these programs at the same rate as Roosevelt chose. The NRA, consequently,
moved quickly to ascertain the extent of the situation. Telegrams between state directors and
NRA leaders exploded with the news of Roosevelt’s actions. Many rehabilitation officials did
not know how to navigate the fallout of this bombshell, and they began reaching out to the NRA
for direction and guidance.60
Tennessee director Robert Bynum remained in constant contact with state directors and
policymakers who were somewhat annoyed by the president’s executive order. William Faulkes
voiced his concerns about rehabilitation’s future with such a drastic reduction in funding. The
end result would resemble a domino effect that would “wreck the programs in the states,” cost
the jobs of hundreds of rehabilitation workers across the nation, and negatively impact services
to people with disabilities. Faulkes also drew his attention to the summary dismissal of the entire
Rehabilitation Service. Roosevelt’s order shifted the Federal Board under the direction of the
Interior Department while completely ridding itself of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation.
The president saw this as a plurality of authority and attempted to make the administration more
efficient in its delivery while saving the government money.61
Over the course of the next few days, NRA leaders corresponded between themselves
over how best to address their current situation. With the loss of vocational programs’ federal
funding by nearly a quarter, many states erupted in chaos. NRA Vice President George

60

Ibid., 3.
Telegram from William Faulkes to Robert Bynum, June 12, 1933, Tennessee Department of Education Records,
TSLA, Record Group 273, Box 174, Folder 5.
61

112

Hambrecht, who was also the director of vocational rehabilitation in Minnesota, telegrammed
state rehabilitation officials and informed them that a “nation wide effort” was “being made to
preserve the Federal Board” as it had been known up to that point. Though Section 15 of
Roosevelt’s order reduced funding to rehabilitation and reorganized national administration, it
was Section 18 that made the long-term future of rehabilitation (and all other federal grants)
come into question. This particular section moved to cut all grant-in-aid programs completely by
the end of the fiscal year, which was rapidly approaching on June 30. Hambrecht, sensing a
possible solution, frantically wrote to Robert Bynum in hopes of getting him to use some of his
contacts in the capitol to aid the cause of rehabilitation across the nation.62
Bynum sympathized with Hambrecht and his colleagues about the loss of federal
funding, but more importantly the shuttering of the federal Division of the Vocational
Rehabilitation. Bynum was friends with former Senator, now Secretary of State, Cordell Hull as
well as Senator Kenneth McKellar, both of Tennessee. In turn, the two politicians sympathized
with Bynum’s concerns. In the Senate, McKellar convinced his colleagues to make a statement
about the president’s executive order. Senator Robert La Follette secured a Senate Resolution to
suspend Section 18 of Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6166. The abolition of federal grants to the
states, which were already appropriated, was in their mind unconstitutional. Roosevelt, at the
advice and influence of Arkansas Senator Joseph T. Robinson, recognized the resolution and
provided a temporary suspension of 60 days in order for Congress to act on the question.63
The NRA moved to secure a repeal of Roosevelt’s order and, for the remainder of 1933,
this became their sole mission. Roosevelt had passed the impetus over to Congress to act and,
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with the influence of several prominent senators, the president relented. In February 1934, FDR
issued Executive Order 6586, which called for the repeal of his earlier order that stripped grantin-aid funding to the federal-state vocational programs. The NRA’s plan of action had
succeeded. In a letter dated February 6, 1934, federal vocational rehabilitation chief John Kratz
informed Bynum that the administration had been inundated with letters from people with
disabilities and rehabilitation workers from all over the country. Kratz, though happy with the
level of support from the American people, explained to Bynum that the administration was
being overloaded with communications. Letters poured in from all over the country addressed to
everyone from Roosevelt and his secretaries to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins to nearly
every member of Congress. The NRA used their position as the representative body of
rehabilitation workers and officials to influence Congress and the president in order to secure
their own programs and interests. For his part, Roosevelt cited the reasoning behind the new
order as being a lack of clarity on the administration’s part with respect to vocational education
and rehabilitation programs. Moreover, the president noted that his earlier order, when
confronted with new data, was “not in the public interest or consistent with the efficient
operation of the Government.”64
Despite the limited funding due to Roosevelt’s initial order in June 1933, vocational
programs appeared to carry on without much disruption. William Faulkes’ fears that the cuts
would “wreck” the states’ ability to rehabilitate their disabled populations did not come to
fruition. There was no dip in the level of people served, according to statistics, and, more
importantly, the number of successful rehabilitations actually appeared to increase. In 1933,
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rehabilitation statistics noted 5,613 people completed a rehabilitation plan and placed within a
wage-earning position; that number increased to 8,062 in 1934, which was an increase of 44%
within a year. The reduction in funding did not appear to stifle any efforts on the states, who
continued to fund their programs, far outpacing that of the federal government. Indeed,
Roosevelt, on the same day as issuing his new order rescinding Section 18 of E.O. 6166, sent a
message to Congress urging a 25% bump in the appropriation already being debated for
vocational programs in an effort to return their funding to early spring 1933 levels. For the fiscal
year 1935, Roosevelt sought to increase rehabilitation from $822,750 to $1,097,000; the total
budget for vocational programs was $1,305,000, of which rehabilitation received a full 84% of
the money allocated. The efforts of the NRA proved successful in defending their programs in
the face of one of the worst economic disasters in recent memory.65
Roosevelt’s quick use of the executive order limiting grant-in-aid programs followed by a
revocation order spoke to a larger issue regarding the New Deal itself. Many historians have
argued that the New Deal emerged too rapidly and did not address the limitations designed to
maintain a system of constraints on the various branches of government. Richard Hofstadter
referred to the New Deal rather pejoratively as a “chaos of experimentation” and others have
followed suit. Roosevelt’s New Deal lacked a coherent ideology; Executive Order 6166 was an
attempt to curb government spending, but it was issued without much thought about what was
being cut or which agencies were being reorganized. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
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FDR issued a revocation order less than a year later, essentially backtracking and trying to save
face for acting before he knew all of the details.66
The administration, however, looked toward a bigger picture developing in 1934 and into
1935. One of Roosevelt’s early campaign promises sought to develop a system for old age
pensions for America’s nearly 30 million senior citizens. He tasked Secretary of Labor Francis
Perkins to create legislation that sought to provide a form of social safety net for America’s
elderly. Roosevelt predicted that these Americans would retire from the workforce if they had
some form of economic sustenance on which to rely upon retirement. The result was the
“Economic Security Act,” which would be renamed the Social Security Act. The bill, drafted by
New Deal lawyers, appeared to run afoul of established constitutional principles, but Perkins
received clandestine advice from Justice Harlan Fisk Stone. The Supreme Court Justice
explained to the Labor Secretary how, under the taxing power of Congress, the federal
government could do just about anything. The Social Security Act, therefore, framed itself as a
social safety net using the guise of a payroll tax in order to pass constitutional scrutiny.67
The passage of the Social Security Act in August 1935 brought sweeping changes to
American society. No longer were senior citizens going to go without should they retire from the
active workforce. The government would send them a monthly stipend on which they could live
beginning at the age of 65. More importantly, America’s vocational programs received a huge
stimulus from the Social Security Act. States reported to the Federal Board of Vocational
Education that rehabilitation efforts were increasing and results were mostly positive. The NRA
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saw these results as a vindication for their efforts in lobbying for more funding. Vocational
rehabilitation was up for reauthorization in 1935, and the NRA convened its legislative
committee to meet the deadline.68
Rather than pursue similar avenues of reauthorization that had proved successful in the
past, the NRA’s legislative committee decided to push for a more permanent solution. John Kratz
advised the NRA’s leadership to urge Congress to include vocational rehabilitation within the
new Social Security Act. John Lee, chairman of the NRA’s legislative committee, agreed and
altered their plans from a new three-year reauthorization toward permanent inclusion within the
Act’s framework. To this end, the NRA worked closely with Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins
and received President Roosevelt’s approval, and their collaboration secured Title V of the
Social Security Act to include permanent federal funding for the rehabilitation of the nation’s
disabled workers. Though little else changed for vocational rehabilitation’s operational structure,
the Social Security Act did allow for states to request any unused funds returned to the Treasury
to be reallocated; rehabilitation still existed as a grant-in-aid scheme on a matching basis. The
NRA claimed a major victory in rehabilitation’s permanent status. Roosevelt’s approval signified
not only his remorse for the actions of Executive Order 6166 but also represented a ringing
endorsement for the value that rehabilitation added to the nation’s workforce.69
Vocational rehabilitation overcame the limitations of the Great Depression and continued
to expand during the 1930s and into the war years. The NRA quickly became the voice of
rehabilitation officials and workers across the nation. They represented the fusion of civil servant
and social scientist advocates. The organization occupied a powerful position among
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professional groups due to its composition of rehabilitation officials who occupied a publicly
appointed position as an administrator, as well as a position as a nongovernmental organization
representing a profession. This status made the NRA more influential among members of
Congress and the several states.
The power and influence of the NRA during the late 1920s and early 1930s was reigned
in by the consolidation of the administrative state in the aftermath of the New Deal. Between
1936 and 1940, as Congress opened investigations into potential corruption, federal agencies
began internal inspections of their subsidiary programs. The Federal Board for Vocational
Education followed suit and audited state rehabilitation programs. Investigations found evidence
of financial and political malfeasance. In the aftermath, the Federal Board took direct control; the
NRA had seemingly been marginalized by the administrative state.
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Chapter 3
“Legitimating Social Welfare:
The Consolidation of the Administrative State, 1934-1939”

In November 1939, Robert Lee Bynum, Director of the Tennessee Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation, appeared in front of the Tennessee Board of Education. Bynum, whom the Board
had suspended in August with pay for sixty days and again on October 10 without pay, was set to
defend his actions as the state’s top rehabilitation official. The decision for suspension stemmed
from a prolonged federal audit of the state’s expenditures and with whom it conducted official
business using federal vocational rehabilitation funds. The Federal Board for Vocational
Education (FBVE) charged Bynum with “gross negligence and mal-administration.” Despite the
brevity of the charges, Benjamin Oscar Duggan, the newly appointed Tennessee Commissioner
of Education, conceded there appeared to be nothing criminal.1
This was a radical course of action that the FBVE took. Just a decade prior, the FBVE
declined to intervene in any state’s rehabilitation program, citing the position vocational
rehabilitation held within American society, namely education. Education was the realm of the
state, not federal, government; therefore, the FBVE adhered to its original role, defined by
federalism, and removed itself from daily administration.2 But, by 1939, not only was the FBVE,
under the leadership of John Aubel Kratz, auditing state expenditures, it dictated who a state
could hire and fire, at least nominally, from a state-run program. Kratz’s damning report
substantiated the charges against Bynum. Although the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation
(CVR) program was state-administered, the federal government, in the form of the FBVE, did
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not wish to see its financial resources linked to any corrupt or negligent dealings. It pressured the
Tennessee Board of Education, by threatening to withhold federal dollars, to take action.
Tennessee’s Board of Education voted 7 to 1 to sustain the federal report and dismissed Bynum
from his post, one he had held since 1923.3
Vocational rehabilitation, for its part, was a small program serving a specific subset of the
population. The CVR program, like other grants-in-aid, weathered the Depression by continuing
to perform its duties. Both the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, however, targeted the
rehabilitation program. Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur,
recommended the “shuttering of [welfare] programs to cut costs,” while Roosevelt, after
assuming the presidency, issued Executive Order 6166, which reduced all vocational programs
by 25% and abolished the FBVE as an independent federal agency. In response, the National
Rehabilitation Association and the American Vocational Association lobbied extensively against
this action. Roosevelt consequently rescinded his order in February 1934, stating that “after
further investigation,” it was revealed that a reduction in vocational rehabilitation services was
“not in the public interest.”4
The New Deal Democrats envisioned the state to have a moral obligation to provide
assistance to Americans who were struggling in the midst of the Depression. Indeed, the
administration urged Congress to pass a litany of legislation, which resulted in the “alphabet
soup” of federal agencies. All of these new agencies, such as the Civilian Conservation Corp
(CCC), the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the National Industrial Recovery
“State Board of Education Dismisses R.L. Bynum,” Nashville Banner, vol. 44, no. 215 (November 10, 1939), 1,
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Administration (NIRA), etc., served the purpose of providing relief to the American people and
set the country up for long-term recovery. The New Deal, moreover, sought to restore
Americans’ trust in the government. Republican economic policies, according to New Dealers,
were the source of the nation’s economic woes in the 1930s, and the solution was a strong
centralized state directing relief efforts.5
In order to restore Americans’ faith in the state, Congress launched a series of
investigations into corporate abuses, banking practices, and “industrial espionage.” Beginning in
1935, the United States Senate undertook investigations into these questionable endeavors. Led
by Alabama Senator and future Supreme Court justice Hugo Black, historian Michael Czaplicki
argues, these highly public hearings were an effort to prove to the American people that the New
Deal was worthy of being labeled an “ethical project.” Czaplicki concludes that the New Deal
state reinvigorated Congress’s ability to investigate and that these investigative committees
served as the battleground for the “promotion of transparency, assurance of accountability, and
willingness to produce knowledge” about corrupt practices in their quest to defend state
integrity.6
This chapter takes Czaplicki’s analysis forward. Rather than focus on the role of
Congress in its investigative capacity, it explores the role of federal agencies, notably the Federal
Board for Vocational Education, and these agencies helped restore confidence in state-run
programs. To this end, the chapter examines the consolidation of state power over
associationalism between 1935, with the adoption of the Social Security Act, and 1943, with the
expansion of vocational rehabilitation services during the height of World War II. This chapter
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traces the shifting sands of federalism during the latter half of the 1930s as cooperative
federalism gave way to coercive federalism. The chapter argues that the Civilian Vocational
Rehabilitation program became a battleground for federal agencies to assert their power, and
while the CVR program was, nominally, state-run, it quickly became clear that the cost of federal
dollars was a loss of autonomy.
The chapter, furthermore, augments historian Alan Brinkley’s argument that 1937
marked the “end of reform” with the New Deal slowing down in its efforts to restore the nation’s
economy. Brinkley correctly asserts that governmental regulations were necessary for economic
recovery; the goal being to use the state to fix the flaws inherent to capitalism. However, when
examined in terms of state development, the period 1935-1939 was incredibly active. It may
have been the “end of reform” for capitalism, but reforming the state itself was just getting
underway. Moreover, the chapter enhances historian James Sparrow’s position about the
expansion of federal authority in the World War II era. Sparrow persuasively explains how
authority of federal agencies expanded at the expense of state and local power during World War
II; however, he argues that the Second War Powers Act of 1942 provided for the “one of the
biggest grants of executive discretion” in American history. Sparrow is partially correct here.
The delegation of power to the president did not occur in a vacuum; rather, it was the
culmination of the trajectory on which the federal government was heading by the time of Peral
Harbor in December 1941. The Reorganization Act of 1939 laid the foundations for the
consolidation of executive power by the early 1940s and it can be seen most visibly with the
creation of the Federal Security Agency (FSA) in 1939. In other words, the “warfare state”
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emerged as the product of several years of a slow, incremental coalescing of authority into the
federal bureaucracy.7
Robert Bynum’s dismissal, at the direction of the FBVE, characterized the consolidation
of federal authority of the era. The 1930s witnessed the dramatic expansion of federal power
with the implementation of FDR’s New Deal. Congress authorized federal agencies to take a
more direct role in overseeing their programs. This was in stark contrast to the governing
strategy Congress utilized in the decade prior. The United States of the 1920s, characterized by
demilitarization and economic prosperity overseen by Republican administrations, employed an
associational governance approach to fulfill federal policy. Non-state actors, such as the NRA,
quickly rose to positions of power within this authoritative vacuum. The emerging New Deal
state, however, effected massive bureaucratic change on the associational state. In the case of the
CVR program, these various non-state actors were pushed out of their previous administrative
capacities in favor of state-employed agents to carry out the daily operations of the public policy.
Securing Rehabilitation’s Permanency
In June 1934, following up on a campaign promise, President Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 6757 establishing a temporary agency, the Committee on Economic Security (CES), to
explore the “problems relating to economic security” and to propose “both a long-time and an
immediate program of legislation” for the administration and Congress to consider. To this end,
FDR assigned his Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins to chair the committee, which comprised
four cabinet secretaries, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Agriculture,
and the Attorney General, along with the Federal Emergency Relief Director. Several “technical
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experts” also provided the group valuable social scientific evidence in order to “hammer out the
precise terms” of a national program of social insurance. Perkins recalled FDR’s instructions
about the committee’s mission and his vision of the scope of economic security. When a person
grows up, Roosevelt reasoned, “he should know he will have old-age benefits…if he is sick or
crippled, he gets a benefit.” The president, in other words, wanted to create a social safety net for
those Americans who tended to fall through the cracks.8
Adjunct bureaucratic agencies handled much of the CES’s work. Executive Order 6757
created two “subordinate agencies to assist the Committee in the discharge of its assigned
duties.” These two agencies were the Advisory Council on Economic Security, which was
entirely comprised of private citizens from the business sector, and the Technical Board on
Economic Security, which, as the name suggests, was the staffed by technocrats who possessed
“special knowledge of the problems” brought before them. President Roosevelt appointed, at the
recommendation of the CES, Edwin E. Witte, a professor at the University of WisconsinMadison to serve as Executive Director of these subordinate agencies. Secretary Perkins
explained that the role of these advisory committees was to conduct studies and relay data and
conclusions to the CES for consideration into a final bill that was to be sent to Congress. Perkins
noted the advisory committees conducted wide-ranging research, including unemployment due
to “widowhood, maternity and cycles of business depression, and personal and psychological
reasons for unemployment.” Witte’s council also was tasked with examining the potential of
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“rehabilitating persons in dying or abandoned industries” as well as, more importantly,
unemployment caused by “invalidism” from birth or as the result of a workplace accident.9
The administration’s push for enacting such widespread legislation came from the ebb
and flow of public opinion. Beginning in the early 1930s, eight states adopted old-age pension
legislation in an effort to provide some economic relief to citizens over 65-years-old.
Policymakers in these states argued that senior citizens were at a significant disadvantage in
finding a well-paying job. Moreover, by the summer of 1934, demagogues, like Huey Long and
Francis Townsend, were gaining support among the unemployed population. Long’s “Share Our
Wealth Society” called for the confiscation of wealth from America’s richest citizens and the
direct redistribution of that capital to American families. Townsend fomented the “Townsend
Plan,” which sought to provide all Americans over the age of sixty a guaranteed monthly income
of $200; recipients were required to retire from the workforce and to spend their stipend within
the month received. Townsend proposed that a small sales tax fund the endeavor. The plan,
Townsend explained, would increase wages due to a limited workforce, take care of senior
citizens, and create a surge in economic activity due to the elderly population’s requisite
spending. FDR needed to act quickly if he was to politically capitalize on the growing social
calls for old-age insurance and social welfare.10
While Perkins and the CES met to discuss the data and potential system of federal
legislation for social security, officials with the National Rehabilitation Association (NRA)
gathered to begin the lobbying process for a funding extension. Congress required the CVR

Social Security in America, iii-iv; “Begins Wide Study of Social Needs: Professor Witte of Wisconsin Heads
Technical Inquiry of Roosevelt Committee,” The New York Times (July 29, 1934), 19.
10
Paul Douglas, Social Security in the United States: An Analysis and Appraisal of the Federal Social Security Act
(New York: Whittlesey House, 1939), 4-5; Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, 238, 224. The eight states with early oldage insurance provisions were Montana, Colorado, Nevada, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Utah.
9

125

program to get reauthorization every two years, a procedure which rehabilitation officials
successfully undertook since the first instance of congressional reapproval in 1922. Even at the
height of the Depression, Congress voted to extend the program’s funding another two years,
over the objections of some Hoover administration officials, which spoke to the government’s
faith in the program overall.
The CES studied a variety of social issues revolving around unemployment. Of those
problems, committee members continuously returned to the question of “invalidism.” In 1920,
Congress allocated funds for the vocational rehabilitation of those disabled as a result of an
accident or congenital condition. Sensing the need for further federal backing, Witte’s Advisory
Council recommended that any new social insurance legislation include, not only an increase in
funding for such programs, but also a section which made them permanent; Witte labeled this as
the “new federal responsibility” for social welfare.11
One of the major hurdles with which Secretary Perkins and the CES wrestled was the
constitutional authority for such a major shift in social policy. The Supreme Court played a
significant role in shaping New Deal public policy. By the summer and early fall of 1934, the
lower federal courts issued hundreds of staying orders against New Deal programs; two
programs, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery
Administration already had a date on the Court’s docket. In an oft-told story, members of the
CES received subtle hints from some of the Court’s more liberal justices about how to pass
constitutional scrutiny. One version has Secretary Perkins herself receiving a solution from
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone while having tea with his wife, another tells how Elizabeth Brandeis
Raushenbush obtained an answer from her father, Justice Louis Brandeis, on how to successfully
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adopt such a massive social program. Regardless of the story one chooses, the answer
consistently landed on Congress’s power to tax.12
The Depression had exposed the limitations of state and local governments’ abilities to
handle such a crisis. State relief funds quickly dried up and many Americans simply went
without. Roosevelt signaled his plan to overhaul the nation’s social welfare system and place the
federal government’s bureaucracy in charge of distributing funds and making sure Americans,
who were either elderly or dependent, were taken care of for perpetuity. In June 1934, FDR sent
a message to Congress informing them of his plan and that they ought to prepare for its arrival
once the CES made their final recommendations. He briefly sketched out the idea noting that the
bill would include old-age and unemployment insurance “in cooperation with the states,” which
was funded “by contribution rather than…general taxation.” More importantly for FDR, the
“federal government would have the responsibility of…maintaining and safeguarding the funds.”
Social security funds would go to the states, but it was the federal bureaucracy that dictated the
process in which this occurred. Though states, nominally, had a seat at the fiscal table, FDR
made no mistake about who held the upper hand.13
Roosevelt, however, was not completely sold on the idea of social security being a solely
federal endeavor. The president wanted the Economic Security bill to inspire “the states to take
action in the field of unemployment insurance.” In FDR’s mind, the idea of old-age insurance
and social welfare ought to be a product of associationalism, which held that federal policy
required the partnership and cooperation with state and local government in order to successfully
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be implemented. The core of the Economic Security bill was composed of a federal payroll tax
which employers and employees paid. The Social Security Board, the bill explained, oversaw
these funds and distributed them to the states in the form of block grants. This was nothing new
within the established federal-state relationship. Congress had utilized block grants to the states
for decades. The inclusion of social security merely continued a longstanding tradition.14
For state rehabilitation workers and NRA officials, the talk coming out of Washington
appeared to be quite positive for not only Americans’ economic woes in general, but for the
continuation of the CVR program specifically. By the autumn and early winter of 1934, the
NRA’s legislative committee worked tirelessly to obtain reauthorization. John Kratz, director of
the federal Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, advised the NRA’s leadership to urge
Congress to include the CVR program within the Economic Security bill, then being drafted by
the CES. John Lee, chairman of the NRA’s legislative committee, agreed and altered their plans
from a new three-year reauthorization toward permanent inclusion within the bill’s language.
Lee and his colleagues on the legislative committee received favorable responses from Secretary
Perkins and a ringing endorsement from FDR, who apparently felt remorseful for his earlier
blunder with Executive Order 6166. The CVR program provided a national service, one that the
CES could not overlook.15
The federal grant-in-aid system served as the driving force behind the original intent of
the Economic Security bill. In the first draft brought before Congress, Secretary Perkins
explained that “no federal financial aid was contemplated in either the unemployment insurance
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plans or the permanent program for old-age pensions” and that federal funds would only be used
to provide a stimulus to “States in meeting the immediate emergency problems of the indigent.”
Much of what the administration pushed for was conservative in its outlook. The Social Security
Board oversaw the dispersal of funds and made “temporary federal grants to States having
pension plans for old-age and indigent persons.” Moreover, the initial version of the bill provided
for the continuation of “aid for dependent children, the crippled and the handicapped.”
Vocational rehabilitation officials, it appeared, successfully secured their program’s funding
once again.16
On January 15, 1935, the CES presented its report to the president for his final approval.
This was a formality, however, since FDR had made his intentions known to the nation for
several months. A week prior, The New York Times reported, Roosevelt met with Speaker of the
House Joseph Byrns (D-TN) and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson (D-AR) to discuss the
Economic Security bill’s legislative trajectory. FDR advertised that he wanted “prompt action on
his program” and informed these congressional leaders that other legislative actions “could be
postponed until more pressing legislation,” meaning the Economic Security bill, faced a
congressional decision. The president sent the bill to Congress on January 17, 1935; the short
turnaround from receiving the final report from the CES to sending the Economic Security bill to
Congress suggests that FDR may have already had the legislation drafted.17
The Economic Security bill, sponsored by Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY) and
Representatives David J. Lewis (D-MD) and Robert L. Doughton (D-NC), commenced its
legislative journey in the House Ways and Means Committee. Surprisingly, the bill did not
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originate in the House Committee on Labor, which was much more radically liberal than the
more conservative Ways and Means Committee. The administration argued that should the bill
go before the Committee on Labor, it could emerge, as economist Paul Douglas argues, much
more liberalized and take on a “more radical position than it wished to assume.” William
Connery (D-MA) served as the chairman of the House Committee on Labor and was a supporter
of the “Lundeen Bill,” which was a more radical form of social security. Ernest Lundeen, a
Progressive-Farmer politician from Minnesota, originally sponsored the bill which called for a
drastic increase of income taxes in order to pay “average wages to all workers who lost their
jobs” for any reason. At FDR’s urging, the Senate assigned the bill to the Committee on Finance
in a similar move to the House.18
Despite the attempt to curb more moderate support, the Economic Security bill was
inherently a radical shift in federal social policy. Even though some states had previously
adopted legislation providing for old-age insurance for their elderly populations, the Economic
Security bill went much further. Some commentators, by March 1935, noted how the radical
nature of the proposal could effectively “doom” the measure before it could make it to the House
or Senate floor. Edwin Witte conceded that the bill was “a measure of great importance” and that
it required “entirely new policies” for a successful implementation. Though he expressed an
optimistic appraisal toward its passage, Witte did explain that FDR’s administration did not
expect “the congressional committee or the Congress to merely rubber stamp this bill.”
Moreover, the delivery of social security for Americans ran into some reservations from some of
FDR’s own political allies.19
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The House Ways and Means Committee commenced hearings on the bill on January 21,
1935, while the Senate Committee on Finance undertook hearings the next day. The Economic
Security bill, as drafted and introduced in January 1935, was nothing like its final counterpart.
While in the hearing process, which took three weeks in the House and nearly a month in the
Senate, the bill underwent significant amendments. One such amendment “sharply qualified”
what the bill labeled as “a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.” This was
done as a way to placate southern senators and representatives who felt that the bill, as written,
forced southern states to provide more assistance to African Americans.20 Congressmen from the
American West possessed similar sentiments when it came to Native Americans. Other
amendments to the bill included exempt vocations which the social insurance did not cover.
These included workers in agriculture, non-profit organizations, faith and worship leaders,
domestic servants, etc. Payments made to Americans who reached the age of sixty-five were
altered slightly so that a minimum income of $10 per month and a maximum income of $85 per
month was included. This figure was reached by calculating the total amount of wages
accumulated by an individual employee over the course of their working lifetime.21
Most importantly, states were no longer allowed to develop their own plans for dispersal
of funds without the consent of the federal Social Security Board. The bill, as amended, flew in
the face of FDR’s plan to have a cooperative structure of social security. The House Ways and
Means Committee determined that FDR’s cooperative proposal was not feasible. It concluded
that this system “would be accompanied by unequal rates of contributions.” Some businesses
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which were exempt from the payroll tax could still receive the tax credit from the state. In its
final recommendations, the committee overruled the administration’s plans and pushed for full
federal control of the social security program.22
By late March, the Economic Security bill appeared to stall in committee. The NRA had
secured support from the administration in securing vocational rehabilitation as a permanent
feature within what The New York Times deemed “the very heart of the social economics of the
New Deal.” Though FDR gave his approval for rehabilitation’s inclusion, the program once
again found itself in legislative limbo. The House Ways and Means Committee tabled the bill
until the Senate Committee on Finance concluded its “long-drawn-out investigation of the
National Recovery Administration.” This legislative snag, coupled with a growing “general
apathy” of several congressmen, led to serious jeopardy for social security as a whole. The
administration urged the passage of an omnibus bill which included all parts of society from the
initial draft. Reality, however, saw a more piecemeal approach being favored among
policymakers who argued that such a massive shift in public social policy was “too unwieldy and
too complex…and too ambitious…to adopt without greater consideration.” It appeared that only
one part, old-age insurance, was certain to pass. Other parts of FDR’s proposed measure, “such
as widow’s aid and child welfare will probably…be adopted,” but other parts, such as
unemployment insurance and aid to crippled Americans, would have to wait until the next
session of Congress convened. This development did not discourage the president or his cabinet.
Secretary Perkins, while on a speaking tour of California, urged educators, labor leaders, private
social clubs, and politicians to fight for the social security bill.23
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In response to Perkins’ call for politicians to support the social security bill in Congress,
some policymakers took it upon themselves to push for congressional authorization of some
established social programs. Representative Thomas Fletcher was one such example. The Ohio
Democrat filed HR 3050, which called for the continuation of the Civilian Vocational
Rehabilitation program. The bill was similar to previous installments crafted by the NRA’s
legislative committee. It was in direct response to the great uncertainty NRA officials found
themselves in following the legislative traffic jam in which social security found itself. Fletcher
noted the popularity of the vocational rehabilitation program and how it served a specific
purpose in getting America’s crippled population back to work. Representative Harry Sauthoff, a
Progressive from Wisconsin, joined Fletcher’s effort and defended the necessity of social welfare
programs such as vocational rehabilitation. Sauthoff read a telegram from former NRA president
and Wisconsin Director of Vocational Rehabilitation William F. Faulkes into the Congressional
Record noting the state currently had “over 14,000 physically-handicapped juveniles and adults”
and urging the reauthorization of vocational rehabilitation.24
By mid-April, the social security bill made its way out of the House Ways and Means
Committee and came to the House floor for debate. The bill had been amended once again and
now included Title V, a provision which called for the maintenance and implementation of social
welfare programs in the United States. Title V covered the protection of children and other
dependents. Vocational rehabilitation was tacked onto Title V as merely an afterthought. Though
congressional debates focused on homeless, dependent, and crippled children, vocational
rehabilitation received only a marginal mention as part of the overall grant to the states. Robert
L. Doughton (D-NC), the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, shepherded this
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section through Congress and explained that “these very essential services have been greatly
curtailed during the depression years” and that congressmen were now “fashioning the
foundation stones upon which will rest the happiness and welfare of future generations.”25
The social security bill, as reported out of the Ways and Means Committee, possessed all
of the characteristics of the omnibus bill envisioned by FDR and the CES. As a result,
Representative Fletcher addressed the House and motioned to withdraw his bill, which was
currently being heard by the House Committee on Education, in order “to avoid duplication” and
increase the efficiency of Congress. Fletcher noted that his bill “coincide[d] with the president’s
program on economic security” and that “it would be more practical to include vocationalrehabilitation legislation in the Economic Security Act” as a whole, rather than a piecemeal
process. The political winds had shifted once again, this time in favor of the omnibus approach to
a national social security program. Title V, moreover, did not garner much opposition from
congressional forces. Much of Title V sought simply to make permanent social programs that
had long been in existence, some adopted by conservative Republican administrations.26
Indeed, even conservative Republicans saw the merit of maintaining these aspects of
social welfare. The GOP legislatures of the 1920s adopted programs for maternity and infant
mortality in addition to the vocational rehabilitation program. During the reauthorization cycles
in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge urged Congress to continue funding for the program. By
1928, Coolidge pushed Congress to expand “that resultful, humanitarian legislation, which has
demonstrated its economic worth to the Nation” to include Washington, D.C. When the CVR
program entered a reauthorization cycle in the early stages of the Great Depression, President
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Herbert Hoover supported the measure when it came before Congress, and maintained the
cooperative nature of the federal-state grant-in-aid system typical of the period.27
For congressmen debating the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, like Thomas
Fletcher, the continuation of the CVR program was a positive force for the nation-at-large. He
reminded his colleagues that Title V in general, and the CVR program specifically, applied to a
small population of Americans. He explained how “forty-five states and the District of Columbia
[were] now engaged in vocationally rehabilitating their disabled citizens.” Fletcher estimated that
there were approximately 3 crippled adults out of every 1,000 Americans; of this number, he
figured only 1 out of that 1,000 qualified for rehabilitation services. The population that qualified
and feasible to train, Fletcher pontificated, amounted to no more than 1 in every 5,000 of the
general population. For those congressmen who still were not convinced, Fletcher laid bare the
economics of rehabilitation. Simply put, “the total cost of training a disabled person and placing
[them] in remunerative employment…averages less than $300,” compared to the “$300 to $500
per year to maintain such a person in idleness” in an institution. With his calculations, the Ohio
Democrat concluded that if 1 out of every 5,000 qualified and were feasible for rehabilitation,
coupled with the increasing accident and population rate, the country could see upwards of
25,000 new qualified clients annually; this amounted to nearly $12,500,000 in yearly upkeep at
an institution. In the midst of an economic disaster, the bottom-line argument carried the day.28
Outside of the debate over Title V, there was not much opposition to the continuation of
social programs that bore measurable results. The House voted in favor of the Social Security bill
on April 19, 1935 with a vote of 371 to 33. The final vote took place after the House heard and
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voted down no less than twenty-five amendments to the original legislation reported by the Ways
and Means Committee. There was fierce debate over some of these amendments, such as the
Lundeen bill and the Townsend Plan. Two such amendments, the Greenway Amendment and the
Ekwall Amendment, threatened to undo the whole system which the administration envisioned.
The Greenway Amendment, sponsored by Representative Isabella Greenway (D-AZ), proposed
that the federal government bore the responsibility of funding social security. Grants to states
worked in many instances, but something of this magnitude, Greenway reasoned, required
federal leadership. She argued that “many states will have to amend their constitutions to qualify
for federal aid.” The states, in 1935, simply did not possess the capability to implement such a
policy. “We are dealing here with people who are helpless,” she explained. “We are considering
not a distribution of wealth, but a distribution of necessity.” John W. McCormack (D-MA) led
the opposition to Greenway’s Amendment holding that if the House voted in favor of
supplanting the duty of the states with federal power, “a disintegration of our dual system of
government would result.” Though McCormack urged his colleagues to preserve the “dual
system of government” that had come to dictate federal-state relations since the conclusion of the
Civil War, the Social Security Act, ultimately, served to undermine that very relationship
McCormack sought to uphold.29
The House sent the Social Security bill to the Senate in late April, which assigned it to
the Senate Committee on Finance. The bill underwent more revisions while in committee, but it
was voted out favorably and went to the Senate floor. Interestingly, the Senate amendments did
not concern the social welfare provisions of Title V, where aid to dependent Americans, widows,
children, and the disabled, were found. Section 531, which governed the CVR program, received
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only scant attention to its semantics, suggesting that Senators had no opposition to providing
federal aid to Americans with disabilities. Senator Pat Harrison (D-MS), chair of the Committee
on Finance, explained how the social security bill before the Senate did not create any new
welfare programs, it simply made current programs permanent. The Committee on Finance had
more issues with the administration of the program. The Social Security Board (SSB), the agency
tasked with governing the dispersal of funds to the states, was the primary target of Senators. The
House version of the bill called for the SSB to be its own agency, fully independent of the
Department of Labor; the Board was beholden to the President alone. The Senate recommended
the SSB be placed under the direction of the Department of Labor and argued that “it was
inadvisable to create new independent agencies” while other administrative departments with
“closely related functions” already existed. The Senate was, apparently, not in the mood to
expand the federal bureaucracy.30
Indeed, the Senate debated the House amendments concerning the expansion of the
national state and its influence over the individual states. The Social Security Board’s
independent nature caused some policymakers to question the House’s judgement. Moreover, the
House version prohibited the states from creating industry reserves; the Senate Committee on
Finance felt this was a step too far and took an opposite approach. States ought to be permitted to
establish their own industry reserves for a more efficient use of federal grants. The major driving
force behind the change of policy came on May 6, 1935, when the Supreme Court in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company held the Railway Pension Act unconstitutional.
The Court found that the Act violated of the commerce clause as well as the Fifth Amendment’s
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due process protections. This decision led some senators to reconsider the role of the states and
their ability to choose. The power of choice was how federal policies pre-New Deal were sold to
states weary of federal authority.31
Federal authority and its limits played a significant role in the Senate debate on the Social
Security Act. While senators bickered over whether the Social Security Board ought to reside
within the Department of Labor or the placement of the Oxford comma within each section of
the bill, the Supreme Court continued its decimation of the New Deal platform. On May 27,
1935, the Court handed down three unanimous decisions hostile to FDR’s policies. Though the
facts of each case differed somewhat, the Court’s rationale was remarkably similar. The justices
declared that Congress violated the separation of powers and unconstitutionally delegated too
much legislative power to the president. In the wake of these decisions, minority voices rose to
discredit the bill. One of the more vocal was Representative John Baker Hollister (R-OH) who
flatly opposed the bill on constitutional grounds. He chastised his Democratic colleagues for
pushing such a massive change in federal policy onto the states and the American people.
Hollister noted his opposition was “because it purports to do what it cannot do.” As historian
Michelle Dauber explains, the Supreme Court’s “Black Monday” decisions provided some
policymakers “an excuse” to go against the will of the president.32
Despite the shaky constitutional ground of the bill in the late spring 1935, the Senate
voted in favor of it and sent it back to the House for their final consideration. The Senate,
ultimately, adopted the House’s proposal on placement of the Social Security Board. Senators

31

Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. 295 U.S. 230 (1935); Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 144. See
Massachusetts v. Mellon 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
32
See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States 295 U.S. 602 (1935), Louisville Bank v. Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935),
and Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 U.S. 495 (1935); John Hollister, Speech on the House Floor,
Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 79, part 9 (June 19, 1935), 9681; Dauber, The Sympathetic
State, 144-145.

138

agreed to the agency’s independence of the Department of Labor, which was a win for the
president. The question of compulsory old-age insurance still lingered on the minds of both
representatives and senators, with Senator Bennett Champ Clark (D-MO) submitting an
amendment to that part of the bill. Clark believed that old-age insurance, required by the state,
unfairly pushed private insurance companies out of the market. His proposal sought to permit the
inclusion of these private enterprises within Social Security. The question of old-age insurance
and who would ultimately be the guarantor of it resulted in an unexpected stall for much of the
summer, but a compromise reached with Senator Clark and his supporters allowed the bill to
pass both chambers by August 5; FDR signed it on August 14, 1935.33
The passage of the Social Security Act was a cause celebré for vocational rehabilitation
workers and NRA officials. The Act not only made their program a permanent fixture within the
national welfare apparatus, it also increased its annual funding. Social welfare received a
significant boost in federal contributions to the states from the new legislation. Congress
appropriated $98,500,000 for Social Security in 1935. Of that, old-age insurance received nearly
half of that amount coming in at $49,750,000. The remainder went to the various social programs
Congress included within the omnibus framework of the law. According to Edwin Witte, a full
third went to America’s dependent population, children receiving the lion’s share; however,
“approximately one-twelfth was to be allocated to vocational rehabilitation.” This resulted in
federal funds of $841,000 per year for the fiscal years 1935-1936 and 1936-1937, in addition to
the already appropriated funds for the CVR program. Moreover, beginning in 1938, that figure
jumped to $1,938,000 annually and on a permanent basis.34
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The NRA had scored a huge victory with the Social Security Act; rehabilitation, it
appeared, was a popular program and one that policymakers saw possessed positive economic
results. No longer did the NRA and its legislative committee need to lobby congressmen for
reauthorization. The program had proven its worth to the American people. In 1935, for example,
while debates raged in Congress over Social Security, the CVR program reported 9,422 people
were rehabilitated. The increase in funding allowed the program to break 10,000 completed
rehabilitation plans for the first time in 1936. Though NRA members and rehabilitation
auxiliaries praised the financial and policy gains they achieved from the Social Security Act, the
increase in federal dollars brought with it an increase in federal control. As the second half of the
1930s began to unfold, the federal-state cooperative relationship would be sorely tested.35
Tightening the Federal Grip on Rehabilitation
On May 24, 1937, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Helvering v. Davis, which
upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act. In Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s majority
opinion, the Court found Social Security’s payroll tax to be a constitutionally permissible
exercise of the taxing and spending power in pursuit of “providing for the general welfare.”
Cardozo explained that Congress was the appropriate institution to pursue such a massive policy
since “the problem is plainly national in area and dimensions” and that the “laws of the separate
states cannot deal with it effectively.” In a separate decision, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
Cardozo went further stating that since “the states were unable to give the requisite relief,” it fell
to the federal government to develop a solution. Congress and the federal agencies that it
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established received a judicial blessing to take the lead in implementing social welfare across the
nation. For all intents and purposes, the federal government was now in control.36
The Court’s opinions in these cases came as a judicial consecration for the economic
heart of FDR’s agenda. Moreover, Roosevelt’s massive policy shift placed the federal
bureaucracy in the driver’s seat of federal-state relations. The losses in court pushed conservative
watchdog groups to hold the New Deal’s programs accountable rather than overturn them.
Organizations, like the American Liberty League and other “property holders’ associations,”
who opposed much of the New Deal plan as “a monstrous usurpation of power” shifted their
focus toward maintaining efficiency and rooting out corruption. With respect to vocational
education and rehabilitation, the FBVE assumed this responsibility. Like other agencies, the
FBVE received new authority from the New Deal state in general, and the Social Security Act
specifically, to oversee all the functions of America’s vocational programs.37
The driving force behind this new move was a renewed sense of authority within the
federal agency. Scholars have, for some time now, examined the role of the state agency as an
agent of historical change. They occupy a murky realm between the high political actors and the
frontline agents. By the 1920s, as Stephen Skowronek has observed, the United States had
completely reconfigured its state structure where “new centers of rule-making” emerged to
implement federal policy. Other scholars, such as Richard John, note how agencies played a role
in this governing strategy since the early Republic. In essence, governmental agencies had taken
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over as the administrative wing of the government. But what did this mean for the associational
state as a governing strategy?38
The New Deal did more than simply restore Americans’ faith in capitalism. It established
a new political order that placed the civil bureaucracy, at the federal level, in control of social
programs. While popular opinion interpreted the New Deal as the paragon of the new welfare
state, governmental agencies targeted corruption, inefficiency, and waste in order to assume the
mantle of legitimacy within American society; vocational rehabilitation, though a smaller cog in
the New Deal machine, was not immune to such federal oversight. In the autumn of 1936, FDR
appointed an oversight committee to “study the effects of federal aid on vocational
rehabilitation.” Dr. Floyd Reeves, a professor at the University of Chicago, chaired the
committee which was the first federal oversight into the CVR program since its inception, but it
was not to be the last. In 1937-1938, the FBVE began a series of audits of state programs to root
out such questionable practices. Historian Alan Brinkley contends that the late 1930s marked
“the end of reform” for capitalism, however, state reform had just begun. The FBVE, operating
in the senatorial umbra of Hugo Black’s congressional investigations, moved to purge third-party
vendors and other non-state actors from the administration of the CVR program. Though
rehabilitation was nominally under the control of each state’s department, it became clear, by
1939, that the FBVE dictated administrative policies. The language of the law prohibited direct
federal control over these programs, but it the Social Security Act provided the FBVE with new
authority over the dispersal of federal dollars, which it used to coerce states into falling in line.39
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In no other state was this coercion more directly felt than in Tennessee. Tennessee’s
rehabilitation program continued to function without major problems from the very day it was
initiated. Successive gubernatorial administrations, from both political parties, lauded its
operation as a success well into the 1930s. By 1936, however, the winds were rapidly changing
within the administration of the rehabilitation program. The Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation, since November 1923, had labored under the direction of Robert L. Bynum, who
Governor Austin Peay appointed to the position after the resignation of Robert White. Bynum’s
tenure guided Tennessee’s CVR program through the financial uncertainties of the Republican
administrations of the 1920s and the economic chaos of the Depression. Moreover, his time in
office demonstrated a new commitment to the rehabilitation of the state’s disabled population. In
order to fulfill the requirements his office, Bynum reached out to community leaders for help in
locating potential clients from the periphery of rural Tennessee; these included local school
officials, private business leaders, and philanthropic organizations.40
As the New Deal took hold across the country, state officials realized vocational
rehabilitation was slowly being consolidated under the FBVE. Prior to 1936, Bynum’s division
operated on a sort of honor code and network of acquaintances. Very little, if anything, was
actually spelled out in writing. The FBVE took notice of Tennessee’s operation and unofficial
partnerships with these private entities. They strongly suggested Bynum create some form of
contract with them, rendering them adjuncts to official state business. Seeing the forest for the
trees, Bynum moved to justify private, non-state actors so that they could carry out official

Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Richard
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage, 1955).
40
“Minutes of the Tennessee State Board of Education,” November 8, 1923, Papers of Governor Austin Peay, 19231927, TSLA, Record Group 40, File 24.

143

duties. Some of these entities, such as the Junior League, became paid staff on the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation’s payroll.41
Much of this auxiliary rehabilitation work came from two specific sources: The Junior
League of Memphis and Toler’s Business College in Paris, Tennessee. Since the 1920s, the
Junior League operated the Memphis office for vocational rehabilitation. Begun in 1901 in New
York City by wealthy socialite Mary Harriman Rumsey, the Junior League spread across the
nation. By 1920, it had chapters in 82 cities and counted nearly 17,000 members nationwide.
Working in conjunction with vocational rehabilitation satisfied two goals of the Junior League:
engaging in charitable community service and, second, breaking with the perceived image of
being an upper-class social club. The Memphis chapter successfully presented themselves in this
way.42
The longtime president of the Junior League of Memphis, Frances Shields, used her
position as executive officer of her local chapter to act as the caseworker for potential clients.
After stepping down from the presidency, Shields continued to locate and interview people with
disabilities within the City of Memphis and greater Shelby County. Under the new agreement,
the Junior League would deposit $2,400 with the Tennessee State Treasurer. The Smith-Fess Act
allowed for donations to be made to state programs for matching federal funds allocated; the
money from the Junior League, therefore, received a match from the federal government to help
pay the salary and travel for the supervisor and secretary for the Memphis office, which, in
actuality, was a member of the Junior League itself. The FBVE insisted state officials place the
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duties of the Junior League, as a non-state actor, in writing. The move was a clear departure from
the practice of allowing the states to conduct their programs as they chose.43
By 1939, however, the FBVE decided to move in a different direction with regards to
having third-party, non-state actors involved with the daily administration of the CVR program.
These people, such as Shields and Charles Toler, had served as adjuncts to Tennessee’s
vocational rehabilitation program and acted as gatekeepers to social benefits. With the
consolidation of federal power taking place, the FBVE sent its agents to the various states in
order to audit their programs and identify any inefficiencies and malpractices. The FBVE divided
the nation into regional sectors; the southern region reported to Tennessee native Homer Bryce
Cummings, known among rehabilitation officials as the “Father of Rehabilitation,” due to his
work on the Army Medical Board during World War I. In the course of his audit, Cummings
discovered numerous discrepancies among Tennessee’s practices and bookkeeping. In January
1939, the FBVE released its report highlighting Cummings’ criticisms of inadequate record
keeping on the part of Bynum’s state division.44
In November 1938, Tennessee voters elected Prentice Cooper to serve as their next
governor. Upon his inauguration, Cooper cleaned house and appointed new department heads for
the state’s executive agencies. For Commissioner of Education, Cooper chose University of
Tennessee education professor Benjamin Oscar Duggan. Duggan entered office in the winter of
1939 already faced with a potential scandal. In the first weeks of his tenure, Duggan received the
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Federal Board’s report and Cummings’ recommendations. His subordinate, Robert Bynum,
continued in his position as Director of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. The federal
report opened Duggan’s eyes and raised numerous red flags about one of the state’s longestserving civil servants. Simultaneously, the agreement with the Junior League was set to expire at
the end of September. Duggan’s challenge seemed to grow larger with each passing day; it
appeared Bynum had lost control of the Division.45
After Frances Shields stepped down from her leadership role at the Junior League, she
was succeeded by Leila Wade Chaney who sought to strengthen the relationship between the
Junior League and the state of Tennessee. Based on the direction and recommendation that the
Federal Board was moving in the late 1930s, attempting to remove any corrupt practices and
strengthening public support, a new contract had to be negotiated and signed by all parties
involved. The agreement Chaney referred to was the renewal contract; the original expired on
September 30, 1938. The Tennessee Board of Education took up the renewal process and
constructed a new agreement in the fall of 1938; however, Chaney explained that the Junior
League objected to many of the terms of the contract. Of the more blatant terms the League
found outrageous was the early termination date of June 30, 1939 rather than the usual and
understood September 30. The Board of Education cited the June 30 end date as the end of the
state’s fiscal year. Bynum, playing the part of mediator, protested the new date of termination.
He argued that chapters of the Junior League nationwide “adopt a project” with which to work
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each year; the League’s project year reflected the federal fiscal year: October 1 to September 30.
By terminating at the end of June, the League “will be three months without a project.”46
There was good reason for the Tennessee Board of Education’s shift in policy by setting
an earlier termination date with the League. The federal audit provided several recommendations
for the state to consider, and the FBVE expected the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to
adopt these changes and reorganize the whole program. Listed as the very first recommendation
was the termination of any relationships with non-state actors. The FBVE, seeking to work only
with the state, required the establishment of a “bona fide branch office” in the city of Memphis
“in connection with some public agency, preferably with the public-school system.” The FBVE,
and the federal government, did not defeat associational governance; rather, the FBVE redefined
it. Associationalism morphed from a public-private endeavor into a national-state-local system.
The FBVE partnered with local schools over local businesses; no longer did the FBVE deal with
private organizations as case managers, and, by extension, neither did the individual state
programs. State-employed civil servants conducted government business; it would not be
conducted by philanthropic groups seeking a side project.47
The FBVE’s reservations about non-state actors participating in state business and
spending public money were well-founded. In tandem with the Junior League issue, during the
summer of 1939, an audit of the Division’s finances showed some major discrepancies on the
part of Director Bynum. Annual reports reflected two different amounts of money left over in
Tennessee’s rehabilitation account. According to J.C. Wright, the Assistant Commissioner for
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Vocational Education, Bynum reported a balance of $4,118.21, but the audit reported only
$3,548.13; Wright quickly sent a letter to both Bynum and Duggan directing them to “establish
an ‘actual’ balance” for Tennessee’s rehabilitation expenses. In other words, Wright pondered
where the money went.48
In an attempt to save face, Bynum sent a memo to Commissioner Duggan outlining all of
the Division’s major expenditures. He argued the $4,118.21 was a “credit” that the Tennessee
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation was entitled to from the United States Office of Education
and rejected the idea that it was from any gifts or donations made by private organizations. The
Junior League had, by July, stopped its annual tribute to the state since federal officials had
“recommended” they cease a working relationship. Bynum wrote to Cummings asking him to
help fix the issue, and Cummings informed him that he was making a special trip to Nashville to
resolve the discrepancy.49
Cummings’ visit to Nashville coincided with the State Board of Vocational Education’s
quarterly meeting. On August 11, 1939, the Board met to discuss their regular business, the
approval of salaries, the hiring and dismissal of rehabilitation workers, etc., but the minutes of
the meeting reflected something else. Much of their time was spent discussing the federal report
on Tennessee’s vocational rehabilitation program. The FBVE did not simply highlight a simple
accounting error, it uncovered a history of mismanagement and negligence on the part of the
director. The FBVE’s recommendation to reorganize Tennessee’s Division was not made from
just an efficiency perspective; rather, it was made to pressure state officials into sacking Robert
Bynum and replacing him with someone else. The members of the State Board voted to place
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Director Bynum on a sixty-day suspension with pay “pending a hearing, or until the matter is
settled.”50
The Board agreed to hold a special session of the Vocational Committee at the end of the
sixty-day period. On October 10, 1939, the Board met again to discuss the actions of Robert
Bynum and what his fate may be. Members of the Committee prepared for the hearing; they
requested the advice and opinion of William Eagle, the Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee.
Commissioner Duggan was conflicted between his official duties to administrate the Department
of Education and his obligation to his long-time friend, Robert Bynum. Duggan lamented to the
Committee that, “It has been and still is a heavy obligation on me to have to take charge of the
investigation and take part in doing what I wish very much I did not have to do…There is no
prejudice in my mind nor ill-will in my heart for Col. Bynum.” Though Duggan made it clear at
the outset that this was not a judicial inquiry, the vibe among the committee members was more
akin to a criminal jury than an administrative board.51
Robert Bynum’s counsel, Judge Joseph Higgins, requested that Bynum be given the
opportunity to make a statement regarding the findings of the federal report. The Board granted
his request. Bynum vehemently denied all of the charges made against him by the FBVE,
especially those of gross negligence and mal-administration. He served as the director for sixteen
years and for the majority of his tenure, Bynum did not have a full staff. Indeed, it was not until
1933 when the state received aid in their rehabilitation efforts. During the initial months of the
New Deal, the federal government sent seven relief workers to help evaluate applications and
interview clients; Bynum was quick to list his duties ranging from caseworker to welfare worker
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to administrator. Bynum’s defense, therefore, was the job was too big for one person and
mistakes were made.52
As the federal audit made clear, those mistakes were not simple accounting errors.
Assistant Commissioner J.C. Wright pointed out to Commissioner Duggan back in July 1939
that from 1936 onward, there were significant balances remaining in the state coffers of federal
funds. What was alarming was the lack of a balance ending 1938; unexpended money could roll
over to the next year, so long as the amount was deducted from the new fiscal year’s federal
allotment. Wright and the federal auditors contended that Bynum did not make this deduction
and the money, calculated in the tens-of-thousands of dollars, simply went missing. If the state
did not immediately make restitution, then the FBVE, under John Kratz’s order, was ready to
suspend, or if necessary, revoke future allotments to Tennessee. The fallout of the loss of such a
popular program did not bode well for the state’s disabled population.53
The heart of the financial issue centered on Bynum’s alleged misuse of federal funds for
daily administrative business. As the Smith-Fess Act and then the Social Security Act made
clear, funds were available for the training purposes of clients in vocational programs. As the
Nashville Banner reported in November 1939, of the nine charges levied against him by the
federal auditors, four were directly tied to the mismanagement of funds. What Bynum had done
was use state and federal funds, earmarked for training and boarding of clients, and charged it to
transportation. Furthermore, under his watch, all secretarial help had been paid from
transportation funds without any permission. The State Board for Vocational Education voted
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overwhelmingly to accept the federal report as written in August, but at the November meeting,
they would decide how to proceed with its now suspended director.54
The attention of federal officials did not only come from the misspending of federal funds
in violation of the law. After the FBVE’s lengthy and extensive survey, it concluded that
Bynum’s Division did not appear to serve all Tennesseans, while those it did serve were
disproportionately placed in vocational tracks with “a very narrow scope of objectives.”
According to the federal survey, the majority of people accepted into training programs by
Bynum’s administration were between 16 and 21 years of age (41%). People with disabilities
over the age of 30 were relatively marginalized. Cummings argued Bynum discriminated against
older clients and provided them with “improper selection of the type of training.” Of those
approved for vocational training, 47.5% of them were provided with a rehabilitation plan which
sent them to a business college. Though this number was not itself shocking prima facia, when
compared to the FBVE’s Southern District, comprising most of the former Confederate States,
this figure was downright disproportionate. The region, as a whole, saw 18% of its clients going
to business schools; so, the question remained, why did Bynum approve such a high number of
these plans?55
Bynum fervently defended his actions against the questions of the committee members.
To Bynum, he was not discriminating against older people seeking rehabilitation services; rather,
he was following the directives of the Federal Board, the same directives he followed for over a
decade. Bynum cited the Federal Board’s own publication to defend his actions. In 1936, the
Federal Board issued Vocational Education Bulletin No. 190 that offered tips and frequently
asked questions to the state programs and where the Federal Board’s position on certain subjects
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stood. With respect to people applying for rehabilitation services, the government’s position was
clear: disability is not uniform and must be approached from an individual basis. Therefore,
disabled workers must meet certain requirements for rehabilitation training; it was not
economically feasible for the program to accept everyone. Clients must possess some level of
feasibility; funds were finite and state programs could overlook a person who was middle-aged
in favor of a younger individual. As the Bulletin crassly explained, rehabilitation agents were
“not miracle workers.”56
The maxim of rehabilitation workers not being miracle workers appealed to Bynum and
influenced the way he operated the Division. That same document also noted the economic
importance of vocational rehabilitation overall. States must look at potential clients as a business
investment and they should give more favor to those with a longer working lifespan than
someone who was middle-aged. Bynum’s counsel, Judge Higgins, probed the director further
about the alleged special treatment of younger applicants. Getting a bit more frustrated, Bynum
answered his representative, “The young everywhere are being trained and they should be.” The
number of younger people was higher due to easier referrals from local educators. “One boy or
girl tells another, ‘why don’t you apply for rehabilitation?’ They go to the university, to the
teacher’s colleges. ‘You can get help from the State.’ Well, they do.” It was not, according to
Bynum, a policy of downplaying older applicants in favor of younger applicants; rather, it was
disproportionately younger due to a de facto circumstance.57
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It made sense to Bynum and others that many of the potential clients came from the
public school systems around the state. But the numbers the federal surveyors reached did not
completely match Bynum’s claim. In their analysis, public education staff and faculty amounted
to only 4.4% of the number cases referred to the Division. The vast majority, nearly half
(47.8%), were self-reported cases. This figure included all applications, not just those from
people under the age of twenty-one. Teachers and administrators were not actively referring their
students to rehabilitation services. It appeared that students were actively seeking out services on
their own volition. Though Bynum perhaps misinterpreted the truth, the committee members
overlooked it. What got their attention was the rehabilitation plans for these clients, not
necessarily their age distribution.58
It was widely understood that clients were entitled to a say in their rehabilitation plan.
Rehabilitation counselors interviewed clients and, with the client’s input, crafted a plan which
fulfilled the client’s economic hopes, while maintaining a course of action in-line with their
physical and intellectual capabilities. In some cases, as the FBVE noted, the rehabilitation plans
appeared forced onto the client or were not suited to their individual needs and abilities. Fred
Adams, for example, lost his right hand while working as a box cutter. He possessed a fifthgrade education and was uncertain about a training program, writing, “I am open to suggestions,”
on his application. Though Bynum questioned his intellectual stamina, he nonetheless approved
Adams’ rehabilitation plan to attend Mountain City Business College with training courses in
bookkeeping and clerical work.59
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Adams’ experience and rehabilitation plan were typical of many clients during Bynum’s
tenure. The state sent nearly half of its clients to a business school with many being placed at
Toler’s Business College in Paris, Tennessee. Others in Middle and East Tennessee attended
institutions like Draughon’s Business College (now Draughon’s Junior College). It was this
pattern that drew the attention of the FBVE in the first place. Moreover, the affiliation between
Bynum and Charles Toler was more akin to a symbiotic relationship where one critic described
the two as “thick as peas politically and the best of friends.” Toler had, in the early days of the
CVR program, served in an unofficial administrative role. He pursued referrals, interviewed
applicants, and aided Bynum’s office with the creation of rehabilitation plans. During the 1920s
and early 1930s, this sort of practice was not only allowed, but also encouraged by the FBVE.60
With the implementation of the New Deal, the federal government sought to reclaim its
moral authority and legitimacy. Agencies like the FBVE moved to stamp out any potential
corruption. The high level of clients being approved for courses at business schools, like Toler’s,
drew a closer attention from state and federal officials. A more questionable link went public in
September 1939. Not even a year into Prentice Cooper’s administration, a disgruntled
constituent, Vance Tilley, wrote the governor applauding the actions of the State Board for
Vocational Education in suspending Robert Bynum. During the campaign of Governor Cooper’s
predecessor, Gordon Browning, Tilley met with Bynum to discuss a potential partnership with
his institution, the Dickinson School, and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. After
months of being strung along, Tilley realized Bynum was not going to send any rehabilitation
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clients to his facility in Dickinson, even though two of the Division’s caseworkers came to
inspect the school and reported it favorably to the administration.61
Unfortunately for Tilley, Bynum did not respond favorably to him or the business school
that he operated. Instead, Tilley claimed the Division sent “the state’s cripples” to Bynum’s old
friend Claude Toler. Sensing some backdoor corrupt bargain between Bynum and Toler, Tilley
wrote the new governor inquiring if he could intervene on Tilley’s behalf. The superintendent of
the Dickinson School not only called out Bynum’s alleged scandalous dealings, he went so far as
to call for Bynum’s immediate dismissal and subsequent trial for graft. Tilley drafted a series of
probing questions that he uncovered during his quest for his own exclusive deal with the state.
He called out Bynum’s refusal as an example of the South’s “good ol’ boy system” and that
rehabilitation clients received a lower quality training course at a “school…equipped only with
typewriters and…located in an unimportant town, commercially speaking.”62
Tilley’s letter to Governor Cooper highlighted what the federal audit already discovered
and shared with the State Board for Vocational Education. In their eyes, too many clients were
being sent to educational institutions than were being trained in trades. All told, Bynum approved
and sent 74.7% of the state’s rehabilitation clients to either a private business school or a public
university in Tennessee. This figure alarmed federal officials like Cummings and Kratz, who
concluded that “Tennessee uses business colleges as the training agency more often than any
other State in the region…they use employment training a great deal less than any other State in
the region.” Tilley emphasized this point using the example of Fred Baugus, a rehabilitation
client approved for business courses at Toler’s Business College. Baugus was, according to
Tilley, not disabled and people could see him working with his father hauling ice blocks with
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ease; yet, Bynum approved public money to send him to school. Similar to the federal
Vocational Education Bulletin No. 190, Tilley saw rehabilitation as a business venture, one with
concrete economic gains and losses. It was not only an economic investment on the part of the
state and the potential salvaging of the “human junk” a disabled person had become. There was a
whole network of both public and private institutions seeking a piece of the pie.63
These discrepancies led the FBVE to taking a closer look at the financial dealings of
Tennessee’s CVR program. The New Deal, as historian Michael Czaplicki notes, served to
reestablish the public’s confidence not only in capitalism, but in their governmental institutions.
Vocational rehabilitation, even with its touted successes, was not immune to an erosion of faith.
The “creative accounting” of Bynum’s Division partly confirmed Americans’ fears in
government corruption; the perceived preferential treatment toward his friends crystalized their
views. Economist Paul Douglas argues the CVR program, nationally, faltered in its efficiency
because it “had fallen into purely political hands.” Indeed, the FBVE was so concerned about
this development, it issued Vocational Education Bulletin No. 184, which outlined the
“procedure for [a] survey of a state program.” The bulletin advised state programs to inform and
explain the “status of political practices” within each individual state so that the FBVE knows
who they are dealing with and the qualifications of those authorized by the states to implement
the CVR program. With states differing significantly on these practices, the FBVE moved to
standardize state programs, which began with the removal of non-state auxiliaries.64
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It was this sort of scandal that New Dealers sought to root out and destroy. If the New
Deal was to be taken seriously and resurrect the economy, it had to ground itself in the moral
authority that state power used to wield. It was not lost on Americans in the late 1930s that the
“dollar decade” witnessed both scandal and a flagrant disregard of the law. The Teapot Dome
Scandal in 1924 and the constant undermining of Prohibition were two lightning rods of
corruption within the federal government. The New Deal Order sought to reestablish law and
order by promoting economic security for American workers and do everything in its power to
eliminate corruption.
The Teapot Dome Scandal became the most infamous example of governmental
corruption until it was eclipsed by Watergate in the 1970s. This particular scandal, involving a
backroom deal between Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall and two oil companies over mineral
rights to Teapot Dome, nearly brought down the Harding administration, with several cabinet
members resigning and some going to federal prison. Though the scandal wreaked havoc on
Harding’s administration and Democrats politicized it in the congressional midterms of 1926 and
the presidential election of 1928, it did not erode Republican dominance. By the early 1930s,
however, it became increasingly clear to younger Americans that federal institutions had
betrayed them. These Americans, as Connecticut Governor Wilbur Cross explained, had lost “all
faith in the integrity and intelligence of public officers.”65
Closer to home, Tennesseans dealt with their own egregious scandal which nearly
brought down the administration of Governor Henry Horton and left the state bankrupt in late
autumn of 1930. Known as the “Kyrock Scandal,” it involved similar dealings with a prominent
finance capitalist, Rogers Caldwell, and the Bank of Tennessee. Caldwell owned the Kyrock
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Road Construction Company and was chairman of the Bank of Tennessee. He used his
friendship with Luke Lea, owner of the Nashville Tennessean newspaper and personal friend of
Governor Horton, to obtain exclusive no-bid contracts for Kyrock. Moreover, Caldwell
persuaded the governor to place significant amounts of the state’s deposits into his bank. In
November 1930, the Depression hit Tennessee hard and nearly $6 million of state funds simply
evaporated. Once known as the “Morgan of the South,” Caldwell’s financial company collapsed
which resulted in the loss of “the layman’s faith in banks and inspired runs on scores of them.”
The Republican Party attempted to politicize the scandal, much like the Democrats did with
Teapot Dome, but were met with similar results. It became clear that state and federal institutions
had lost the proverbial “Mandate of Heaven.” The New Deal order, therefore, sought to restore
the legitimacy of these institutions by placing the national state in control and using federal
dollars as the penultimate carrot to get the individual states to adhere to federal policy.66
In the wake of these scandals, the New Deal order rethought the role of the associational
state and how it operated within the political system. With vocational rehabilitation, the FBVE
pushed out the Junior League and other non-state actors, like Charles Toler, in order to make
room for state-employed agents and counselors. By 1939, Tennessee employed nine
rehabilitation counselors who traveled the state following-up on referrals and applications that
were sent to the main office in Nashville. Associationalism, however, endured in Tennessee as
well as in other states, albeit in a new form. The FBVE did not prohibit the training of clients by
third-party vendors, it only proscribed these entities from administration work. It was not until
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the 1970s and early 1980s when comprehensive rehabilitation centers emerged to fully train
vocational rehabilitation clients. Even after Bynum’s dismissal from the Division, his successor,
Louis Schubert, continued approving rehabilitation plans and sending clients to private
businesses and educational institutions. The difference, following Bynum’s departure, was who
operated the gates to vocational rehabilitation benefits. Administration fell to state-employed
rehabilitation counselors rather than the private sector. In essence, the CVR program was a state
policy overseen by state officials; associationalism, though not eliminated, was significantly
limited in its operational function following the establishment of the New Deal order.67
“To Make Democracy Work”
The consolidation of the Federal Board of Vocational Education’s power over the states’
programs was indicative of a larger movement by the Roosevelt administration in the latter half
of the 1930s. The president interpreted his 1936 electoral landslide as a mandate from the
American people to take more action. His first target was the conservative wing of the Supreme
Court. FDR submitted the Judicial Reorganization bill to Congress on February 5, 1937, which
called for the expansion of the Court’s members; Roosevelt could appoint a new justice for each
existing justice over the age of seventy, which amounted to an expansion of six new justices.
Legal historians have noted how this episode allegedly scared the Court “and facilitate[ed] its
accommodation to New Deal legislation.” It is an oft-told story, which historians have covered
extensively, where the Senate Judiciary Committee defeated the “court-packing plan,” handing
the administration its first stinging defeat.68
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Despite the defeat of the “court-packing plan” in the spring of 1937, the president was not
fazed by it. The Supreme Court did change its tune around the same time by upholding federal
minimum wage legislation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. With one battle seemingly won, the
administration changed its focus toward the executive agencies that carried-out New Deal
policies. In the autumn of 1937, FDR proposed a new reorganization bill sponsored by Senator
James Byrnes (D-SC), one which allowed the president to reconfigure the executive branch into
a more efficient bureaucracy. Earlier in the year, the president requested an appropriation for “six
executive assistants” and the House voted favorably to the request “without more than scant
opposition.” Roosevelt, next, proposed the creation of a Department of Conservation and the
reorganization of civil service into one agency overseen by one person appointed by the
president.69
Once the Byrne’s Reorganization bill became known to the remainder of Congress at the
end of January 1938, opposition quickly arose from the Republican Party and other conservative
forces. One in particular took offense to Roosevelt’s proposal. Amos Pinchot, a conservative
Democrat, wrote FDR accusing him of establishing a dictatorship. Pinchot elaborated that the
bill, as written, “strips Congress of the most important powers it now possesses,” and that it
“transforms the government into a dictatorship presided over” by Roosevelt himself. Pinchot
enumerated several federal agencies that were listed in the bill’s language, including the Federal
Reserve Board, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, among
others. These agencies, Pinchot warned, “upon whose policies and action depends…the welfare
of every section of the country.” The Senate tabled the bill for the remainder of 1938.70
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By December, the administration moved to revive the reorganization bill after having a
meeting with the Brownlow Committee, composed of three Roosevelt confidantes Louis
Brownlow, Luther Gulick, and Charles Merriam. The committee recommended to the president
that he resubmit the bill with some amendments. FDR again had the support of Senator Byrnes
who acted as the bill’s shepherd through Congress. This time, Byrnes suggested to Roosevelt to
attempt his proposal in “four or five separate bills” rather than “trying the omnibus form again.”
He suggested the president push against the congressional amendment, submitted by Senator
Burton Wheeler (D-MT), which provided Congress with the ability to veto any executive order
and reorganization plan that the Executive Branch submitted. Byrnes believed that to be an
unconstitutional power of the legislature to veto an executive order. If the bill passed, the
president could retool the Executive Branch in any way he saw fit. FDR mainly sought
consolidation of federal agencies and shuffling them into a new bureaucratic framework.71
By January 1939, just as the damning report concerning the vocational rehabilitation
program in Tennessee was released, the House Ways and Means Committee began hearings on
Roosevelt’s Reorganization bill. In a similar move to the Judicial Reorganization bill of 1937,
opposition rose quickly again to the administration’s proposal. Charles Halleck (R-IN) led the
charge against FDR’s new plan. He argued in committee that “we were called back here to pass a
reorganization bill that nobody seemed to want.” Halleck’s position was that there were too
many other concerns facing the nation and that Congress had enough to address without talking
about reorganizing the federal bureaucracy. Representative Hamilton Fish III (R-NY) echoed
Halleck’s sentiments and criticized the administration for using strong-arm tactics to force
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members of Congress into being “rubber stamps” by “jamming through the court-packing bill or
reorganization bill.”72
Despite these opposing voices, a modified Reorganization bill passed Congress in March
1939. The House approved the measure with a vote of 246-153, mostly along party lines, and
sent it to the Senate. In this version of the bill, known as the Cochran-Warren Reorganization
bill, its authors persisted about the purpose behind such a measure. The president “desired” such
power as “a means of reducing government expenditures and promote efficiency.” Once the bill
became law, it permitted the president to “group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies of the
federal government, or to abolish any not specifically exempt.” The Senate took up the measure
on March 21 and voted to accept the Wheeler Amendment, which restricted the president’s
powers on executive reorganization, by a slim majority, but the following day, the Senate
reversed itself by overturning the Wheeler Amendment in a separate vote of 46-44. Though
Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA), one of the bill’s sponsors, emerged victorious, senators did reach a
compromise with moderate policymakers. The president could have limited powers to reorganize
the federal bureaucracy, but he could not “abolish the ‘functions’ of agencies” regardless of
exemption status. In a final vote of 63-23, the Senate approved the proposal and sent it to the
White House for FDR’s signature. Though he received the ability to restructure federal agencies
in the name of efficiency and reducing costs, the bill FDR signed into law on April 3, 1939, did
not grant him the sweeping powers he originally sought in both his 1937 and 1938 proposals.73
The Reorganization Act of 1939 granted the president the power to reconfigure the
federal bureaucracy into a more efficient institution. Its main purpose, however, was to limit the
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number of federal agencies reporting to the president by consolidating them into one omnibus
agency. In FDR’s first stab at reorganizing the federal government, he chose to consolidate some
twenty-one agencies into three departments. In a message sent to Congress on April 25, 1939,
Roosevelt explained his actions, which were “designed to improve the administrative
management of the Republic” and to “promote efficiency and prevent overlapping” and could
save the federal government, in FDR’s estimation, between $15,000,000 and $20,000,000 per
year. The agencies the president focused on in his “Reorganization Plan No. 1” were those
“departmental bureaus concerned with various phases of public welfare, public works, and
Federal lending programs.” Roosevelt, in other words, pushed for the consolidation of social
welfare into one agency with his direct oversight.74
The primary agency that emerged from this game of bureaucratic round robin was the
Federal Security Agency (FSA), which was where FDR placed all social welfare programs as
well as education. Legal historian Mariano-Florentino Cuellar criticizes other scholars of
American Political Development for leaving the FSA in relative obscurity and argues that the
Roosevelt administration justified the establishment of the FSA as a means to protect the nation
from “international threats” by having one colossal agency to “implement the law effectively in
domains such as health and education.” Until the Executive Office of the President was
established, the FSA served as a vital link between the president and the federal bureaucracy. As
Cuellar explains, the FSA allowed “the president to have more control over important
administrative agencies.” The Reorganization Act of 1939 crystalized federal power over that of
the states and gave the Executive Branch direct control over numerous federal agencies.75
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The Federal Board for Vocational Education had, since its inception in 1917, been a part
of the Department of the Interior as an offshoot of the U.S. Office of Education. The federal
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, under the direction of John Kratz since the mid-1920s,
operated as a subordinate agency to the FBVE. The Roosevelt administration transferred several
governmental agencies to the FSA, including many of the New Deal programs such as the
Civilian Conservation Corps and Social Security. Other agencies placed in the bureaucratic orbit
of the FSA included the U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S. Office of Education, which
included the FBVE and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. According to Mary Switzer, a
future director of the national Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, the placement of the CVR
program within the FSA was a positive thing. It “facilitated efforts by those interested in
vocational rehabilitation to influence future legislation to a larger degree than before.” Switzer
cited the example of Dr. Henry Kessler and his “concept of medical care as a way of lessening a
vocational disability” rather than simply “working around it.” Kessler’s work led to a renewed
interest in expanding the CVR program. The annual budget for the FSA amounted to nearly half
a billion dollars by 1940.76
With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the growing tension with Imperial Japan,
that budget grew to nearly a billion dollars by 1943. The FSA began a program in the vocational
schools with the goal of students being “more quickly placed in defense-related industries upon
completion of their training.” Vocational rehabilitation clients were also drafted into the war
industries. By 1943, for example, Tennessee’s CVR program placed 602 men and women with
disabilities into the war industries. Though the federal government had consolidated its power
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and hold on welfare programs, like vocational rehabilitation, it relied on the private sector for the
training and job placement necessary to complete a successful rehabilitation case. The Roosevelt
administration may have reshuffled administrative agencies into a more efficient system under
the direct control of the Executive Office of the President, but they did not eliminate the
associationalism that defined the era both pre- and post-New Deal; rather, the president’s
executive expansion placed significant constraints on the associational state. State and local
governments, coupled with the private sector, proved to be the best sources for New Deal policy
implementation.77
Overall, the constraints placed on associationalism were clearly visible in the federalstate vocational rehabilitation program. The power of the NRA climaxed in the early New Deal
era, but waned over the course of the latter half of the decade. NRA officials lobbied diligently
for reauthorizations of the CVR program, and, ultimately, the passage of the Social Security Act.
Little did the NRA realize that the legislative victory they achieved in 1935 began the general
decline of its influence. FDR wanted the states to retain as much authority as possible from
Social Security, but, as even the Supreme Court alluded, the problem was too complex and too
massive for the states to successfully manage; an alternative solution, led by the federal
government, was necessary for such a tremendous policy shift. As the New Deal order rooted
itself into American politics and society, the federal bureaucracy expanded and claimed more
power for itself.
Nominally, however, the states retained control over their social programs, but as the
saga of Robert Bynum demonstrated, by the latter 1930s, federal agencies had taken a more
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active management approach toward federal-state welfare programs. Americans had simply lost
faith in their government institutions and the New Dealers realized they needed to restore the
peoples’ trust in the state and its functionality. Vocational rehabilitation, long seen as a stateoperated program, in conjunction with non-state actors, soon became eclipsed by the emerging
federal colossus. Much of the program, especially in the South, had become too politicized,
which required federal intervention. If states accepted federal dollars, they had to play by the
rules set forth by the corresponding federal agency. With respect to the CVR program, the FBVE
assumed full control of state programs. Philanthropic organizations and non-state actors were
either pushed out of their previous roles entirely, or they were significantly restrained in their
activities. As the United States moved toward World War II, federal agencies took on the mantle
of the administrative wing of the federal government.
The consolidation of the vocational rehabilitation program from 1937-1939 was but one
example of the federal government’s trajectory in the latter 1930s. FDR, arguing that it would
make the government more efficient and cost-effective, urged Congress to pass his
Reorganization bill, which granted the president the authority to shuffle executive agencies and
streamline the federal bureaucracy. The Reorganization Act of 1939 crystalized the national
state’s power over the various states. Roosevelt’s reconfiguring of the federal bureaucracy set up
a top-down authoritative flow. Federal-state cooperative programs were now more beholden to
their respective federal agency, the most visible of which was the FSA. Welfare and educational
departments were transferred from the Departments of the Interior and Labor into the FSA,
which reported directly to the president. Between 1935 and 1939, the New Deal order entrenched
itself and facilitated the expansion of federal power at the expense of the state and its
associational relationships with the private sector.
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Chapter 4
Making Disability Work:
Implementing the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Program on the Ground, 1920-1945
In October 1924, 16-year-old Cary Adams, a white male of Whitlock, Tennessee, met
with Claude Toler to discuss options about the future. Adams, the victim of childhood paralysis,
had been left without the use of his left leg since the age of six. Due to his disability, the boy had
never held down a paying job, but he had obtained a sixth-grade education where he excelled in
math and English. On his vocational rehabilitation application, Adams explained how he wished
to pursue a career in bookkeeping and clerical work, which was within the scope of his disability.
Toler, the vocational rehabilitation field agent, noted how the “young man [was] bright” but that
he “liv[ed] a good ways from the county school” and that his “home surroundings” could be
better. Toler returned the application with his commentary to Director of Vocational
Rehabilitation Robert Bynum, who, in turn, labeled Adams as being “eligible” for services.1
The Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) created a rehabilitation plan for
Adams, along with his imput, based on both his wishes and his physical and intellectual
capabilities. Adams, who wished to learn bookkeeping, received courses from Toler’s Business
School in Paris, Tennessee, paid by the DVR. By late March 1925, Charles Toler wrote Bynum
asking him if he had heard from Adams; when Bynum admitted he had not, Toler informed him
that the boy had not been to class in a few weeks, and when he had attended, his progress was
less than satisfactory. Bynum inquired if Adams’ lack of progress was due to “carelessness and
indifference” or if it was based on his “lack of educational background” which “started [him] out
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on the wrong road” and implored Toler to reach out and arrange a meeting. Adams was never
located and so his case was closed.2
Adams’ case contrasted starkly with fellow Tennessean Pearl Abbot. In July 1929, Abbot
appealed to Bynum for help in securing rehabilitation services; a car accident had left the 20year-old white woman from Camden, Tennessee with an “effected (sic) [weak] shoulder, back
spasms, and a weak right side.” Within a few weeks, Bynum replied and encouraged the young
woman to fill out the enclosed application, who promptly filled it out and returned it just a day
later. Rehabilitation counselors reviewed Abbot’s application and found that she was both
“eligible” and “feasible” based on the Smith-Fess Act’s established criteria. Bynum wrote back
to Abbot explaining her acceptance into the vocational rehabilitation program; all that stood in
her way was a meeting with a rehabilitation counselor to devise a plan of service.3
Acceptance into the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation meant everything to Abbot.
She feared how her “condition” could impact her life and economic future; she argued how she
was not “physically or financially situated” to obtain an education or gainful employment and
that she required the assistance of the state. Working with her rehabilitation counselor, Abbot
chose to pursue a course in secretarial work. The state paid for her to attend Draughon’s Junior
College in Nashville for an 8-month program to learn clerical services, which Abbot
enthusiastically accepted. By June 1930, Abbot completed her rehabilitation plan and received a
job as a secretary for Charles Toler at Toler’s Business School. For Abbot, it appeared that her
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“financial situation” was no longer dependent upon her “physical condition.” Vocational
rehabilitation seemingly placed Abbot onto the road of self-support.4
The Smith-Fess Act established the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program as a
means to retrain America’s disabled population and return them to the workforce. To appease the
opposition, lawmakers included a “means test” to assess whether an applicant met certain
criteria. To be eligible, an applicant needed to be of employable age, possess some form of a
physical handicap which “limits [applicants’] opportunities for employment,” and must be
“mentally capable of pursuing the training within their rehabilitation plan.” The overwhelming
majority of rehabilitation clients (75%) in the 1920s and 1930s were “disabled from amputations
or orthopedic impairments.” No mention was given to race, class, or gender as limiting factors
for services.5
Abbot did not pursue her rehabilitation plan alone. She had the help of several interested
parties to her success. Indeed, Robert Bynum and the rehabilitation staff wanted her to succeed,
but there were others who aided her along the way. Charles Toler, who owned Toler’s Business
School, personally interviewed Abbot and oversaw her vocational rehabilitation and job
placement. Abbot’s hometown of Whitlock, Tennessee did not have a local rehabilitation office;
the state relied on local businessmen and officials to help locate and interview potential
applicants. Without such cooperation, people like Abbot, who lived on the periphery, could
easily be overlooked. Moreover, minority groups, such as African Americans, depended on
associational cooperation to make their voices heard for vocational benefits.6
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The Federal Board encouraged cooperation between the public and private entities and
organizations. In the early years, rehabilitation programs welcomed the aid from private
agencies. Private institutions performed nearly every aspect of rehabilitation work for clients,
including the referral process, rehabilitation assistance, and funding medical assistance. These
groups ranged from the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, numerous churches, and local
hospitals. Local, prominent businessmen joined the effort. The Ohio Supervisor of Civilian
Rehabilitation, W.F. Shaw, praised associationalism at the First National Conference on
Vocational Rehabilitation in 1922. He noted how the private sector and grassroots movements
“pioneered” the great social movements in American history because “very little progress could
be expected if the Government were given the entire lead.”7
This chapter, therefore, examines the social aspects of the Civilian Vocational
Rehabilitation program and how the policy was implemented on the ground. Ideally,
policymakers envisioned the vocational rehabilitation program to focus on white, male
breadwinners as its primary beneficiaries; however, this was not always the case. Race and
gender were not mentioned in acceptance criteria, which suggests the program was open to
everyone who fit eligibility requirements. Furthermore, the chapter explores the associational
state as it operated on the ground. To staff vocational rehabilitation programs, the state cultivated
networks of cooperation with local officials and organizations. The private sector worked
alongside state officials in seeking out, interviewing, developing rehabilitation plans, and,
finally, aiding in job placement. This chapter, therefore, argues that though women and African
Americans were not the intended candidates for the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program,
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they were not disqualified by the legislation itself and gained access to the program. This access
was due in no small part to the associational state, which facilitated the extensive reach of the
vocational rehabilitation program into realms where state authority appeared absent.
Vocational Rehabilitation on the Ground
Industrialization brought great wealth to America’s capitalists, but also brought great
strife for her working class. Heavy industries, such as mining, steel production, and the railroad,
employed millions of Americans across the country. In the course of their employment, several
hundred thousand became victims through the commonality of industrial accidents. These
accidents left thousands incapable of working and providing for their families. The rising level of
Americans with disabilities quickly developed into a significant social and economic issue;
simply put, there were not many avenues for advancement for crippled Americans in the early
twentieth century. Congressional lawmakers, following Europe’s lead, adopted a nationwide
vocational rehabilitation program in 1920 as a means of providing Americans with disabilities an
opportunity to return to the workforce.8
In 1915, Frederick Hoffman published a bulletin for the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics where he outlined the growing problem of industrial accidents. In his report, Hoffman
explained how there were, on average, approximately 2 million accidents each year. Several of
these accidents resulted in the death of the victims (approximately 35,000), but more often the
case, they resulted in some form of disability (approximately 50%). Of those who were disabled,
most could not return to the job they had prior to the accident. The most dangerous occupations
in the United States were in the heavy industries; mining outpaced all other employers in rates of
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death and disability. Hoffman noted how it was safer to be in the United States Army than it was
to work in a mine.9
Not surprisingly, men composed the majority of the American workforce in the early
twentieth century. According to the 1910 Census, the estimated number of wage earners in the
United States was 37,960,000 people; of that total, men made up 30,760,000 laborers, a full 81%
of the total workforce. Men were much more likely to be involved in one of these accidents
resulting in disability or, worse, death. By 1919, F.S. Crum of Prudential Insurance Co. noted an
increase in the accident rate. According to Crum, and his assistant, Olive Outwater, there were
approximately 3,000,000 accidents in American industries. Nearly 20% of these accidents
resulted in “complete or partial disability.” Officials at Prudential and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics placed these accidents in economic terms citing the number of manhours and potential
profits lost. Outwater estimated that with 115,000 permanently disabled workers, the nation lost
around 108,000,000 working days, which, when multiplied by the average national wage of $4
per day, equated to a net loss of $432 million. The Industrial Accident Board of Montana, for
example, reported 5,475 industrial accidents in the fiscal year 1918-1919, of which 5,201 (95%)
of these accidents resulted in a “total temporary disability.” The cost to Montana was 256,738
work days amounting to wage loss of $1,075,085 for the year. These estimations, however, left
out the social factor: what were these disabled workers to do for the remainder of their natural
lives?10
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Historians have noted a cultural shift in how society viewed its disabled members. In the
wake of rapid industrialization, possessing a physical disability was a mark of honor. Historian
John Williams-Searle argues that working-class men within industries saw their disabilities,
typically missing limbs, as their “Red Badge of Courage” and facilitated the emergence of
brotherhoods among industries, such as the railroad and steel mill workers. These groups
developed brotherhood organizations to aid each other in the event of injury or death. By 1900,
Williams-Searle asserts, disability underwent a negative shift. The rise of organized labor and its
competition with big business resulted in the reduction of disabled workers to either low-wage
positions or summary termination. Before the adoption of a national vocational rehabilitation
program, employers gave little-to-no thought to the “possibility of recreating in him the ability to
hold [a] good job.”11
Industrial accidents reduced many crippled Americans to begging on the streets for
money in order to survive. Some relied on family resources, but even these were finite. Eleanor
Adler described one such incident of a young ranch hand who lost his legs in a train accident.
The young man “hunt[ed] daily for any kind of a job,” but he quickly found that “nobody would
give work to a cripple.” Left destitute, the young man “drifted to a lodging house” and then to
the streets where a police officer “arrested him as a vagrant.” Between the Civil War and World
War I, several states and municipalities adopted new laws to deal with these “unsightly beggars”
and remove them to the poor house or local jails. These statutes reflected what historian Susan
Schweik calls a “culture of disgust,” where state officials attempted to discern between the

John Williams-Searle, “Cold Charity: Manhood, Brotherhood, and the Transformation of Disability, 1870-1900,”
in The New Disability History: American Perspectives, ed. by Paul Longmore and Lauri Umansky (New York: New
York University Press, 2001): 157-180, 186.
11

173

deserving and undeserving poor. Vocational rehabilitation sought to transform this disgust into a
culture of productivity.12
After the Smith-Fess Act established the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program,
Americans with crippling disabilities were attracted to the prospect of reclaiming their lost
earning capacity. Though applicants were not many in the first few years, their numbers
continued to increase as the 1920s progressed. In the first year of the program, the Federal Board
for Vocational Education counted 523 clients who were retrained via state divisions. Only six
states produced any successfully rehabilitated clients in 1921; however, the following year
produced 1,898 clients, from 31 states, retrained and placed in jobs around the country, a 362%
increase. By the end of World War II, that number skyrocketed to 41,925 people with disabilities
who received vocational training from the state.13
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Before becoming vocational rehabilitation clients, applicants utilized the benefits of
worker’s compensation as a source of income. Between 1908 and 1925, all but five states
adopted some form of worker’s compensation agency. These agencies did not have any form of
national standardization and compensation claims were applied in wildly different ways. Most
states utilized some form of commission or board to assess compensation claims; others, such as
Tennessee, relied on an antiquated system which used local courts to discern worker’s
compensation benefits. The result was a haphazard application of the compensation laws, one
where it changed on a county-by-county basis.14
States differed on how claimants received their compensation awards. For those who
were permanently disabled, a special compensation was required. As Carl Hookstadt noted, total
disability resulted in a significant economic loss to the family unit; death was actually cheaper to
a family versus the alternative of caring for the person for the remainder of their life. In terms of
compensation for total disability, 18 states, plus the federal government, provided income for the
remainder of the claimant’s life; however, the majority of states in the nation set a time frame for
payments. In Montana and Tennessee, for example, compensation claims were capped at 400
weeks. In states like California, Kansas, and New Hampshire, benefits were paid for a max of
156 weeks.15
For workers who acquired a temporary disability while on the job, a different system
applied to worker’s compensation claims. Two options existed for these people: Claimants could
receive a percentage of wages paid in a lump sum or they could opt for “fixed amounts based on
type of disability” acquired from the accident. Seventy-five percent of states in 1920 chose to
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define different forms of temporary disabilities and how long a person could collect a stipend. In
Tennessee, for example, the loss of an arm resulted in 200 weeks of pay, the loss of a hand was
capped at 150, an amputated foot was allocated 125 weeks of compensation. After these periods
passed, a claimant had to pursue work or rely on family or a local charity.16
This was precisely the situation that Johnnie Brown and Arthur Clay found themselves in
after suffering “temporary” disabilities. In Brown’s case, the young man suffered a loss of his
left arm in an accident at his job at Pioneer Pole & Shaft Company in 1924. Deeming the loss of
his arm to be only a “temporary disability,” the Tennessee Department of Industrial
Rehabilitation and the Tennessee Worker’s Compensation Commission, awarded Brown a lump
sum of $1923.11 for his financial losses. Arthur Clay, who lost his left leg in 1926, while
working at Nickey Brothers, Inc. in Memphis received a weekly income of $9.75 as part of his
settlement with the Department of Industrial Rehabilitation. Clay’s settlement paid for 175
weeks, which was in-line with Tennessee’s statistical breakdown of worker’s compensation
claims for temporary disabilities. Both of these cases highlighted a growing problem for states:
what happened with these individuals once their worker’s compensation claims expired?
Officials at the Worker’s Compensation Commission referred them both to the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation.17
Brown gained acceptance into Tennessee’s Vocational Rehabilitation program in
September 1924, as one of eighty-five men admitted. Out of the overall cohort, loss of an arm
amounted to 8% of the total number of disabled workers. In his application, Brown noted how he
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held a fifth-grade education but possessed a long and productive work history. The 28-year-old
resident of Nashville explained to the interviewer that he only “required an artificial limb” in
order to rejoin working society. Director Bynum explained that Brown was “clearly eligible for
vocational training” which covered a myriad of expenses related to rehabilitation, such as
“tuition, books, fees, room and board.” Bynum, however, agreed with Brown’s request and
approved a rehabilitation plan for him that included procurement of a prosthetic arm at state
expense. Brown simply did not wish for a long period of retraining in a new skill; rather, he
wanted to acquire an artificial limb and return to work quickly in order to support his wife and
young daughter.18
In contrast to Brown’s minimalist rehabilitation plan, Arthur Clay pushed for a more
intensive line of training. Clay’s employment history consisted of manual labor at a saw mill
where he was employed at “dragging logs on [a] carriage.” It was here where he lost his left leg
and required 11 weeks of hospitalization. Tennessee’s Worker’s Compensation Commission
covered a maximum of 30 days or $100 in charges, whichever came first, in the hospital for
medical attention resulting from a workplace accident. On November 20, 1926, less than one
month after he lost his leg, Clay received word from Robert Bynum about the vocational
rehabilitation program. Bynum advised Clay to consider the state’s services. He explained how
rehabilitation could cover the costs of living “while you are undergoing the course of training to
fit you for making a living.” On his application, Clay noted that he possessed a sixth-grade

“Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation: Annual Statistical Report,” Fiscal Year 1924-1925, Tennessee Rehabilitation
Center Archives, Box 1, Folder 4; Johnnie Brown, “Application for Vocational Rehabilitation,” TSLA, Ibid.,
Microfilm Reel 174; Robert Bynum to Johnnie Brown, September 17, 1924, TSLA, Ibid., Microfilm Reel 174.
18

177

education and was “fairly prolific” with arithmetic. He indicated that he did not wish to return to
the world of lumber and sought to learn a trade; Clay settled on being trained as a barber.19
Clay’s disability reflected a growing concern about industrial accidents. The loss of legs,
either in part or in total, was the most common disability that rehabilitation officials confronted
in the 1920s. When Clay entered his rehabilitation program in the spring of 1927, he was one of
178 Tennesseans looking for training. Leg injuries composed a full 39% of clients in 1927, a
clear majority of those accepted into the program. The next most common was the loss of arms.
This made sense in a heavily agricultural state such as Tennessee. Other states possessed similar
breakdowns of disabilities: leg injuries composed significant numbers of rehabilitation clients.20
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These two cases represented two different understandings of rehabilitation. In Brown’s
situation, he only requested assistance in procuring a prosthetic limb. After this was completed,
he intended to return to his previous job. Clay, on the other hand, chose a different path. To him,
rehabilitation offered a new opportunity for a better future. After losing his leg, Clay became a
client in the vocational rehabilitation program. He noted how he sought to learn a new skill and
was granted complete tuition and supplies at Martin’s Barber College in Memphis.
Rehabilitation took different forms and clients received plans based on their capabilities and
interests.21
One of the defining characteristics of vocational rehabilitation was its flexibility of
services among its clients. There was not a standardized system of vocational rehabilitation, and
policymakers and rehabilitation workers realized this fact. One client could require only a
minimal amount of attention and resources, while other clients might necessitate a complete
physical reconstruction. The Federal Board, as early as 1922, instructed states to adopt a
piecemeal approach toward vocational training. Rehabilitation plans were “constructed
individually and developed on a scientific basis,” which facilitated a more seamless transition for
the client into a new career. These career choices were made in conjunction with the
rehabilitation counselor and the client; therefore, clients possessed some say in the development
and execution of their rehabilitation plan.22
It was this individual approach to rehabilitation plan design that distinguished vocational
rehabilitation from vocational education. The distinctive nature of rehabilitation required
officials to recognize that people with disabilities were among some of the most unique
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Americans in the nation. Each client had to be treated on a case-by-case basis; people with
disabilities “cannot be handled in groups.” Vocational education took place within America’s
secondary schools and community colleges; these courses had teachers that instructed several
students at a time with a standardized curriculum. Vocational rehabilitation, on the other hand,
“concerned itself with disabled individuals” who possessed “varying levels of vocational
capacity.”23
Applicants needed to meet certain eligibility qualifications in order to be admitted into
the civilian rehabilitation program. By having eligibility requirements for services, vocational
rehabilitation could largely escape the criticisms of being a welfare policy. Applicants needed to
be of working age, possess some form of physical handicap, and be intellectually capable of
undergoing training and performing in a job. Some states, such as Tennessee and Ohio, further
required applicants to be citizens of the state in which they were applying and be in residence for
a year. These criteria kept the number of potential applicants to more manageable levels.
Moreover, they served as a bureaucratic gatekeeper to limited funds and calls of socialism. It was
the inclusion of Simeon Fess’s “means test” which allowed for the Smith-Fess Act to pass
Congress; rehabilitation was “the conservation of manpower,” not a path toward general
welfare.24
States maintained the means test and amended it to fit their needs. Vocational
rehabilitation was not a sweeping program for all people with disabilities. Intellectual disabilities
were completely ruled out of the Smith-Fess Act’s language. Moreover, applicants needed to be
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of working age. Rehabilitation officials admitted that funding was finite each fiscal year and that
individual state programs could not serve everyone. The Federal Board noted how applicants
needed to possess a “measure of feasibility,” which typically equated to a long working lifespan.
In other words, a state program may overlook a person who is middle aged in favor of a person
in their 20s. These people possessed, in the minds of the Federal Board, the greatest likelihood of
success and the ability to repay society through their tax revenue. Though it was desirable to
provide rehabilitation services to all Americans with disabilities, federal officials were quick to
explain that “vocational rehabilitation agents [were] not miracle workers.”25
National data, accumulated by the Federal Board, supported this conclusion. In 1928, the
Federal Board released a study covering the first five years of the vocational rehabilitation
program. The study surveyed over 6,000 people rehabilitated and concluded the vast majority
were between the ages of 18 and 40 years of age. Of the 6,391 clients surveyed, a full 66% of
them fell into this category. Respondents noted their disabilities were mostly the result of
industrial accidents while on the job, or diseases, either acquired or congenital. These were the
ideal candidates for vocational rehabilitation due to their “substantial life expectancy.” Those
respondents over the age of 40 totaled 28% and, though they “had many years of industrial
experience,” they “had passed the age of maximum usefulness in industrial life.” This age group
presented challenges to rehabilitation workers since “their opportunities for reentering industrial
life [were] seriously limited.” Vocational rehabilitation, in essence, was a young person’s
game.26
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Not surprisingly, men composed the majority of rehabilitation clients. The framers of the
Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program visualized the white male as the primary beneficiary
of services. The Federal Board for Vocational Education began collecting national statistics in
1925 which reflected this trend. In 1925, for example, the Federal Board noted 5,825 people
completed their rehabilitation program; of that figure, men comprised 5,061 or 87% of the total
number rehabilitated. Individual states also collected their own statistics. Tennessee, for
example, counted among its first year of operation seven clients. That figure, though small,
represented the inaugural year of rehabilitation. Men made up 86% of the first cohort of trainees
to go through the program. The purpose was to get these men back to work and retrain them in
their “former occupation or a new occupation.”27
Rehabilitation officials relied on the private sector to perform the vocational training of
each client. Once a rehabilitation plan was approved by a counselor and the client, the state
looked to place the client in training. Numerous states utilized private cooperation in order to
carry-out the rehabilitation process. North Carolina, for example, depended heavily on private
businesses to train their clients. Homer Stanton forged several relationships with local
businesses, such as William L. Rushing. Rushing owned a local mattress shop in Unionville,
North Carolina. He remained in contact with Stanton concerning rehabilitation trainees placed
within his business. Rushing praised the students that were placed with him; one of his students,
James T. Smith, excelled at his training regimen, while another, Bunyan Nance, completed his
training and opened his own shop. Rushing was not alone. Stanton pursued cooperative
agreements with other businesses such as the Hamilton Watch Company and the Spencer
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Jewelry Company. Watchmaking and jewelry were popular choices for rehabilitation clients to
pursue.28
Tennessee’s director, Robert Bynum, developed similar relationships between the state
and private businesses. One client, a man named C.J., fell from a train in 1912 and lost his legs.
He was placed with a lithographing company in Nashville in 1923 and excelled in his training.
The president of the company, in a letter to Bynum, wrote that C.J. was “going to make one of
the most valuable employees we have.” Other clients pursued bookkeeping and clerical training
at several private colleges such as Toler’s Business College, Mountain City Business College,
and Draughon’s Junior College. These private businesses and institutions executed the terms of
the Smith-Fess Act. Thomas Adkins, for example, was a 21-year-old diagnosed with infantile
paralysis in 1910. Adkins admitted to Bynum about his future uncertainties in his interview.
Bynum noted how the young man was an ideal candidate for rehabilitation. Bynum secured a
course for bookkeeping and accounting for Adkins at Draughon’s Junior College in Knoxville,
Tennessee. Vocational rehabilitation required associational relationships with the private sector
in order to function at its core. States did not possess comprehensive rehabilitation centers for
training programs. Existing vocational education facilities catered to training whole classes of
students, rather than the individualistic nature associated with disability.29
Clients, such as Marvin Adams, proved to be more competent and ambitious toward their
rehabilitation plan. Adams was a 17-year-old from Buchanan, Tennessee with a fully paralyzed
left arm and hand, acquired after he recovered from an illness. He possessed a seventh-grade
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education and excelled in mathematics. Adams wished to pursue training in bookkeeping, much
like Cary Adams did. The field agent who interviewed him agreed and recommended his
admittance to the vocational rehabilitation division, stating that “this young man can succeed as a
bookkeeper. He is bright and has a good personality.” Robert Bynum authorized the state to pay
for courses in bookkeeping at Toler’s Business School. Adams, therefore, became one of 65 men
being trained by Tennessee’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation in 1925. Within a year, he
had been placed in a job as a bookkeeper.30
Bookkeeping was but one of many training plans that clients could choose in consultation
with their rehabilitation counselor. Business schools, such as Toler’s Business School or
Draughn’s Business College, secured a near constant source of students from the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation. Other vocations available included traditional trades such as baking,
auto mechanic, painter, lock and gunsmithing, as well as new trades like radio technician.
Vocational rehabilitation officials sought to keep their clients apprised of the numerous jobs and
training obtainable by people with disabilities. The efforts exuded by these officials on behalf of
their clients demonstrate an understanding of the shifting economy during the interwar period.
Some clients spent their rehabilitation period in a school setting, with referral to a business
college or even a university, rather than to a traditional job training setting. Since clients were
matched with a plan and a vocation that reflected their intellectual and physical abilities, some
were able to attend college and obtain a degree or teaching certificate. Records consistently
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reflected the overwhelming numbers of clients placed in “school training” rehabilitation plans
throughout the interwar era.31
The associational state even counted veterans among its ranks during the 1920s as the
American Legion signed on to aid the federal government in vocational rehabilitation efforts.
The organization requested permission from the Federal Board to establish field offices among
the several states in order to cooperate “more effectively in the work for the disabled ex-service
men.” Franklin D’Olier, national commander of the American Legion, explained that these local
rehabilitation officers were concerned citizens, stationed at various Legion posts around the
country. Ex-servicemen, as D’Olier noted, saw effective rehabilitation as particularly important
“for their own sake…or for the sake of their disabled comrades in arms, to whom they owe a
duty of continued comradeship in civilian life.” The American Legion, in essence, sought to
oversee the rehabilitation of its members, outside the direction of the individual states.32
The American Legion, interestingly, became the leading organization on the
rehabilitation of private citizens. Other non-state institutions joined them. In Ohio, W.F. Shaw
introduced “an 18-year-old with a left-hand amputation” who received institutional training from
a variety of sources. His rehabilitation agent was unable to secure him training in his hometown,
enlisting the help of the Y.M.C.A. for training and placement in a city 70 miles away. The whole
process required not only the assistance of the Y.M.C.A., but also the Council for Social
Agencies, and the Social Service Federation. Furthermore, local business associations supported
vocational rehabilitation efforts. A young man, recently married, lost his right arm just above the
elbow. In his interview, the man professed his desire to become an electrical engineer. Due to his
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disability, however, it was difficult for his rehabilitation agent to find him training and job
placement; it was “only through the efforts of an interested employers’ association…was this
rehabilitation undertaken.” Private organizations and businessmen understood the importance of
training and placing people with disabilities into the workforce once more.33
By the mid-1930s, placing vocational rehabilitation clients into the private sector was par
for the course. Lucille Henderson secured training for one of her clients, Claud Bassham, at Sky
Harbor, an airfield in Florence, Tennessee. Henderson, one of Tennessee’s nine vocational
rehabilitation field agents, took over the application and interview process from local
businessmen and charitable organizations. Clients, such as Bashham, no longer dealt with the
associational state to secure benefits. Instead, he received a referral to Lucille Henderson through
one of her contacts at a local newspaper office; however, all of Bashham’s services went through
the state itself. This was not to say that private-public cooperation had vanished. In fact, the
vocational rehabilitation program depended on such cooperation in order to succeed. Clients
enjoyed vocational training at a variety of trades overseen by private businessmen.34
Vocational rehabilitation came in a variety of forms for clients. Based on their intellectual
capacity to perform jobs, counselors encouraged them to look at a trade or even to attend college.
One such client, in 1933, was Edward Close, who worked with Lucille Henderson to develop a
rehabilitation plan suited to his abilities and desires. Close, like so many others, had a physical
disability which kept him from holding down a regular job. What aided him, as Henderson noted,
was his completion of three years of college courses. This qualified him to teach school in his
local community. Henderson inquired with the Civil Works Administration (CWA) about finding
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a teaching position for her client. The CWA, born from the bureaucratic incompetence of the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), hired unemployed Americans to rebuild
America’s crumbling infrastructure. Henderson, alas, could not secure a teaching position for her
client; she referred him, however, to the county superintendent for a teaching job and the
acquisition of a teaching certificate.35
The New Deal state squeezed out private organizations and local businessmen from the
administration of vocational rehabilitation. The New Deal order’s consolidation of state authority
effectively removed these factors from the rehabilitation process. Field agents, employed by the
state, acted as the gatekeepers to rehabilitation services. No longer were private organizations or
non-state actors permitted to interview and develop plans-of-action for clients; the Federal Board
made that clear, beginning in 1938, when it mandated the elimination of entities from daily
administration. They directed the Tennessee Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, for example,
to reorganize the “Memphis Office” and place its administration in the hands of state-employed
counselors. These new state agents were encouraged to forge a partnership with the Shelby
County school board. Though the associational state broke down in terms of authority, it
persisted in terms of training and job placement. Counselors routinely placed clients with private
industries and institutions for job training purposes.36
Associationalism was, therefore, an integral component to the implementation of the
Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program. These private sector connections made vocational
rehabilitation more successful. The associational state facilitated the reach of a financially
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limited program to serve several thousand Americans with disabilities. The state focused its
efforts on training white, male clients, as were the idealized candidates for rehabilitation
services. Other groups, such as women and African Americans, were not excluded from the
benefits of the rehabilitation program; they were, however, disproportionately left to the
associational state for services. On more than one occasion, minority applicants were directed to
either local businessmen or private organizations to oversee their rehabilitation process.
Shifting From Men to Mothers
The Smith-Fess Act established a means test for Americans with disabilities to seek
rehabilitation services. The means test included a person’s ability to cover their own
maintenance, possess a physical disability, be of a certain age, and have the intellectual capacity
for vocational training. The Act’s terms did not include any exclusionary language prohibiting
groups like women or African Americans from seeking these state benefits. Historian Audra
Jennings argues that the “civilian rehabilitation program reflected and supported a particular
understanding of citizenship.” She concludes that women were “typically excluded, with the
average…recipient being a thirty-one-year-old white man.”37
Jennings’s assessment is partially correct. Indeed, the average recipient in the World War
II era was a thirty-one-year-old white male. Beginning in the program’s earliest days, women
and African Americans pursued and received rehabilitation services. National statistics do not
account for race and gender at these early stages of the program, but state-level statistics indicate
that these groups, though slow to emerge, became a significant part of rehabilitation’s caseload
by the outbreak of World War II. Moreover, these groups were disproportionately reliant on the
associational state for these services. This development builds on Suzanne Mettler’s analysis of a
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gendered approach to federalism during the New Deal. Mettler demonstrates how New Deal
benefits were divided along gender lines with men receiving benefits from the national
government and women being relegated to the state governments. In terms of rehabilitation
services, while white men worked almost exclusively with state officials, women and African
Americans tended to work more with private organizations and local businessmen.38
The numbers of employed women significantly increased during the early twentieth
century. The 1910 Federal Census counted 8,075,772 female wage earners in the United States.
Census officials estimated that a “full one-third of all women” in the country “will be employed
by 1920.” Traditional vocations for women, such as teaching, secretarial, or homemaking,
eroded during the World War I era, which was due to the war effort. Indeed, as The Vocational
Summary noted, between 1916 and 1920, women’s presence in heavy industry grew
significantly. There was a 40% increase in the iron and steel industry, a 300% increase in the
auto industry, 200% growth in instrument making, and a 100% increase in woodworking.
Disability-incurring accidents did not discriminate based on gender. As worker’s compensation
claims observed, women fell victim to these accidents. The Industrial Accident Commission in
California, for example, found 2% of all accidents involved women workers; women accounted
for 3% of accidents in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, while Massachusetts reported more
than 8% of their accident rate injured women. There were also approximately 25 million more
women who were unemployed, but who could still benefit from rehabilitation services. As The
Vocational Summary reported in 1921, the “woman who [was] injured in her home” has “as
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much right to the benefits of the law as the man whose physical disability is the result of his
work.”39
Disability was clearly not a gender exclusive status in the United States. Industrialization
brought with it new challenges, while exposing older issues within the polity. Men were the
primary breadwinners while women were to remain in the home. As the United States moved
toward an industrial economy in the late nineteenth century, working-class women found it more
difficult to remain at home; they ultimately sought employment in the expanding industrial order.
As historian Alice Kessler-Harris notes, it was a “fruitful time” for working-class women in the
Gilded Age, and they sought to transform the accepted “domestic code” and become full
members of the industrial workforce. One result of such a transformation was the rise of
industrial accidents, and, ultimately, increasing numbers of disabilities, among American
women.40
Women, however, tended to represent a small fraction of the disabled population that
sought rehabilitation services. Statistics showed they had reluctance to seek rehabilitation
benefits from the state. In Tennessee, for example, the first year of operation counted one woman
among its inaugural cohort of seven clients. That number, however, rose in the subsequent years.
In 1922, the state rehabilitated and returned eleven women to the workforce and enrolled 61 into
training programs; of the 289 clients that year, 21% were women. By 1925, female clients
accounted for 13% of the total number of people with disabilities rehabilitated through the
Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program; it was not until 1969 when women reported for
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nearly half of the client pool. Why were women so disproportionately represented in the disabled
population of the United States?41
Vocational rehabilitation, ideally, intended to aid those who were injured in industrial
accidents. In the 1920s, women were not employed in these heavy industries proportional to
men. Indeed, the Federal Board’s 1928 study of clients who underwent rehabilitation services
during the first five years of the program substantiated this point. The study found that women
amounted to 10.2% of the rehabilitated population; men, clearly, dominated the program. The
study’s authors responded to criticism about this apparent lack of female participation in the
“rehabilitation movement.” Critics, they asserted, argued that “the problem of the disabled
woman is being inadequately met.” The authors concluded that this was not a problem of the
program; rather, women were “not generally employed in the more hazardous industrial
occupations” and that, according to a breakdown of worker’s compensation claims, women
“were more apt than men to drop out of industrial life after a work accident.” Even though the
study reinforced the cultural understanding that women typically worked in non-hazardous
occupations, it noted that women were more likely to require rehabilitation services as a result of
“public accident or disease” rather than from an industrial accident.42
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Indeed, applications from women reflected this sentiment. Everyone who applied to the
rehabilitation program noted their disability and its cause. Women possessed a disproportionately
higher level of nonwork-related accidents and congenital disabilities. Verlyn Abbot, for example,
was a 23-year-old woman from Camden, Tennessee. Abbott wrote to Robert Bynum in October
1930 requesting information about the vocational rehabilitation program. She explained that, in
1925, her hip and shoulder were dislocated in a car wreck, which resulted in her inability to work
and make a living. Bynum informed an associate, O.P. Dobson, in West Tennessee to visit with
her and conduct the standard interview. Dobson noted Abbott’s “OK personality” and
recommended she be admitted to take courses in clerical and stenographic work, which were
authorized in November.43
Other women, such as Beulah Adams, acquired their disabilities through natural causes.
Adams, a 23-year-old from Memphis, noted that she was unable to hold down a job due
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dislocated bones in both feet that did not mature properly. In her application, Adams explained
how she had been working intermittently as a housekeeper, but that her condition did not permit
a permanent position. She sought vocational rehabilitation services with the hope of receiving
training in the clerical profession. The state authorized tuition and supplies for a course in
stenography from Draughon’s Junior College. According to state records, Adams completed her
eight-month course and became a stenographer for a local businessman.44
When the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program began, many states suffered from
inadequate staffing. The Federal Board counted the number of rehabilitation workers in 1936 and
found that 14 states had one employee, while the remaining states possessed between 2 and 30
professional rehabilitation workers, which totaled 205 nationally. It should, therefore, not be
surprising that states relied on associationalism to aid in the rehabilitation process for minority
groups as they had for the males in the client population. Women received much of their
rehabilitation attention from non-state actors. Pearl Abbot, for example, obtained referral,
interview, and supervision by Claude Toler, a local businessman and owner of Toler’s Business
School. She did not have any direct contact with Robert Bynum or his secretary during her
tenure with the vocational rehabilitation program. Toler oversaw her training course, with
authorization from Bynum and payment from public funds, at his school and remained in
communication with the state on her progress.45
Other women had a more in-depth exposure to the associational state during their
rehabilitation program. In Ohio, an anonymous 19-year-old woman, who was crippled at the age
of three from a fall, was referred to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation by the secretary of
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the Red Cross Home Service. She worked in a children’s home watching over children “for her
room and board,” but she “wanted to qualify for a position as nursery governess.” Her
rehabilitation plan became a massive undertaking necessitating the cooperation of several
organizations and institutions. The Association for the Crippled and Disabled found an
opportunity for training and job placement at Rainbow Hospital in Cleveland. After several
months of training, this young woman was able to secure employment at the hospital. Shaw
concluded that “without the help of the Red Cross, the Association for the Crippled and
Disabled, and hospital authorities, we could not have accomplished this rehabilitation.” The
cooperation of private resources was requisite for the successful completion of rehabilitation
plans for women.46
Most female clients received rehabilitation plans within traditional women’s occupations.
Those who left industry due to a crippling disability, according to the Federal Board’s 1928
study, typically remained out of industry upon completion of their rehabilitation plans. Other
women, who did not work in heavy industrial occupations, sought similar vocational retraining,
such as Verlyn Abbott, Beulah Adams, and Pearl Abbot. Minnesota, for example, found most
women with handicaps to “possess oversensitive nerves,” which required them to be trained and
place in jobs with climates that were “pleasant, cheerful, and of a quieting nature.” Rehabilitation
workers “encouraged” their female clients to seek feminine vocations such as dressmaking, toy
making, retouching photographs, making jams, candlesticks, handkerchiefs, printing greeting
cards, or needlepoint.47
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Not all women returned to the workforce in these “pleasant” or “cheerful” vocations upon
completing their rehabilitation plans. Rehabilitation agents sought feminine jobs for their female
clients due to several companies not wanting to train or have women placed in their businesses.
Other companies acknowledged the contributions of women and how they were “responsible for
the comparatively small number” of workplace accidents due to their “natural caution.” General
Electric Company of Philadelphia favored female workers over their male counterparts due to
this very characteristic. They employed several female rehabilitation clients, but they were not
the only national business to do so. Goodwill Industries employed hundreds of women who
completed their rehabilitation plans. Founded by Methodist minister Edgar J. Helms, Goodwill
Industries championed the “industrial programs” for America’s disabled population, which,
according to historian Sarah Rose, “generally provided only limited piecework relief programs
for women.” People with disabilities, according to a 1947 U.S. Department of Labor study, were
2% more productive and more cautious while performing their duties than their “able-bodied”
peers.48
The Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program provided women the opportunity to
return to paid employment. The language of the law held that women could receive services even
if they were not injured on the job. This resulted in many women finding their way into the
industrial order and service industries for the first time. Though women were included in the
program, many were relegated to the care of the private sector. Cooperating businessmen and
organizations functioned as the intermediaries between women and state officials. After the New
Deal order’s consolidation of state power in the mid-1930s, state employed rehabilitation
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counselors took over the jobs of administering the program in the rural regions of the nation. The
associational state remained intact, however, with respect to rehabilitation plans. Local
businesses and organizations continued to refer applicants to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation and oversee job training in their industries, but they were no longer permitted to
act in an administrative capacity.
Race and Rehabilitation
Disability did not discriminate among Americans. The staggeringly high number of
industrial accidents in the early twentieth century contributed to the spike in physical disabilities
among Americans between the World Wars. To help mitigate this rising number, Congress
enacted the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program. As the Smith-Fess Act explained,
vocational rehabilitation was “established, free of charge, to any man or woman, who has been
incapacitated by some injury” which rendered them incapable “to pursue their former
occupation” and earn a living. There was no mention of racial qualifications barring African
Americans from seeking services.49
African Americans, especially those with disabilities, found it difficult, at best, to exist
within white society during the early twentieth century. The legal order created by Jim Crow
laws that the United States Supreme Court sanctioned in 1896, consigned African Americans to
second-class citizenship. The emerging welfare state in the early twentieth century offered
African Americans a chance to stake a claim and forge a new social presence through economic
mobility. In order to secure their freedom, it became necessary for African Americans to prove
their economic worth, both to themselves and to their white peers; therefore, the ability to work
and make a living, independent of any outside help, was a prerequisite to true freedom. If a
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person was unable to work, he was incapable of exercising his independence. Rehabilitation,
therefore, facilitated the opportunity for African Americans to negotiate benefits from the state,
while also maintaining their independent status from it.50
The shifting economic structure of the nation, during the Gilded Age, negatively
impacted African Americans and their relationship to the state, especially in the South. White
southerners believed the violence and crime in their states emerged from the uncontrolled masses
of African American vagrants moving from municipality to municipality. Several states and
cities adopted statutes, beginning in the 1890s, to restrict their movements. As historian Edward
Ayers notes, these laws targeted “vagrancy, contract evasion, and labor agents” which resulted in
African Americans being held “at the mercy of local police and courts.” Judges and sheriffs,
sensing a rise in costs with the incarceration of so many vagrants, chose to lease black convicts
to local businesses who “had no incentive to treat the convicts with anything other than enough
care to keep them alive and working.” This lack of humane treatment resulted in an untold
number of industrial accidents, which produced significant levels of disabilities.51
The relationship between African Americans and disability emerged from the
Reconstruction Era. After the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
historians noted a spike in admittance in state-run institutions for the “colored insane.” Slavery
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prevented African Americans from falling victim to certain conditions of the mind and body.
Historian Kim Nielsen notes the example of Dr. J.F. Miller and his diagnosis about the upsurge
in insanity cases was due, in no small part, to the circumstances of emancipation. Miller
concluded that emancipated slaves were more prone to intellectual defects due to the “innate
weaknesses of the black body and mind.” The belief that newly-freed African Americans were
more susceptible to disabilities led to the explosion of new state institutions in the South. These
were segregated spaces where patients were essentially warehoused to keep them out of
society.52
In terms of level of care, it ought to come as no surprise that African Americans received
a lower quality than their white peers. Physicians tended to take very scant medical histories of
these patients, being more inclined to disregard or discount a greater amount of their
symptomatic complaints. Moreover, as historian John Hughes has noted, black Americans were
treated by inexperienced medical professionals or even those who had been barred from
practicing medicine on white patients. Black institutions, or those with segregated wings for
people of color, were severely understaffed and underfunded. Nielsen demonstrates how the
mortality rates at these “colored institutions” were disproportionately higher than their white
counterparts. Though African Americans were not admitted to state institutions with as many
conditions as white Americans, they still experienced greater suffering in the long-term.53
Vocational rehabilitation came with the promise that any American who fit the admitting
criteria could receive benefits from the state. The Smith-Fess Act did not mandate any form of
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non-discrimination policy within its framework, but it also did not prohibit African Americans
from benefitting from the program. Despite the acceptance of black Americans into the public
rehabilitation program, the associational state actually oversaw their rehabilitation plans and job
placement. Rehabilitation officials relegated the discovery and interview process for African
American applicants to local businessmen and organizations. The associational state, therefore,
was an integral part of the rehabilitation enterprise for African Americans.
Though the vocational rehabilitation program accepted African American clients, they
presented a new challenge for rehabilitation officials and auxiliaries. The most important aspect
for vocational rehabilitation was its ability to secure employment for its clients. Able-bodied
African Americans faced immense difficulty in parts of the country when it came to finding
long-term employment; disabled African Americans were even more disadvantaged in obtaining
wage work. Moreover, black Americans were vastly underrepresented in the disabled population
that sought rehabilitation services. The Federal Board’s 1928 study of the first five-year period
of the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program corroborated this conclusion. It found that of
6,391 rehabilitated Americans, African Americans made up a meager 5% of those surveyed. The
authors of the study reasoned that this was “due to the fact that in general the field of
employment for the negro is limited.”54
Black Americans with disabilities remained a significant minority within the
rehabilitation community. National statistics did not start differentiating between race until 1935,
but individual states broke these categories down earlier. The State of North Carolina, for
example, reported 90 clients for the fiscal year 1925-1926, of which 24 (27%) were African
Americans. North Carolina’s statistic reflected the national trend going into the 1930s and
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beyond. In 1935, for example, the Federal Board posted that 9,422 Americans with disabilities
were rehabilitated nationwide. Of that total, African Americans amounted to 382 or 4% of
clients. Between 1935 and 1950, African Americans continued making strides within the
rehabilitation program, but their numbers did not crest more than 13% of the total number of
clients each year. Statistically speaking, vocational rehabilitation was primarily a white man’s
policy.55
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Indeed, black Americans were limited in their employment outlook, even with the
completion of a rehabilitation plan. Racism played an integral role in the social landscape of the
United States during the interwar period, especially in the South. In 1924, for example, Homer
Stanton, Vocational Rehabilitation Director of North Carolina, wrote to the Richmond Beauty
School inquiring about placing some of North Carolina’s vocational rehabilitation clients within
their institution. The school reported favorably to taking on some of Stanton’s clients and
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provided pricing of supplies and curriculum details. It did, however, mention that it was a whiteonly institution and would not entertain the thought of placing black students. In Tennessee,
Robert Bynum found job training for the state’s black rehabilitation clients at Martin’s Barber
College in Memphis, an institution which touted itself as “America’s Only Colored Barber
College.” Due to the limited nature of vocational trades available to African Americans, Martin’s
Barber College received rehabilitation students from Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. 56
African American clients depended on the associational state for access and dispersal of
rehabilitation benefits. In 1926, for example, George Anderson applied to the state for
rehabilitation services. The young father of four lost his right hand while working for the
Southland Cotton Company. The Tennessee Division of Workman’s Compensation offered him
$8.25 per week for 56 weeks. Once that time expired, Anderson and his family faced economic
uncertainty. An official from the Workman’s Compensation division referred him to the state
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation for training and job placement. At the time, the state did
not have a local office in Memphis, where Anderson lived, and his case was bound over to
Frances Shields of the Memphis Junior League. Shields concluded that Anderson met the criteria
for rehabilitation and recommended that he be accepted to the program. Shields and Anderson
worked together to formulate his rehabilitation plan. Since he possessed little education,
Anderson chose to pursue a career as a house painter. Service industry jobs, such as painting,
were common for African American clients. Moreover, black Americans relied on the
cooperation between the state and the private sector for their access to rehabilitation services.57
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The aid of the Junior League went beyond acting as intermediary between clients and the
state office in Nashville. Many of the African American applicants referred to the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation were unable to read or write. Applications for those who could not
write were filled out by Junior League members. Shedrich Cullighan, for example, was a 28year-old African American male who lost his left leg as the result of a car accident, which
prohibited him from returning to work as a road grader. Cullighan never attended a school and
could not write. The Junior League filled out his application and then referred him to Bynum’s
office. The director noted Cullighan’s vocational ability, writing “feasible” on the top of his
application. Cullighan’s rehabilitation plan did not require much on the part of the state; he
sought help in acquiring a prosthetic leg and job restoration with his old occupation. Bynum
wrote to Shields explaining that the state would cover the cost of his artificial leg, but that he was
unsure if job restoration was feasible. Not once did Bynum deal with Cullighan directly, but
always through the Junior League.58
Cases like Anderson and Cullighan were common for black clients in the interwar period.
Rehabilitation agents encouraged their black clients to choose vocational training in the service
industries if they were not physically capable of returning to their previous occupations. Though
vocational rehabilitation could send its clients to school for higher education, African Americans
with disabilities were limited in these pursuits. It was not solely due to racism, though that surely
played a significant role, but more because of admission requirements. Many African Americans
did not possess the high school education required for university admission. Despite this, some
rehabilitation counselors secured educational courses for their clients. Caleb McKnight, for
example, was one such case. In 1925, he lost his right arm “below the elbow and near middle

Shedrich Cullighan, “Application for Vocational Rehabilitation,” March 6, 1929; Bynum to Frances Shields, April
1, 1929, TSLA, Department of Education Records, Record Group 273, Microfilm Reel 174.
58

202

forearm.” North Carolina’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation made arrangements for
McKnight to attend a local “A&T College…to take a course in poultry raising.” Even though
McKnight gained admission to an educational institution, he was relegated to learning the
poultry trade. The theme of African American rehabilitation clients being trained in the service
industry or agriculture was common during the era. Other clients, such as John Moore and
Claude Chavis, were trained and placed at Banner Motor Company Paint Shop or in a small
“fiber weaving” shop making chairs, respectively.59
A survey of rehabilitation clients from the late 1920s and early 1930s reflected this
theme. The list of clients rehabilitated and placed in new jobs covered a wide range of vocations.
Black clients were, however, disproportionately placed into service industry or agricultural
positions. Johnnie Woodley, for example, became a bushelman while John J. Bland was trained
as a shoe repairman. Louise Wilson received “training in dressmaking” and employed as a
seamstress for “nurses in Lincoln Hospital.” These clients were listed alongside their white
counterparts in the ledgers of all rehabilitation clients. While African American clients obtained
placement in service industry jobs, their white peers received training as stenographers, a radio
technician, secretarial work, or attended college.60
White Americans with disabilities clearly had the advantage with the distribution of job
possibilities during the interwar era. By the 1940s, some states introduced industry newsletters
that included referral cards. Tennessee published the Tennessee Vocational Rehabilitation News,
beginning in the mid-1940s, and the back page always included a referral card. It stated that if
the reader knew of someone who could benefit from rehabilitation services, independent of race,
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they ought to fill out the card and return it to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation for
follow-up, noting that “any citizen 14 or over, white of colored, will be investigated.” In the first
issue of the newsletter, the card appeared, ironically, below an advertisement for the Hospital for
Crippled Adults, a private institution where “any white adult” could receive treatment for
physical disabilities free of charge. There was clear conflict between the state and the private
sector in the Jim Crow South.61

The newsletter, furthermore, chronicled the daily activities of vocational rehabilitation
clients. In a series of photographs, the publication demonstrated how clients, both black and
white, were trained and in what occupations they could obtain a job. In none of these photos,
however, were African Americans and white Americans shown to be working together. Black
clients were relocated to urban centers of states such as Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia for
their training while their white counterparts found local accommodations. Despite the illusion of

61

Tennessee Vocational Rehabilitation News, vol. 1, no. 4 (September 1947), 8.

204

welfare equality across the South, segregation was still well entrenched and not about to be
eroded anytime soon.62
Rehabilitation officials had to contend as well with a legacy of violence and mistrust held
by African Americans in the South toward state authority. The widespread use of the convictlease system and the tremendous efforts utilized by state and local authorities to keep African
Americans from migrating out of the region during the World War I era coupled with the low
numbers of black clients suggests that they were apprehensive in pursuing state rehabilitation
services. Indeed, in a 1919 United States Department of Labor report, R.H. Leavell concluded
that African Americans were “suspicious of everything that the white man does.” They had
historical precedent guiding them. Between 1915 and 1930, town and county officials forced
thousands of unemployed African Americans onto cotton plantations out of fear of losing a
cheap source of labor. In other states, such as Mississippi, local and state police routinely
harassed any black American who was buying a train ticket; the situation in Greenville,
Mississippi, for example, was much more violent. Here, police stopped trains and forcefully
removed any African American passengers whom they felt were fleeing. The limited
rehabilitation of African Americans during the interwar period was not due solely to racism, but
more of a combination of racism and apprehension.63
Ultimately, the success of the civilian vocational rehabilitation program has been
questioned by several scholars over the years. As historian Sarah Rose notes, vocational
rehabilitation’s limitations notwithstanding, it did “manage to provide some disabled people with
a small level of income.” Despite the levels of success, it cannot be denied that it was a popular
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program, embraced by tens of thousands in less than a generation. States found the program
worthwhile and consistently outspent congressional appropriations each year, even during
uncertain economic times. In 1926, for example, for every one dollar of federal money, states
spent on average $1.19 in matching funds. The social consequences of rehabilitation were,
perhaps, more significant than the simple economic gains. Americans with disabilities used the
rehabilitation program as a means to regain their independent, breadwinner status. For many
white women, it restored them to wage-earning employment, some for the first time. African
Americans, though underrepresented, utilized the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program as
an opportunity to stake a claim for economic citizenship.64
Americans with disabilities possessed the perception of being incomplete or in need of
some form of medical intervention. The predominant medical model argued that disability was a
flaw that required correction by medical experts. Rehabilitation offered a different, more positive
alternative to the typical institutionalization of people with disabilities. They could now learn to
work within the limitations of their disabilities, rather than in spite of them. The program
contributed to the release of several from institutions and the removal of thousands from welfare
relief rolls. Municipalities had attempted to remove “unsightly beggars” who were the products
of the socially disrupting forces of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Disability in
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century was characterized as a “civic contagion” that
needed a cure. Rehabilitation became that cure and trained these beggars to make them
productive citizens within the American community.65
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Despite these positives, the program did not serve as a “catch-all” safety net nor propel
people with disabilities into economic prosperity. Some scholars criticized the program as being
a failure due to the lack of economic prosperity among Americans with disabilities. The policy,
however, targeted a specific subset of the population: people with physical disabilities. While
their numbers amounted around four million nationwide in the late-1920s, the vocational
rehabilitation program served a mere fraction. This was due to several factors such as age, type
of disability, employment feasibility, and intellectual capacity for training. Vocational
rehabilitation was never meant to be a harbinger of social mobility. It was not a means to
complete economic equality; rather, it was a way to get people with disabilities back to work and
trained in a skill in which they could, over time, earn a living. In other words, the program served
to get people back on their feet and, after that, it was up to them to seize the opportunities
presented to them. Rehabilitation became the crossroads between American individualism and
the welfare state. At government expense, people with disabilities were trained in a skill which
allowed them to go on and reclaim their lost economic independence.66
The road to self-support was not paved by the state alone. There were many private
organizations and prominent business leaders who lent their assistance to the federal-state
program. The cooperation between the private sector and the state facilitated the widespread
access to rehabilitation services for those groups who were marginalized by race, gender, or
geography. The limited staff of the state rehabilitation programs relied on the private sector’s
continued support for referrals, interviews, development of rehabilitation plans, and job
placement. In the overwhelmingly rural states, such as those in the South, the associational state
formed the administrative bridge between the applicant and the government. State employees
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routinely deferred to the judgement of these non-state actors when presented with cases from the
peripheral regions of the state. Moreover, the state programs depended on associational
relationships with private businesses and institutions for the training and job placement of their
clients. Even after the New Deal order reconfigured the associational state and pushed non-state
actors out of administrative roles, state-employed rehabilitation counselors pursued private
training and placement for clients.
As the country entered World War II in December 1941, rehabilitation took a more
center-stage position. A new round of veterans would soon return, coupled with the thousands
injured in the industrial army, in service to the United States. The war required a massive labor
force to prosecute, and the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program was integral to that
success. The need for labor was so great that Congress, in 1943, adopted the Barden-LaFollette
Act, which expanded vocational rehabilitation services to those with intellectual disabilities. This
resulted in the first wave of deinstitutionalization. Rehabilitation was there to transition these
Americans with disabilities back into the civilian labor force, ensuring the stability of the road to
self-support.
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Epilogue
“Challenged but Never Defeated”:
The Expansion of Vocational Rehabilitation and the Associational State
On a humid day in August 2013, a group of sixty-four students lined up to “take the court
in the game of life” and receive their diplomas at the summer commencement ceremony in
Smyrna, Tennessee. They were no ordinary graduates. Up to this point, they were clients of the
Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation (CVR) program. These sixty-four individuals, hailing from
vastly different parts of the state and facing different challenges, underwent the right of passage
from education into the professional world. They did not do this alone. One graduate, Jacob
Weaver diagnosed with Pervasive Development Disorder, explained how his experience at the
Tennessee Rehabilitation Center, one of only eight comprehensive training centers in the nation,
helped him to master life skills and prepare him for employment. The class speaker, Justin
Woods who “has a form of Autism that hinders communication skills,” praised his teachers and
the work they put in to ensuring each student came out with an individualized training
experience.1
The successes of Jacob Weaver and Justin Woods built upon those of their predecessors
from graduating classes. In 2011, Cory Nelms graduated from the Tennessee Rehabilitation
Center’s Transitional Living Skills program. This path affords high school students, enrolled in
Rutherford County Schools, a dual enrollment option to help prepare them for independent adult
life. The training course teaches students how to balance a checkbook and maintain finances,
operate a motor vehicle, and, even, develop personal relationships. Though initially reluctant,
Nelms’ mother, Becky Souviron, praised her son’s accomplishment. “Because of this, he’s
learned more about the ability he has.” Parental uncertainty was an issue for several students.
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Terry Burnett, who works as a job coach, explained that “families are apprehensive” about their
loved ones attending a program like this at such a young age, but “once the kids get involved,
they become more independent.”2
The experiences of Jacob Weaver, Justin Woods, and Cory Nelms, though typical in the
present day, were not possible until the latter decades of the twentieth century. The CVR
program, as it was understood and legally defined prior to World War II, did not have
accommodations for Americans with intellectual challenges. Many of these Americans with
disabilities dwelled within the walls of institutions, which acted more as warehouses than places
of long-term care. This line of thinking began to change in late 1942 as the United States became
fully involved with the Second World War. World War II provided the catalyst for the expansion
of vocational rehabilitation services for both veterans and civilians, an expansion which
reinvigorated the partnership between the state and private sector.3
As the United States began sending troops to Europe and the Pacific, it quickly became
clear that the nation’s labor supply needed reinforcements. The country sent approximately
eleven million Americans into war; many occupied positions integral to the war effort before
they left for the frontlines. The government called on those who remained on the home front to
fill these vacant roles while making significant sacrifices. Federal officials, such as Wayne Coy
of the Federal Security Agency (FSA), panicked over where war industries could pull sufficient
labor even before the events of Pearl Harbor. People with disabilities, however, occupied a tough
spot. According to historian Kim Nielsen, several national employment programs, prior to the
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war, labored under the assumption that people with disabilities “did not and could not work for
wages.” These assumptions, however, possessed no empirical proof. Industrial leaders and
governmental officials also had to address the compounding issue of rising accident rates among
the war industries. Historian Andrew Kersten notes how “it was safer for Americans to be on the
battlefront” than to work in the war industries. With the labor crisis of the war, the government
urged private industries to hire people with disabilities. The government’s message was wellreceived; in 1940, there were only 28,000 Americans with disabilities working in the war
industries. By 1945, however, that number had grown to approximately 300,000. How could
such a spike in the number of people with disabilities, in such a short time, be explained?
Congress looked to the expansion of vocational rehabilitation services during World War II as
the solution to the labor shortage question.4
Expanding Services, Expanding Rights
The experience of World War II felt eerily similar to that of the First World War a
generation earlier in terms of Americans falling short of fulfilling their civic duties. Just like the
problems that Homer Cummings confronted in 1917-1918 regarding American draftees being
unfit for military service, the same was also true for Lewis Hershey, Director of the Selective
Service Board during World War II. In the early autumn of 1941, Hershey expressed his
concerns in a letter to First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. He explained how there were several
individuals called into service by the draft “who did not meet the physical and mental standards
prescribed by the Army.” Like Cummings, Hershey concluded there needed to be a
governmental program that could train those “unfit” for military service to engage with the war
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effort in heavy industries. Though unlike Cummings’ situation, the federal government in 1941
possessed such a program with a fully staffed bureaucracy to support it.5
In response to Hershey’s dire circumstance, the federal government took action to
alleviate the concern. FDR instructed his FSA director, Paul McNutt, to craft a plan to expand
vocational rehabilitation services to those Americans deemed unfit for military service. In 1941,
the CVR program operated much as it did in 1931; the major difference was an increased annual
federal allotment and permanence within the federal bureaucracy. The states continued to take
the lead in daily operations, even though the Federal Board for Vocational Education (FBVE)
had the final word on each matter. As McNutt noted to the president, the current structure of the
CVR program was not conducive to the reforms required for the nation to prosecute the war
effort properly. These reforms, as McNutt explained, required congressional action and that
“amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation Act would be necessary.”6
Congress convened on January 7, 1943 and took up a slate of bills its various members
filed. Taking McNutt’s concerns seriously, Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., a Progressive from
Wisconsin, filed S. 180, which called on the expansion of vocational rehabilitation services “to
persons disabled while members of the armed forces, or disabled in war industries or otherwise.”
La Follette’s bill included the phrase, “and other certain persons,” which became defined as
people with intellectual disabilities. The inclusion of such language was revolutionary in the
expansion of rehabilitation services. The senator’s bill echoed that of his colleague,
Representative Graham Barden (D-NC), which called for a similar expansion of rehabilitation
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services. Barden originally introduced his bill, H.R. 7484, in 1941, which had the backing of the
National Rehabilitation Association (NRA), but Congress effectively tabled it. The NRA, though
reduced in its influence among federal and state officials by the 1940s, still retained its lobbying
power among policymakers. In August 1942, Barden reintroduced his legislation, which was a
mirror image of La Follette’s bill, and this time he was not alone in this endeavor.7
Interestingly enough, California Republican Bertrand W. Gearhart, who identified as a
strong conservative, joined both Barden, a southern Democrat, and La Follette, a midwestern
Progressive, in their effort. On July 17, 1942, a month before Barden’s reintroduction, Gearhart
filed H.R. 7396, which called for the “vocational rehabilitation and return to civil employment of
disabled persons” released from the armed forces. Though his version did not go as far as
Barden’s bill, Gearhart recognized that the current structure of rehabilitation needed amending if
it was to cope with the spike in returning soldiers. The call for rehabilitation expansion was,
therefore, popular among policymakers with members of all three major caucuses independently
introducing legislation to expand access to vocational rehabilitation services. The different bills
outlined competing approaches, but their goals were the same.8
On March 5, 1943, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor initiated hearings for
the Barden-La Follette bill. In the course of the hearings, Senator Burton Wheeler (D-MT)
introduced several letters and telegrams opposing the Barden-La Follette bill. Several veterans’
groups in Montana, including the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW),
urged Wheeler to vote down the bill due to its inclusion of civilians. Indeed, the Barden-La
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Follette bill combined both veterans and civilians into one proposal to expand rehabilitation
benefits. Veterans’ groups grew concerned that the inclusion of civilians injured in the war
industries could potentially lead to veterans’ service to the nation being eclipsed. Omar B.
Ketchum, a national representative of the VFW, explained that his and “other veteran
organizations are not opposed to vocational rehabilitation of industrial workers,” but that they
were united and “unalterably opposed to the inclusion of such persons in a bill which covers the
rehabilitation of war veterans.” In other words, Ketchum hinted, civilians and veterans were two
different classes of Americans and should not be intermingled.9
The veteran-civilian divide aside, the Barden-La Follette bill received a favorable verdict
from the Committee on Education and Labor. Committee members agreed on a compromise to
leave both populations, veterans and civilians, within a combined bill. The Office of Vocational
Rehabilitation retained control over civilian clients while veterans were placed under the
direction of the Bureau of Veteran Affairs. On the Senate floor, the bill garnered significant
attention from senators of both political ideologies, this time over the terms of the rehabilitation
expansion. The Barden-La Follette bill called for complete public support of physical restoration.
Proponents argued the inclusion of such a provision was needed due to the national emergency
of World War II. Medical treatment, as a part of vocational rehabilitation services, “must be
particularly emphasized in speedily placing large numbers” of people with disabilities “in
productive employment.” The Smith-Fess Act prohibited federal funding toward medical
treatments in an effort to appease the American Medical Association; the Barden-La Follette bill
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made clarification of this provision and explained that under the current crisis, federal dollars
could be used for such endeavors.10
Moreover, the Barden-La Follette bill resurrected the partnership between the state and
the private sector. Associationalism suffered a major setback in the years immediately preceding
World War II. With respect to the CVR program, the FBVE intervened and placed significant
constraints on the movements of non-state actors. Private organizations, such as the Junior
League or the Rotary Club, as well as private businessmen, such as Claude Toler, were pushed
out of the daily rehabilitation administration. The onset of World War II brought with it a change
in policy. In Section 7 of the Barden-La Follette bill, the authors realized the importance of the
associational state in implementing federal policy on the local level. These policymakers,
furthermore, explained that state rehabilitation departments were ill-equipped to handle the
influx in both civilian and veteran applicants. Therefore, the bill included a measure which
authorized the FSA administrator to “enter into agreements with other public and private
agencies, persons, and institutions for the use of their facilities and to compensate them for such
use.” In other words, the war effort required the FBVE to engage in associational cooperation
once again; however, Congress did provide the federal agency with more oversight power.11
This language granted congressional approval of the work associationalism provided to
the execution of the CVR program. States could now fully rely on private agencies and
institutions to aid them in the rehabilitation process. Tennessee, for example, depended on the
private companies to train and, then presumably, hire their clients for work in the war industries.
The state placed 503 clients into war industries positions in 1943, with the largest group (45%)
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being employed in industrial jobs, such as mechanics, welders, engineers, and draftsmen. A
further 18% were trained and placed in factory jobs, which included riveting and assembly of
war equipment. Interestingly, 4% were rehabilitated and placed in active duty in the armed forces
as either combat soldiers or bombardiers. This reinforces the idea that the U.S. military held a
vital interest in the rehabilitation of those previously deemed unfit for military service in 1940.12
The Barden-La Follette Act (also referred to as the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1943) became law on July 7, 1943, after President Franklin Roosevelt signed it. The finalized
Act sorted out the funding and coverage issues raised by members of Congress and private
lobbying groups. It maintained both veterans and civilians within one law, but placed their
administrations within their appropriate agency. Funding for Americans with disabilities seeking
rehabilitation increased, but, perhaps more importantly, funding for training rehabilitation
counselors appeared for the first time. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1943 provided
federal dollars to train rehabilitation professionals, which allowed for individual state programs
to expand their staff to accommodate the large influx of new clients. Moreover, the Act outlined
a new funding system for rehabilitation. The federal government covered all expenses for the
“rehabilitation of the war disabled,” fifty percent of the cost of civilian rehabilitation, and,
finally, the “entire expense of guidance and placement services.”13
Barden’s and La Follette’s legislative measure redefined the client pool for vocational
rehabilitation. The two lawmakers successfully included the eligibility of all Americans with
disabilities. For the first time, the CVR program covered both physical and intellectual
disabilities. As Mary Switzer, the first woman commissioner and director of the federal Office of
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Vocational Rehabilitation, explained years later, the Barden-La Follette Act was “farseeing, and,
for those days, revolutionary.” People with intellectual disabilities were not considered feasible
for rehabilitation in the early 1920s; however, with the crisis of the war and the need for labor,
policymakers understood that some of these higher-functioning people, who mostly resided
within institutions, could be trained to perform some tasks. Much of the credit for the inclusion
of America’s “mentally retarded” population for rehabilitation services went to Dr. Winfred
Overholzer, a member of the American Legion and director of Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital in
Washington, DC. Overholzer worked alongside state-level directors Mark Walter of
Pennsylvania and Paul Barrett of Georgia to get this often-neglected population included in the
new legislation. The Barden-La Follette Act not only expanded rehabilitation services to more
Americans with disabilities, it also called into question the very nature of citizenship.14
Despite the inclusion of Americans with intellectual disabilities within the new
vocational rehabilitation legislation, there was only a small percentage who took part in claiming
these new benefits. In an article, published in the Journal of Educational Research in 1965,
education professor Wallace Wallin argued that even with such access, many people with
“psychiatric challenges” did not flock to the CVR program as had been hoped. Indeed, as Wallin
found, the first few years after the passage of the Barden-La Follette Act produced a scant
number of participants with intellectual disabilities. Between 1944 and 1947, the CVR program
successfully rehabilitated and placed 580 people with intellectual disabilities; that number
increased to 5719 by 1956, a full thirteen years after the program began accepting and training
Americans with intellectual disabilities, a mere “drop in the bucket,” according to Wallin. He
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reasoned the low numbers were due to a lack of knowledge on the part of parents and local
institutions that such services were available. In 1957, after “persistent demands of parents’
groups and more liberal government support,” the FBVE reported that 1,094 clients with
intellectual disabilities completed a rehabilitation plan and were placed in remunerative
employment, many for the first time in their lives.15
As the 1950s gave way to the 1960s, more Americans with intellectual disabilities took
advantage of vocational rehabilitation. Due to this increase in numbers, rehabilitation centers
popped up all over the country in order to address the new client pool. These centers served to
meet the needs of people with all types of disabilities. The facilities already in existence were
found to neglect people with intellectual disabilities. They lacked adequate medical treatment
facilities, psychological and social services, as well as vocational training tailored toward those
with intellectual challenges. Acting through a federal grant furnished by the Office of Vocational
Rehabilitation, the School of Architecture at the Pennsylvania State University “developed a
guide for architects” who designed rehabilitation centers. The OVR recognized the need for a
standardized approach to constructing new rehabilitation facilities. To this end, associationalism
played a significant role in the construction of facilities and the research behind rehabilitation
techniques from counselors and facility administrators.16
The expansion of rehabilitation services also coincided with growing sentiment among
people with disabilities toward claiming their civil rights. Beginning during the height of World
War II, people with physical disabilities pushed for more exposure of their situation and, led by
Paul Strachan and the American Federation of the Physically Handicapped (AFPH), successfully
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lobbied President Harry Truman to declare the first National Employ the Physically Handicapped
Week in 1945. For Strachan, disability was not a question of welfare programs or rehabilitation;
rather, it was a question of civil rights. The AFPH championed equal rights for Americans with
physical disabilities. Americans with intellectual disabilities were not counted among Strachan’s
organization. This group, though the expansion of vocational rehabilitation helped bring some
out of the institutions, did not receive much focus until the mid-1960s, despite the passage of the
National Mental Health Act of 1946.17
Similar to the African American Civil Rights Movement, the Disability Rights Movement
began as a series of court decisions. In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia circuit’s Judge David Bazelon issued his ruling in Rouse v. Cameron, which
declared that people could only be placed in hospitals for treatment and not for punishment.
Americans with intellectual disabilities could not be housed indefinitely within these institutions;
such indefinite, involuntary holding of American citizens violated the Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act of 1964. The core of Bazelon’s ruling held that indefinite hospitalizations of
people with intellectual disabilities violated their basic civil rights. The court found violations of
due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protection.18
The Rouse decision opened a judicial floodgate for the remainder of the 1960s and spilled
over into the 1970s. In a series of rulings, federal courts held that Americans with psychiatric
disabilities were entitled to the same due process rights as their “able-bodied” peers. Courts
declared that disability did not constitute an abridgement of civil rights. These decisions laid the
legal foundation for the Deinstitutionalization Movement of the 1970s. Thousands of patients
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were released into society in order to forge their own path. The National Council on Disability
(NCD) noted in a 1996 report that the federal government counted 195,000 Americans with
intellectual disabilities living within public and private institutions in 1967, shortly after the
Rouse decision came down; however, by 1992, shortly after the Americans with Disabilities Act
became law, the NCD counted only 78,000 left within institutions. The Deinstitutionalization
Movement rested on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Youngberg v. Romeo that a person had the
right to refuse medical treatment, “regardless of defects or convictions,” if they so wished. In the
eyes of the law, Americans with disabilities, intellectual or otherwise, maintained all their civil
rights regardless of condition.19
In an effort to enshrine the rights of Americans with disabilities, Congress debated the
passage of the Rehabilitation Bill of 1972, which was the first to deal directly with the rights of
people with disabilities. The federal judiciary made their rulings based on interpretations of
existing law and the United States Constitution, but the Rehabilitation Bill’s aim was to make
these rights explicit. Much of the bill flew under the legislative radar, with only one part
receiving any attention. Section 504 of the bill was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
mandated that any program, public or private, receiving federal funding, was prohibited from
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discriminating against any person with a disability in terms of hiring or distributing social
benefits. Congress passed the bill, but President Richard Nixon vetoed it, citing great limitations
placed on the Executive Branch. Congress passed the bill again in 1973 after amending the bill to
address many of Nixon’s concerns.20
Rehabilitation Meets the Twenty-First Century
The Deinstitutionalization Movement proved to be a significant watershed moment for
the rights of Americans with disabilities. Once patients obtained their release from the hospitals
and other psychiatric institutions, they sought to claim their social and economic rights.
Rehabilitation centers had grown in number since the 1940s. By the 1950s, many had updated
their facilities to include both in-house and “day center” rehabilitation services. The Hartford
Rehabilitation Center of Hartford, Connecticut, for example, opened in 1948 as a day center,
which meant that clients did not reside at the center. The facility specialized in vocational
training for people with all types of disabilities. Under a heading for “Special Emphasis,” the
Hartford Rehabilitation Center listed “mentally retarded.” This meant that the facility could
handle clients with intellectual disabilities. Other facilities that were older tended to omit such a
label from their offerings. The rise of the rehabilitation center, however, provided an excellent
example of the resurrection of associationalism in the post-World War II era. Many of these
facilities were privately operated, but overseen by state rehabilitation officials.21
Some states began to construct their own rehabilitation facilities in the postwar era. The
model institution was the one found in Warm Springs, Georgia where President Franklin
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Roosevelt spent much of leisure time both before and during his presidency. In 1964, Tennessee
opened a new rehabilitation facility in Oak Ridge, a small town in East Tennessee made famous
for its contributions to the Manhattan Project. State officials described their accomplishment as
“such a fine center through community effort.” The new facility received financing from a
cooperative effort of a state appropriation, a county bond issue, and private donations. Though
the Oak Ridge facility was a significant step forward in bringing state services to more people,
the center was not comprehensive in its approach and remained disconnected from other
facilities around the state.22
The state moved to rectify this disjointed system of rehabilitation centers in the 1970s.
Tennessee’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, under the leadership of Edward Reece,
devoted much of their annual resources to transportation of clients from one location to another.
Reece urged the state legislature to provide funding for a new “comprehensive rehabilitation
center” at a centralized location. In response, legislators adopted a measure in 1973, which
established funds for the construction of a comprehensive rehabilitation center that served all
disabled citizens of the state regardless of geographical location. The Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation acquired a portion of the Sewart Air Force Base in 1975, which was part of a
federal downsizing effort in the mid-1970s. Using some creative construction and adaptive reuse
techniques, the newly christened Tennessee Rehabilitation Center (TRC) opened in 1977. The
facility operated for a few years before temporarily closing amidst a state investigation in 19811982. The TRC was the heart of a lawsuit filed by the parents of one of its students who alleged
the bureaucratic organizational structure and administrative pluralism among competing state
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agencies contributed to a limited vocational experience. As a result, TRC underwent a
reorganizational process and reopened to students and staff in May 1982.23
Rehabilitation centers could not, however, remain static in their approach to training
people with disabilities. As technology and understanding of the human body improved, the
techniques and service options expanded for these rehabilitation facilities. In the 1980s and early
1990s, for example, Tennessee experienced a higher-than-average number of applicants with
traumatic brain injuries (TBI). The issue was so pervasive that the Tennessee Legislature
established the Brain Injury Advisory Committee in 1993 as part of the Department of Health.
These clients required a specialized training plan. In 1994, the TRC took a risk and applied for a
federal/state grant in order to open a TBI program for the state’s rehabilitation clients.
Spearheaded by Cynthia Murdock and Joseph DiDomenico, the TBI program sought to provide a
more economical alternative to private-based rehabilitation centers. Murdock noted in the grant
proposal that it cost a TBI patient in the private sector approximately $70,000 for a full
rehabilitation course; she contended that a public TBI program, overseen by the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation, would cost only $14,000 which was a significant savings. In a
separate paper, Murdock and her colleagues argued that disability was “the nation’s number one
healthcare problem.” The expansion of services offered to those with TBI’s filled a growing need
within the rehabilitation community. The grant was approved and TRC began offering TBI
rehabilitation services on September 5, 1995.24
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The opening of the TBI program was a big deal for rehabilitation staff and counselors at
the TRC in the 1990s. Within the first year, the facility enrolled seventeen clients with a TBI. Of
that initial class, twelve successfully completed rehabilitation and were placed in a job lasting
longer than ninety days, which provided the TBI program a 71% success rate. By the autumn of
1996, referrals to the new TBI program increased 28% based on outreach from TRC evaluators
and counselors. The TBI program, moreover, relied on the surrounding community not only to
locate new clients, but also to provide training and employment opportunities. Successful
students were placed in a variety of employment positions from Sunshine Nursing Home to
Orange Grove Center to Ambassador Travel School. These employers were but a few of those
“who provided training and employment opportunities for individuals with traumatic brain
injuries.” Moreover, the TBI program staff reached out to the private sector to “conduct specific
job analysis and provide education about hiring employees with disabilities.”25
The TBI program represented the first push for the CVR program into the twenty-first
century. Beginning around 2006, rehabilitation facilities began admitting students diagnosed
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). By 2012, approximately a fifth of the student population
at TRC was on the spectrum. The emergence of autism, though not a radical development, took
rehabilitation counselors by surprise. Clients arrived at the TRC in Smyrna after graduating from
the public school system. Many simply had nowhere else to turn; autism spectrum disorder was
fairly new within vocational rehabilitation circles. Rehabilitation counselors and center
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psychologists had to adapt to the new demands made on them from a newly emerging group of
Americans with disabilities. As an internal memo from 2011 states, “no specialized programs
sponsored by the Tennessee Division of Rehabilitation Services” existed to “serve clients with
ASD.” Similar situations existed at other rehabilitation centers nationwide. The National
Consortium of State-Operated Comprehensive Rehabilitation Centers, the memo explains,
proceeded to examine the “vocational rehabilitation needs of individuals with ASD” and craft “a
report of best practices” to share with other centers nationwide.26
The increase in numbers of clients with ASD necessitated a change in rehabilitation
techniques and practices. Just as rehabilitation officials in the 1940s and 1950s adapted to the
inclusion of people with intellectual disabilities as entitled to rehabilitation services, so too did
contemporary rehabilitation staff. ASD required new steps to be taken in order to best serve this
emerging group of students. Employers needed extra training in how to interact with clients and,
ultimately, employees with ASD. Vocational rehabilitation counselors and job coaches aided
with such training. In 2013, for example, one of the TRC’s graduates, Steven Sheegog II, worked
closely with the local Lowe’s Home Improvement Store for his internship in the Jobs Program.
Sheegog completed his training in groundskeeping and was subsequently placed at the store.
Without the support of the local business and industrial community, individuals such as Sheegog
struggled to find long-term employment. Associationalism, though not as powerful as it was in
the interwar period, still played an integral role in vocational rehabilitation.27
The story of the Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation program began as a means to restore
Americans with disabilities back to the active workforce. Its purpose promoted American values
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of individualism and a strong work ethic. The program garnered great popularity among both
Republicans and Democrats since its inception in 1920; however, state officials did not
accomplish their goals alone. There were a host of private organizations and prominent
businessmen who took a special interest in the rehabilitation of America’s disabled population.
They saw how this program could be used as a conduit to mitigate a growing burden on state and
local welfare and charity rolls. A cost-benefit analysis of rehabilitation found it was far more
economical to retrain those injured in America’s growing industrial economy than it was to send
them to workhouses on the public expense.
Moreover, this story does not conclude with the passage of the Barden-La Follette Act.
Vocational rehabilitation expanded its services and, in doing so, adapted to meet the needs of a
new and large population. In the aftermath of the Deinstitutionalization Movement, the CVR
program responded with the construction of new facilities and techniques to address these new
clients. This project examined the origins and first wave of expansion between the two World
Wars. It has shown how associationalism played a role in implementing this policy, and it has
shown how associationalism shrank in the wake of the New Deal order. However, as has been
demonstrated, there is much more work required to paint an accurate picture of the Civilian
Vocational Rehabilitation program. The policy has shown great resilience in the face of political,
economic, social, and cultural forces; it may be repeatedly challenged but not defeated.
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